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CONTENTS

Frederick Sherwood Dunn and the American Study of International Relations — *William T. R. Fox* — 1

Changing Roles of the CPSU under First Secretary Khrushchev — *Howard R. Swearer* — 20

A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification — *Amitai Etzioni* — 44

The Rise of African Nationalism: The Case of East and Central Africa — *Robert I. Rotberg* — 75

Optimizing Military Assistance Training — *Charles Windle and T. R. Vallance* — 91

REVIEW ARTICLES

Middle Eastern Studies: A Review of the State of the Field with a Few Examples — *Manfred Halpern* — 108

U.S.-Allied Relations and the Atomic Bomb in the Second World War — *A. J. R. Groom* — 123

The Rationale of Japanese Surrender — *Harold Stein* — 138

On the Correct Handling of Contradictions — *Thomas Perry Thornton* — 151

German War Aims in the First World War — *Klaus Epstein* — 163

The Contributors — ii

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THE CONTRIBUTORS

WILLIAM T. R. Fox at various times between 1943 and 1951 was Research Associate and Assistant Director of the Yale Institute of International Studies, and served as Managing Editor of *World Politics* during its first five years of publication. He is now Professor of International Relations and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.

HOWARD R. SWEARER is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. In recent years he has published a number of articles on Soviet domestic affairs and is at present making a study of local governmental and party affairs in the USSR.

AMITAI ETZIONI is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and a staff member of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. His most recent publications are *The Hard Way to Peace* (1962) and *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (1961).

ROBERT I. ROTBERG teaches African history at Harvard University and is also a research associate of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. Having completed *A History of Tropical Africa*, to be published in the spring of 1963, he is working on a full-length study of "The Roots of Nationalism in East and Central Africa."

CHARLES WINDLE, until recently a member of the George Washington University Human Resources Research Office, is now with the Special Operations Research Office of the American University, where his chief interest lies in developing programs of human factors research for Army problems.

THEODORE R. VALLANCE, former Deputy Director of the Human Resources Research Office, is now Director of the Special Operations Research Office of the American University in Washington, D.C. He has taught social psychology at the University of Massachusetts and Miami University.

MANFRED HALPERN, Associate Professor of Politics in the Program of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, is also a consultant to The RAND Corporation and the Department of State. His book on *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* will appear in the summer of 1963.

A. J. R. GROOM, a former student at the University of London and Lehigh University, is now doing graduate work at the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva, where he is preparing a study of British thinking in regard to nuclear weapons.

HAROLD STEIN, Professor of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, is Research Director of the Twentieth Century Fund's Study of Civil-Military Relations. He is the co-author, with Walter Millis and Harvey C. Mansfield, of *Arms and the State* (1960) and both co-author and editor of *Civil-Military Decisions* (in press).

THOMAS PERRY THORNTON, a member of the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, was Visiting Research Associate of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University during 1961-1962. With C. E. Black, he is serving as co-editor of a forthcoming symposium on international communism and political revolution.

KLAUS EPSTEIN, Associate Professor of History at Brown University, is the author of *Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy* (1959). He is currently engaged in a study of the history of German conservatism from Möser to Hegel.

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FREDERICK SHERWOOD DUNN AND THE AMERICAN STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By WILLIAM T. R. FOX

"The great difference between foreign affairs in books and foreign affairs in action lies in this, that foreign affairs in action consists largely of doubts and confusion, of difficult choices based on insufficient knowledge and dimly perceived objectives, followed by the same thing all over again, whereas foreign affairs in books commonly appear as definite, orderly, and rational." —From an unpublished manuscript by Frederick S. Dunn, ca. 1942.

AS a legal officer in the Department of State in the 1920's, Frederick S. Dunn developed a curiosity about the decision-making process of which he was a part. The dissatisfaction which he felt with prevailing explanations of state behavior, and particularly with single-factor explanations, was the spur to a lifetime of scholarly activity.[1] His quest for greater knowledge relevant to the ordering and control of foreign affairs was to lead him successively to Johns Hopkins, Yale, and Princeton Universities and far afield from the methods and subjects of interest to his colleagues in international law; but there was a forty-year continuity of interest in a set of questions whose answers would lead to improved decision-making.[2]

Participation in the work of two international claims commissions had convinced him that legal considerations alone could neither ac-

[1] Frederick Sherwood Dunn (1893-1962) was born in New York City. He graduated from Princeton University in 1914 and took a law degree at New York University in 1917. He served in France in World War I in the A.E.F. as First Lieutenant in the Tank Corps. In the 1920's he was Assistant Solicitor in the Department of State. He was associate counsel in the American and British Claims Arbitration and attorney for the United States Agency in the Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Mexico. Professor Dunn took his Ph.D. degree at Johns Hopkins in 1928 and was from 1930 to 1935 executive secretary of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins and Creswell Lecturer in International Law at the same institution. In 1935 he became Professor of International Relations at Yale and from 1940 to 1951 was in addition Director of the Yale Institute of International Studies. Princeton University awarded him an LL.D. degree *honoris causa* in 1949, and in 1951 invited him to return as Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice and as Director of its new Center of International Studies. He retired in 1961 and during 1961-1962 taught a course in international relations at Bryn Mawr College.

[2] See, for example, his Introduction to *Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan*, to be posthumously published by Princeton University Press in 1963, in which there is a self-contained essay on the dilemmas and perplexities of the decision-maker in foreign affairs (pp. xii-xviii).

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count for nor provide the basis for predicting what would happen to a given claim. At Johns Hopkins University, Walter Wheeler Cook and his colleagues were finding a new understanding of municipal law and the legal process in their sociological jurisprudence. Frederick S. Dunn blazed the way for a similar development in international law in three monographic studies and several journal articles.[3]

He wrote that "The conventional idea of the legal process rests upon the assumption that it is possible to develop a body of rules and standards of conduct which will, if properly applied, normally yield one and only one answer to each new problem falling within its scope. It appears in fact that, in doubtful or novel cases, the existing body of rules and principles generously provides, not one, but two or more precepts logically applicable to the question at issue, each one leading to a different answer. How the selection is made between these competing precepts is the crucial point in every case, yet, under the prevailing view of the nature of the legal process, the method by which this selection is made remains a mystery."[4]

Throughout his career, Mr. Dunn also gave short shrift to other types of simplification, but particularly to those that suggest that evil or materialistic men have somehow come to occupy the key points of decision-making and have only to be turned out. He was severe in his judgment of Sumner Welles' *Where Are We Heading?* He knew Welles to be experienced and intelligent and obviously felt Welles' readers deserved better. In his words, ". . . what Mr. Welles has done is to fall into the ancient error of seeing a devil behind everything that is unsatisfactory in our relations with the rest of the world. His method of analysis is based on the implied assumption that if anything is amiss in our foreign affairs, it must be due to some stupidity or lack of knowledge or downright venality of some particular official. . . . The means of practical improvement in foreign affairs lie not so much in finding people to blame for what is unsatisfactory as in discovering new ways of mutual accommodation between the conflicting interests and viewpoints of independent states."[5]

Similarly, while paying due respect to John U. Nef for the historical scholarship in *War and Human Progress*,[6] he judged Nef also to have

[3] *The Practice and Procedure of International Conferences* (Baltimore 1928); *The Protection of Nationals* (Baltimore 1932); and *The Diplomatic Protection of Americans in Mexico* (New York 1933). See also the journal articles cited below for the 1927-1930 period.

[4] *Protection of Nationals*, 10.

[5] "Mr. Welles Dissents," *Yale Review*, xxxvi (Winter 1947), 343-44.

[6] Cambridge, Mass., 1950.

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neglected to mobilize the relevant social science findings by which he might have tested his belief that man had only to curb his passions to exorcise the evil spirit of war and bring peace.

> As a matter of fact, the Communist leaders have shown little concern over their comforts, their lusts or even over their lives. Their motivations cannot be explained in simple terms of human corruption or in the traditional categories of common sense. It is a false diagnosis which suggests that such people can be redeemed and made more pacific by being encouraged to exercise more freely the human faculties of love, craftsmanship and grace.
>
> Professor Nef gives little attention to the recent advances that have been made in the understanding of group behavior and the ways of influencing men's attitudes.[7]

Welles, the diplomatist, and Nef, the economic historian, had in their post-World War II writing, in Frederick S. Dunn's eyes, exhibited the kind of intellectual vice which he thought he had found in the lawyers of the post-World War I period. Whitehead, in his view, had described it very well: "The man with a method good for purposes of his dominant interests, is a pathological case in respect to his wider judgment on the coordination of this method with a more complete experience. . . . We all start by being empiricists. But our empiricism is confined within our immediate interests. The more clearly we grasp the intellectual analysis of a way regulating procedure for the sake of those interests, the more decidedly we reject the inclusion of evidence which refuses to be immediately harmonized with the method before us. Some of the major disasters of mankind have been produced by the narrowness of men with a good methodology."[8]

It was, however, the inadequacy of conventional modes of legal analysis *to answer the particular questions he was asking* to which, down to the mid-1930's, Professor Dunn addressed himself. Note that he never asserted the inappropriateness of the conventional analysis for the intellectual operation for which it was originally developed. He only denied that it helped him order, explain, predict, or control what went on in Foreign Offices. He did not, for example, find convincing an analysis of successor-state obligations which cited John Quincy Adams' statement of 1823 affirming Colombia's legal obligations as the successor state to Spain. Dunn knew that United States officials had earlier been as eager to divest themselves of successor-state obligations following the American Revolution as were Colombian officials follow-

[7] *Political Science Quarterly*, LXVI (June 1951), 303.

[8] A. N. Whitehead, *The Function of Reason* (1929), quoted in Dunn, *Protection of Nationals*, 4.

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ing Colombia's war of independence. "The law," he thought, could not account for both the earlier and the later American position.[9]

What then were the "unacknowledged factors that influence legal decisions"?[10] It would have been easy enough to say "self-interest"; but this slurred over for Professor Dunn the really interesting questions as to what selves happened to have what interests promoted and maintained by Foreign Office activity, and how an identifiable set of officials came to perceive those selves and those interests as the ones to be served. It also slurred over the even more interesting questions as to how these officials would have perceived those selves and those interests with greater and better-organized knowledge of the world environment in which they were acting and greater awareness of their own roles in serving those interests. Evidently, conventional ideas of self-interest provided no more of a basis than conventional ideas of law for developing rules and standards which, if properly applied, would normally yield one and only one answer to a problem falling within their scope. Although not a utopian, Dunn was a meliorist who believed that with greater knowledge and self-awareness Foreign Office officials would more often make choices which would have the consequences they expected and desired.

Writing before Adolf Hitler had shattered the Versailles order, Dunn could say:

> Wars and alliances and balances of power have the appeal of grandeur, and are the traditional preoccupation of diplomatists and of students of international relations. But the average foreign office official or diplomatist discovers, often to his surprise and pain, that there is given him little opportunity to exercise his mind and skill upon them. The subject-matter of his daily note-writing and his conferences is apt to be concerned primarily with the safeguarding of the interests of his fellow-citizens in their activities that extend beyond the borders of their own country.
>
> This is, of course, especially true of the United States. Owing to its isolated geographical position and its relative size, its officials are relieved of the necessity of thinking continuously about maintaining its security from attack by its neighbors. Its contacts with other nations originate primarily in the commercial and social activities of its citizens abroad, and, to a lesser extent, in the activities of citizens of other nations within its own territories. Its paramount interests in the field of international relations seem to be grouped around the preservation and advancement of these foreign activities of its citizens.[11]

[9] "The New International Status of the British Dominions," *Virginia Law Review*, XIII (March 1927), 376-77.

[10] This is the title of Chapter 6 of *Protection of Nationals*. [11] *Ibid.*, 12-13.

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This may seem to be a parochial viewpoint, considering the dramatic involvement of the United States in the high politics of the world less than ten years after he wrote. It was, however, an accurate description of what the officials were actually doing—or could have been doing, given the temper of American traditions and American public opinion regarding European involvements. For anyone with Professor Dunn's intellectual interests in improved policy-making, the contemporary literature on international relations which described and evaluated steps in American foreign policy in terms of progress toward or away from international government was largely irrelevant.

Frederick S. Dunn saw that legal concepts and precepts appropriate to interstate relations in the pre-Industrial Revolution world of relatively isolated communities where economic and social life were localized had to be modified to meet the needs for orderly intercourse of men whose persons, goods, funds, and ideas were in ever-increasing amounts crossing state boundaries.[12] Inevitably, legal norms were shaped by the dominant ideas of capitalist Europe, the home of the great states of the Western state system.

Thus, diplomatic protection could best be understood as a substitute for territorial conquest. It was a practice which harmonized the interests in trade and investment of the nationals of the great states and of the Europeanized part of the world with the interests of nationals of the lesser and non-European states in avoiding the extinction of their countries' sovereignty.[13] Nor did he doubt that the practice of diplomatic protection would be greatly changed if the non-European and non-capitalist states gained in power.

The first "unacknowledged factor" in the behavior of Foreign Office officials was then their failure to see as relative the standards of justice and reason which they asserted as absolutely binding on governments with whom some conflict had arisen. These standards were derived, Dunn concluded, from largely unexamined assumptions about the prevailing world order and the place of the official's own country in it. He proposed to help the decision-maker master the sources of his own ir-

[12] *Ibid.*, 28ff. Professor Dunn had earlier written that ". . . if we examine the cases in which the responsibility of states for injuries to aliens within their borders has been successfully invoked, we find that this minimum standard of justice is nothing more or less than the ideas which are conceived to be essential to a continuation of the existing social and economic order of European capitalistic civilization. . . . And so long as these states remain dominant in the international society, it is the fundamentals of their civilization which will determine the content of the standard of justice embodied in the international legal system."—"International Law and Private Property Rights," *Columbia Law Review*, XXVIII (February 1928), 175-76.

[13] *Protection of Nationals*, 355-58.

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rationality by exposing the role which intuition, prejudice, outworn postulates, doctrinaire methods, and hidden ethical concepts were actually playing.[14] Ideological blinders derived from stereotypes associated with nationality, class, and profession would be removed.

There were other unacknowledged factors more specifically associated with the holding of official position. In this "public office" category, Dunn included the distortions and irrationalities induced by the need to have some decision which one can subsequently justify and the consequent temptation to cite and to follow a convenient precedent without inquiring too closely as to its suitability. He also showed how the tyranny of administrative habit and, in legal decisions at least, the desire to maintain the respect of the members of one's own profession could keep methods of choice running in accustomed grooves, whether or not the conditions that originally accounted for those methods still obtained. He noted the operation, where the available precepts afforded some latitude of choice, of a "prophylactic factor" (what decision will discourage the recurrence of this deviation from the norm of desired behavior?) and a "revenge factor" (what does the affected party "deserve"?). His wish was not that these last considerations should never operate, but that they should operate only when they were explicitly recognized and the consequences candidly examined.[15]

If there seemed to Dunn as a pioneer in the new sociological international jurisprudence a discrepancy between the "real" unacknowledged factors governing an official's behavior and the "right" legal arguments adduced in support of that behavior, he was careful not to impute bad faith to men whom he saw as merely confused. Thus, he rejected the scandal variant of imperialist explanations for state behavior. He concluded that ". . . the popular imperialist interpretation . . . assumes a singleness of purpose and an unfailing ingenuity in working toward it, which, to anyone familiar with the hesitant and uncertain actions of foreign offices at first hand, must seem in most cases a fantastic illusion. It implies at the same time that otherwise apparently intelligent and high-minded individuals invariably lose a large proportion of these qualities when endowed with the responsibilities of public office in the handling of foreign affairs."[16]

Perhaps the major deception which the decision-maker habitually practiced was self-deception: he often believed he was solving a technical problem when he was in fact making a political choice. He had the persisting fantasy that with more facts about the particular case he was

[14] *Ibid.*, 85. [15] *Ibid.*, Chapter 6. [16] *Ibid.*, 24.

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scrutinizing, his doubts and confusion would go away, but his perplexities really grew from his reluctance to recognize that he was making a choice.[17] Professor Dunn's viewpoint was that, with a better mobilization of the potential contributions of social science, the consequences of a given official action would more often correspond to the expectations of the decision-maker at the moment of choice. When he used phrases like "better choices" or "improved decision-making," there was no element of normative ambiguity; the test was the degree of correlation between expectations and consequences.

If research was to lead to improved public policy, it should concentrate on exposing inappropriate existing techniques of analysis. As Dunn wrote in connection with his Mexican study: "It is unfortunate that in spite of the great advances made in recent years in scientific method and in our knowledge of the intellectual processes, the science of international law still rests upon such ambiguous terms as 'justice' and 'reason.' Many writers apparently assume that it is possible to deduce automatically by the simple laws of logic concrete answers to specific problems from general propositions containing such variable terms. . . . It is of little help to us in attempting to solve the Mexican problem to say that nations are bound to observe a minimum standard of justice in their treatment of foreigners, unless we know what goes on in the minds of the societal agents charged with the settlement of the dispute when they seek to apply this criterion of judgment. To discover this we need only look at the specific acts which have actually been considered in the past as in violation of this standard of justice by nations in their dealings with each other."[18]

Only thus could international law be seen for what it was, an institution responsive to society's need to cope with all "the difficulties and clashes of interest arising out of the tremendous flow of peoples and goods across the border of nations."[19] Regarding the need and the institution responsive to that need, Professor Dunn wrote: "The continuance of our daily social and economic activities along their accustomed plane has become dependent upon keeping open the channels of intercourse and trade throughout the whole of the world. This in turn depends upon *the maintenance of some sort of definite orderly arrangement* of this intercourse so that the activities of others may be permanently counted upon to assure regularity of action and far-reaching scope of plans. Arrangements of this sort are ordinarily the work

[17] *Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan*, Introduction.
[18] "International Law and Private Property Rights," 175.
[19] *Ibid.*, 170.

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of organized political institutions, yet the absence of any such institution for the world as a unit has not prevented the formulation of a body of rules to keep up with the enlarging economic activities of man. These rules make up what we know as international law, which may be described as the collection of habits and precepts of conduct which have grown up out of *the need for bringing about security and predictability in the social and economic intercourse across political borders.* These rules are not only related to the international social and economic order; they are the verbal symbols of that order. And like all systems of law based primarily on custom, they make no provision for revolutionary changes in that order."[20]

In his first published law review article, dealing with the international legal status of the British Dominions following the Imperial Conference of 1926, he boldly proclaimed the necessity to look outside "rigid legal forms" to find applicable law: "To know the real status of the Dominions at the present time, it is not enough to look at the constitutional form of the Empire. Legal forms are rigid and tend to remain in existence long after the conditions which gave them birth have passed away. If we look at the real operation of the Imperial system as it has developed in recent years we find a wholly different situation both within the Empire and without."[21] Nor did he find any more helpful the corpus of international law, with its oversupply of mutually incompatible and frequently inexact precedents regarding the rights and duties of successor states.

In his detailed studies of the diplomatic protection of Americans in Mexico, he found evaluations of the legality of Mexican confiscations as little helpful as he had the legal literature on state succession when he dealt with the new status of the British Dominions. He exhibited a remarkable precocity in anticipating the consequences for international law of what a generation later was called the "revolution of rising expectations." Regarding the claims of Americans which grew out of land reforms in the homeland of the twentieth century's first semi-colonial revolution, he wrote: "Most of the current discussion of the controversy has turned about the question of whether the legislative acts of the Mexican Government really were 'confiscatory,' and whether or not the titles of the former owners were valid under Mexican laws. But these questions, important as they are, do not touch upon the main issue. The fact of the matter is that the Mexican revolutionary government *had* to take the land away from the existing owners and give it

[20] *Ibid.*, 170-71 (italics added).
[21] "New International Status of the British Dominions," 357.

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to the natives, however 'legal' may have been the titles of the existing owners. That government is not now in a position to retrace its steps, nor is it able to make adequate monetary retribution to the owners whose lands have been and are being taken away. Accordingly, from the standpoint of international law, the question that primarily has to be answered is whether foreign governments have a right to intervene to bring about the modification of legislation adopted by the government of a country ostensibly to improve social and economic conditions among its citizens but which cannot be carried out without causing substantial losses to foreigners who had duly acquired property interests which were protected under the prior laws of that country."[22] He specifically foresaw that it was necessary for the instrument of diplomatic protection in particular and the institution of international law in general to get out of the way of bona fide social reform.

> To extend the rule of the inviolability of the property rights of aliens to cover all cases of expropriation without concurrent indemnity, regardless of whether such act is deemed to be a necessary step in the improvement of conditions of the native population, would seem to place a powerful obstacle in the way of future social reform.[23]
>
> From a functional point of view, a possible solution would be to retain the rule of intervention but to except from its operation all governmental acts infringing upon vested property rights which were the result of bona fide social or economic reform, genuinely aimed to benefit the nation as a whole, and were not discriminatory against foreigners as such, nor liable to disturb to any substantial extent the existing methods of carrying on intercourse between nations.[24]

Perhaps his most often-cited contribution to what Frederick S. Dunn liked to think of as "the rational science" of international law, the science which clarifies the common interests and makes the legal process better serve the practical ends of statesmen, is the principle of risk allocation to which his studies of diplomatic protection led him. He defined this principle as follows: "Where a failure to prosecute is such that, if generalized, it would lead to conditions unfavorable to the customary course of intercommunity relationships, then international responsibility would be engaged."[25] Note that Dunn claimed for his principle of risk allocation no earth-shaking significance. He advanced it modestly and as an illustration of similar rules and standards which could be developed by the same patient investigation of other problems on which international lawyers were called upon to work.

[22] "International Law and Private Property Rights," 169-70.
[23] *Ibid.*, 178. [24] *Ibid.*, 180. [25] *Protection of Nationals*, 187.

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Changed conditions could not be dealt with by unchanged law, and even in the narrow area of Professor Dunn's most intensive research, the diplomatic protection of Americans in Mexico, he never supposed that the risk-allocation principle or any other legal formulation would permanently harmonize the clash of interests. He concluded that "It would be absurd to suppose . . . that the subject of diplomatic protection has been permanently removed as a source of serious controversy between the two countries. A change of administration that should bring the Mexican government into weaker hands, a resurgence of revolutionary activity, a renewed shortage of oil in the United States, a revival of anti-foreign feeling, or any other event that seemed to threaten existing American interests in Mexico, would quickly recreate the conditions that have led to controversy in the past and again put to the test the machinery that has been devised for the peaceful solution of disputes of this character."[26]

If new law to regulate new developments in international daily life was not simply to be deduced from old precepts and old precedents, where was it to be found? The answer was, partly in better decision-making by national officials—i.e., decisions which better harmonized the interests of conflicting parties—but partly also in international legislation. Professor Dunn asserted that "In such a rapidly growing community as the society of nations, it would be inconceivable that we should long remain without some kind of legislative process to bring the law within hailing distance, at least, of the needs of international intercourse. The existence of the postulates of sovereignty and equality might make the development of such a process difficult, but they would not permanently stand in the way of the expanding social interests of the ultimate members of the community. International intercourse does not exist *because* of these postulates, but because men *want* to trade with each other and to travel and reap the fruits of a wider civilization than is possible within the limits of artificial national boundaries."[27]

Although Professor Dunn's interests gradually shifted from international law and organization to diplomacy and politics, particularly after he went to Yale in 1935, his interest never flagged in seeking to discover the ways in which all the institutions of international life could be used to adjust conflict. Where the common interest was manifest, there was

[26] *Diplomatic Protection of Americans in Mexico*, 423.

[27] "International Legislation," *Political Science Quarterly*, XLII (December 1927), 576. In a similar vein, he quotes Brierly on the same page: "Law is still thinking in terms of rights; states are thinking of interests and demanding that they be protected" (*British Yearbook of International Law*, 1924, p. 16).

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no intellectual problem. Where it was not, international institutions were to be judged by their success or failure in harmonizing them; and it was the highest task of the international relations scholar to point the ways toward harmonization.[28]

His book, *The Practice and Procedure of International Conferences* (1928), based on his Johns Hopkins doctoral dissertation, showed the same tendency as his writing on diplomatic protection to look outside the law and to the intentions and interests of the parties for the emerging law. It was the needs of "the new international public" which the law had to serve. Dunn wrote that ". . . two developments which began in the latter part of the eighteenth century and have continued up to the present time have completely changed both the substance of international relations and the methods by which they are conducted. The first of these was the industrial revolution and the second was the rise of popular government. These developments have not only altered the nature and extent of the relations between states as *political entities*, but have also given us an entirely new international public with a new type of international relations which did not exist at the time when the classical theories of international jurisprudence were formulated. This fact is of great importance, for it largely explains why, in a theoretically unorganized collection of independent political entities enjoying exclusive territorial jurisdiction, we find such a surprising number of permanent international agencies engaged in the regulation of transnational interests and activities on a community basis. For if it is true that no government can exist without a public, it is equally true that no public which has become conscious of its common interests remains very long without the establishment of instruments of government."[29] He developed a useful distinction between the bargaining conference (diplomacy in multilateral form) and the legislative conference (multilateral international contract).[30] It was the latter type primarily which served the "non-political" needs of the new international public.

[28] The catholicity of Mr. Dunn's interest in whatever social science would help him in answering his questions is illustrated by the precocious concern he showed in 1928, in his first book, for what would now be called "small-group sociology." Thus, in discussing factors affecting the procedure of international conferences, he wrote: ". . . the mere matter of size is an important factor in determining the course of conference procedure. This is true whether the conference be one of diplomats or of dentists. It is common experience that where a large number of persons confer together for the purpose of reaching a common agreement, certain difficulties of procedure are encountered which are not present in small gatherings. There seems to be, in fact, a definite limit to the size of the group which can carry on an intelligent exchange of views without formal organization. This limit varies somewhat with the character and composition of the conference, but it exists for every deliberative body no matter how homogeneous."—*Practice and Procedure of International Conferences*, 25.

[29] *Ibid.*, 10. [30] *Ibid.*, 40.

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The growth of the law by multilateral contract among changing combinations of states, as well as by customary rules in particular regimes of the world, reflected Dunn's view that "In reality the interests and activities of the nations of the world, which it is the function of international law to regulate, are practically never coextensive with the territory of the world community. . . . The society of nations is not, in fact, a homogeneous society. . . . They differ widely in size, in state of civilization and in the nature and scope of their external relations."[31]

In 1935 Mr. Dunn left Johns Hopkins to become Professor of International Relations and a member of the Yale Institute of International Studies, then being established with Nicholas J. Spykman as its first director. At Yale Professor Dunn's unconventional graduate teaching in international law, organization, and diplomacy led him to develop as a field for instruction and Ph.D. examination purposes "methods and instruments of control."[32] This description of a field of special study was his intellectual trade-mark. The deteriorating climate of European and Far Eastern politics, and perhaps also the intellectual stimulation of New Haven as symbolized by Professor Spykman and Arnold Wolfers, had shifted Dunn's interest away from the activities of lawyers in Foreign Offices coping with the problems of "the new international public" toward those of political officials coping with threats to the foundations of the world order. However, he brought to the new problems a viewpoint which had matured in his earlier international legal research.

Peaceful Change, a small book published in 1937, reflected both the sustained viewpoint and the new focus on problems of war and peace.[33] Dunn's concern was still the development of international procedures and Foreign Office methods of analysis which would, to the greatest extent possible, harmonize conflicting interests.

It perhaps tells more about the United States than about Professor Dunn that as late as 1937—after the Manchurian and Ethiopian Incidents and after the remilitarization of the Rhineland—so much atten-

[31] "International Legislation," 587.

[32] The Yale University Graduate School Announcement of the Graduate Program in International Relations for 1962-1963 still lists "Methods and Instruments of Control" as one of the five fields of instruction.

[33] *Peaceful Change: A Study of International Procedures* (New York 1937). This study was also printed as "U.S. Memorandum No. 3" for the Tenth International Studies Conference held in Paris in June and July of 1937. Professor Dunn was the rapporteur of the subcommittee on procedural methods of peaceful change of the Committee of Experts which planned the American studies for that conference. Other members of the subcommittee were John Foster Dulles (chairman), Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Philip C. Jessup, and Walter Lippmann. The book bears, however, the unmistakable stamp of the rapporteur.

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tion was being paid to preserving peace by developing procedures for peaceful change and so little to preserving it by strengthening the machinery of enforcement. *Peaceful Change* anticipates by two years E. H. Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis* both in its emphasis on peaceful change and its lack of attention to enforcement.[34] He also anticipated David Mitrany in seeing the problem not as one of getting unwilling states to yield up territory but as one of lessening the extent to which existing boundaries frustrate human activity and thus reduce the pressure for shifting them.[35] Thus, he wrote: "A beginning might be made by the adoption of genuine open-door policies with respect to the exploitation of raw materials everywhere. These policies should be incorporated in international agreements because otherwise they would be subject to frequent change and would instill no confidence in other states. Eventually it might be possible to establish a system of international supervision of the operation of these agreements in order to give assurance that they were being carried out in good faith. But real progress cannot be expected until some means can be found to lessen the feelings of insecurity which now cause nations to subordinate everything to the building up of national power."[36]

Dunn recognized clearly that it was credible threats, not objectively determined needs, which in the 1930's was stimulating "peaceful" change. It was the demands of Nazi Germany, not the needs of Austria, which was likely to bring, short of war, a change in the *status quo*.[37] No special procedures needed to be invented to facilitate such a change. As for the powers unable or unwilling to make credible threats, he found only very modest opportunities for change through the available procedures of diplomacy, arbitrations, conferences, international legislation, and the League of Nations. About these procedures, he concluded: "The notable thing about them is that they are voluntary procedures. The things to be changed, on the other hand, are for the most part things which are highly valued and not willingly given up by existing holders. This fact cannot be disguised by any multiplication of specific institutions and techniques for dealing with demands for change. The widespread notion that by the mere calling of conferences, the establishment of international commissions

[34] Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis* (London 1939) and Dunn's *Peaceful Change* differed in essential respects. Carr's book was published after the Munich settlement and could be interpreted as a defense of the appeasement policies of the Chamberlain government. Dunn's book had by no means the same prescriptive implications.

[35] *A Working Peace System* (London 1944).

[36] *Peaceful Change*, 51.

[37] *Ibid.*, 127-28.

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of inquiry or the devising of new techniques of negotiation it will be possible to find acceptable solutions for all demands for change is largely the product of wishful thinking. It is useless to pile up additional institutions unless they take full account of existing values and attitudes which determine national policies."[38]

In 1940 Frederick S. Dunn succeeded Spykman as director of the Yale Institute. For the rest of his life, he subordinated his own research and writing interests to those of Yale Institute (and later Princeton Center of International Studies) colleagues.

He continued to believe in and encourage policy-oriented research, and as problems of national security became central with the onset of the Second World War, Institute studies were more and more focused on the making and improvement of national security policy. Dunn did not believe, however, that the denizens of the ivory tower ought to try to do the diplomatist's job. Public officials would always have superior access to current information and had the responsibility of making decisions. Private scholars, on the other hand, could examine problems and procedures on a longer time-scale or in a broader framework, and had the opportunity and the responsibility of completing their research before they reported on its results.

Institute studies were "primarily devoted to clarifying problems in the foreign policy of the United States."[39] They were, one should note, designed to clarify, not to settle, problems. He was still trying to improve national policy-making rather than to make policy from offstage; but as Director of the Yale Institute he was stalking bigger game than the legal officer in a twentieth-century Foreign Office.

Dunn was insistent that Institute studies be "policy-oriented" in the sense that they ask questions the answers to which make a difference. He wanted improved decisions in foreign affairs, and this meant providing the decision-maker and the scholar with deeper understanding and better analytical tools.

The Institute was not hierarchically organized. Directives as to research tasks did not simply flow down from the top. The Yale Institute was organized more as "a band of brothers"; indeed, in the general description of the Institute's publications which appeared in each of the monographs after 1944 there was the statement: "The members of the Institute work at all times in close association, but each member

[38] *Ibid.*, 125.

[39] Each volume in the series contained this phrase in its frontmatter, as did volumes in the later series of the Princeton Center of International Studies.

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is free to formulate his research projects in his own way and each published study represents an individual analysis of a problem."[40]

Institute members, who occupied adjacent offices, had easy access to each other. They met together one afternoon a week for informal but focused discussion. They frequently lunched together. They read each other's draft manuscripts. This was the antithesis of programmed research. Yet the leadership of the Director was not questioned. His evaluation of research priorities provided the basis for foundation support. His decisions in recruiting research personnel influenced the direction and quality of the research. It was his probing questions and marginal comments on draft manuscripts that largely held the Institute members to the central task of advancing knowledge relative to the control and improvement of policy-making in foreign affairs.

What did he see as significant questions worthy of being answered by Institute research? In general, there were two kinds of questions—those relating to major changes in the world political environment and those relating to the foreign policy process. Studies of geopolitical relations between the New World and the Old, of Soviet-Western relations, of the prospect for the development of China as a first-ranking power, of the demands of colonial peoples in the postwar world, of Britain's role as a junior partner in the Atlantic system, of the Soviet view of the United States, and of the impact of atomic power upon world politics fall into the first category.[41] Studies of the role of law in international relations, of the role of Congress in foreign policy, and of public opinion and foreign policy fall into the second.[42]

"Facts" by themselves had little interest for Dunn. He wanted lean, well-written books which an intelligent but very busy practitioner in the field of foreign affairs would still find time to read. He preferred short books and set an example for his colleagues in this respect. He wished to see published only the data necessary to support the conclusions and only the conclusions relevant to improved policy. As Institute director, Dunn took his editorial responsibilities very seriously. He believed that clear writing reflected lucid thinking.

He also believed in removing other possible obstacles to communicating with his target audience, what today might be called "the

[40] See, for example, p. ii of Percy E. Corbett, *Law and Society in the Relations of States* (New York 1951). This volume, the last published under Institute auspices, before the Institute was disbanded in 1951, has a complete list of Institute monographs on the same page.

[41] By Nicholas J. Spykman, William T. R. Fox, David N. Rowe, Annette B. Fox, Percy E. Corbett, Frederick C. Barghoorn, and Bernard Brodie, respectively.

[42] By Percy E. Corbett, Robert A. Dahl, and Gabriel A. Almond, respectively.

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foreign affairs community." It included the decision-makers themselves as well as international relations scholars and elements of the attentive public. One way to reach this community was through the Yale Institute memorandum series. The memoranda were mimeographed and usually longer than journal articles but too short to stand alone as books. They were sent to persons in and out of government who had prior knowledge of and had expressed interest in the work of the Yale Institute or in its memorandum series. They were distributed partly to elicit helpful reactions to interim reports on research, but perhaps even more to get into the hands of the Institute's target audience timely and compact studies.

A second way to improve communications within the foreign affairs community was via *World Politics*, begun as a quarterly journal at Yale in 1948. It was intended to be an academic journal which would avoid reliance either on "big names" or excessive topicality to win readers. Professor Dunn wanted it to be attractive both as to content and format to practitioners and scholars alike. On the more important question of content, he sought to develop and apply criteria of inclusion and exclusion which would give shape to the emerging study of international relations. His focus was on the political process in the absence of central authority.[43]

It was a deliberate choice that the new journal should be named *World Politics,* to emphasize that it was not just the relations of hypostatized states but a world political process acting primarily through governments which was being studied. It followed that Professor Dunn persisted in his interest in those studies of the process which clarified the choices of men in government. It also followed that the test of relevance was the question being asked rather than the source of the data being analyzed or the technique of analysis being used.

His own writing in the first years after World War II demonstrated his continuing attention to the conditions favoring harmonization of apparently conflicting national interests. In *The Absolute Weapon*, for example, his essay on "The Common Problem" is a sensitive examination of the circumstances which would permit a treaty for the international control of atomic energy to bear the load put upon it by any temptations to violate it.[44] In *War and the Minds of Men*[45] he saw

[43] "International relations," Dunn wrote, "is concerned with the questions that arise in the relations between autonomous political groups in a world system in which power is not centered at one point."—"The Scope of International Relations," *World Politics*, 1 (October 1948), 144.

[44] Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York 1946), 3-17. In this essay Mr. Dunn was exemplifying in a special case a point of view he had long held about

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a new international arena in the struggle for the hearts and minds of men on a "middle ground between the bargaining of diplomats and total war." The book reflected both the keenness of his interest in discovering alternatives to two-way atomic war and his receptivity to the findings of all the social sciences, especially including social psychology, that would point toward better ways of attaining broad policy objectives.[46]

Dunn never confused being receptive to the findings of sociology and psychology with uncritical acceptance of the policy prescriptions of those who believed that "tensions are a kind of malignant growth in the minds of people which can be cut out by some form of mental surgery." He saw them rather as "symptoms of deeper conditions, which must be understood before they can be removed."[47] "It is not very useful," he wrote, "to talk about what might be done with men's minds if only some inconvenient features of present world politics could be ignored. Daydreaming about some other world than the one in which it is necessary to operate seldom opens any doors to successful action."[48] As an adviser to the American delegation at a series of UNESCO conferences, Professor Dunn gained a clear view of the choices which had to be made through that organization in a divided world so different from that foreseen by UNESCO's founders. His analysis was accordingly directed to the needs of men who had to decide how to work through UNESCO under the conditions of the cold war.

The reincarnation of the Yale Institute as the Princeton Center of International Studies in 1951 involved no sharp break in the patterns or directions of research. The country's dependence on preparedness rather than potential for security in the atomic age meant more emphasis than ever on politico-military studies and on studies of peacetime coalition arrangements such as NATO.[49] The new requirement

international law in general. "International law," he had earlier written, "is in the last analysis nothing more than a sociological mechanism for making smooth the path of intercourse between nations and providing a solvent for their conflicting interests. This being the case, the proper approach to a study of it would seem to be according to the nature and subject matter of the relationships it is intended to regulate. These relationships are more or less clearly defined social phenomena, and are not derived from the fundamental rights of nations around which the present system of classification seeks to group them."—Review of Charles G. Fenwick, *International Law* (New York 1924), in *Columbia Law Review*, XXV (November 1925), 983.

[45] New York 1950.

[46] See especially *ibid.*, Chapters 3-5.

[47] *Ibid.*, 110.

[48] *Ibid.*, 94.

[49] See, for example, the studies of Klaus Knorr and William W. Kaufmann.

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for intelligent decisions about the Afro-Asian world and the developing areas generally was reflected in more research on comparative politics.[50]

On the other hand, men working at the Princeton Center have shown a concern for highly abstract problems in theory which was uncharacteristic of the Yale group. In part, this reflects the historical discontinuities of the thermonuclear era. Model-building and "hypothetical history" take the place of historical analogy. In part, it reflects the broad tolerance of Professor Dunn as Director. At Princeton as at Yale he was quite willing to see members of his research group formulate their own research program. In part, it reflected his recognition that, in spite of his own interest in the patient examination of case histories of officials in action, "the cure for the disease is quite often found far from the site of the epidemic."

Frederick S. Dunn's own research at Princeton was along lines wholly consistent with his earlier inquiries. With a small group of colleagues he undertook to describe and evaluate the steps in the making of the Japanese peace settlement. In recognition of the increasing importance of democratic control of foreign affairs, one resulting volume concentrates on the domestic political process as it impinges on the decision-maker in foreign affairs.[51] Professor Dunn's own book, *Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan*, to be posthumously published in 1963, takes more specific account of the way in which responsible officials, and particularly John Foster Dulles, handled the stream of information flowing to them from the outside world. In this case, as in all the others on which he had worked, he was not interested in the case for its own sake but in asking, "What is this a case of?" and in discovering "what wisdom can be distilled out of it."[52]

How important Professor Dunn's work has been may be judged from his own writings and those of his Yale and Princeton colleagues. It remains only to notice two remarkable ways in which his scholarly leadership was publicly recognized. There is first the way in which his Yale Institute became a model for others to follow. It cannot be accidental that the present directors of four academic international relations research groups were all Yale colleagues of Frederick S. Dunn.[53]

[50] See, for example, the studies of Gabriel A. Almond, Lucian W. Pye, and Myron Weiner.

[51] Bernard C. Cohen, *The Political Process and Foreign Policy* (Princeton 1957).

[52] *Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan*, Introduction, xviii.

[53] Max Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Arnold Wolfers, Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research associated with Johns Hopkins University; Klaus Knorr, Director of

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The second evidence is the recognition of his work by his alma mater, Princeton University, which gave him an honorary Doctor of Laws degree in 1949 and two years later, in an almost unprecedented act of confidence, invited him to return as Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice and to bring with him no less than six of his Yale colleagues.

Frederick Sherwood Dunn listed in a *World Politics* article as some "important emerging trends in research in international relations" the shifts from reformism to realism, from the study of formal structures to the study of informal process, from single-factor to multiple-factor explanations, from abstract speculation to systematic observations, from the study of inter-state relations to the study of world politics, and from implicitly assumed to explicitly analyzed goals.[54] He was writing in capsule form his own intellectual biography.

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the Center of International Studies at Princeton University; and William T. R. Fox, Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.

[54] "The Present Course of International Relations Research," *World Politics*, II (October 1949), 81-95.

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CHANGING ROLES OF THE CPSU UNDER FIRST SECRETARY KHRUSHCHEV

By HOWARD R. SWEARER

IT came as no surprise that First Secretary and Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress predicted the next historical period will witness "the further increase in the role of the Party as the higher form of public and political organization, the strengthening of its directing influence in all sections of communist building. . . ."[1] What is the nature of this projected party role and how does it differ from past practice? What problems have been encountered by the Khrushchev regime in directing the state through the party apparatus and how has it attempted to cope with these difficulties? By focusing on the Party's changing role since 1953, what light can be shed on modifications in the composition, procedures, and structure of the Party during the Khrushchev era?

Changes in the Party since Stalin's death are attributable to many factors, perhaps the most significant of which are the leadership power struggle and the personality and policy orientation of Khrushchev. These two considerations by themselves, however, are not sufficient to explain fully alterations in the Party. By complementing Kremlinology with an analysis of the role of the party apparatus, especially at the regional and lower levels, one can perhaps achieve a clearer perspective on the motivations for, and trends in, party development. For example, a major thesis of this article is that Khrushchev so seriously overextended the administrative duties of the party apparatus during his bid for power that he faced a potential danger of its collapse as a reliable instrument of central leadership; and that, beginning in 1958, he has attempted to redefine and reshape the Party's role to ease its administrative burdens and, at the same time, increase its effectiveness as a lever of central control.

A review of Khrushchev's use of the party apparatus to consolidate his personal power and to maintain central direction of Soviet society after 1953 will delineate some of the fundamental aspects and problems of party direction of the state. This lengthy historical preface establishes the background for an analysis of the present and projected

[1] *Pravda*, October 18, 1961.

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future role of the Party in Soviet society as it may be reconstructed from the discussions of the party press, the 22nd Congress in October 1961, and the new Party Program and Statutes. Finally, fluctuations in the composition of leading party organs are related to the changing emphasis in party functions.

I. Ideological Underpinnings of Party-State Relations

The Communist theory of the state has carefully differentiated between the governmental and party hierarchies since the earliest birth pangs of the Soviet Union. The 8th Party Congress in 1919 was agitated by this problem: "But the functions of the Party collectives must on no account be confused with the functions of the state organs—the soviets. . . . The Party must carry out its decisions through the soviet organs within the frame of the Soviet Constitution. The Party should endeavor to guide the activity of the soviets, not to supplant them."[2]

The two parts of the formula—party control and direction, and the retention of independent party and state administrations—which are evident in this quotation, remain the essential ingredients in present-day prescriptions. The soviets, various mass organizations, and the state administration are, to use Lenin's term, "transmission belts" of party policy; but the Party must always retain its own unique personality and independent existence. Too close an identification of the Party with the soviets and other mass organizations might destroy their value as organizers of the people on a pseudo-voluntary basis and, more important, could jeopardize the militancy of the Party itself. If the Party directly shouldered state administrative duties, it would wastefully duplicate the governmental bureaucracy and demoralize the latter, and, at the same time, itself become dangerously bureaucratized. According to the separate and unequal doctrine, the Party maintains a vantage point from which it can criticize, cajole, and correct the state administration. To become involved in day-to-day management of state affairs would dilute the critical faculty and revolutionary *élan* that enable the Party to navigate its counterpart governmental organs on the charted course and to put current events in their proper perspective. Too close an identification of local party officials with local administration might damage the cohesiveness and discipline of the centrally responsive Party. It might also divert attention from the Party's educational, ideological, and mass-organizational activities.

[2] Julian Towster, *Political Power in the U.S.S.R.: 1917-1947* (New York 1948), 178, quoting the stenographic report of the 8th Party Congress.

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On the other hand, "the Party is not separate from the soviet state apparatus." The Party is not only the ultimate source of power, but should also serve as a ubiquitous superministry of coordination, as indicated by the following excerpt from an authoritative Soviet textbook: "The Party gives the guiding instructions on all basic political, economic, and organizational questions, defining the direction and character of the activities of the Soviet state."[3] The party apparatus of a territorial-administrative area may be characterized as the board of directors and the state apparatus as its managerial staff.

Depending on the temper of the times, party supervision of the government is criticized by the leadership for being either too lax, owing to negligence or overconcentration on intra-party work; or for usurping the legitimate functions of the administration and its cognate: collusion of party and government officials. During the four and one-half decades of Soviet history, the pendulum of party supervision has swung back and forth several times. In the late 1940's *Bolshevik* undertook a lengthy campaign to separate party and governmental affairs, which had become hopelessly intertwined during the war years when the party apparatus had assumed command at all levels. This drive culminated in Malenkov's report to the 19th Party Congress in which he lectured against mixing party and government responsibilities: "The fact is that the wartime circumstances had caused certain specific features in the methods of Party leadership and also had given rise to major defects in the work of Party governing organs and Party organizations. This was expressed chiefly in the fact that the Party organs slackened their attention to Party organizational and ideological work, and, as a result, this work was neglected in many Party organizations. Some danger arose that the Party organs would be divorced from the masses and change from organs of political leadership, from militant organizations with drive and initiative, into something in the nature of administrative and managing bodies, incapable of meeting all sorts of local narrowly departmental and other antistate pulls."[4]

With the rise of Khrushchev, the emphasis again shifted to direct action by party organizations in administration, especially in agriculture. At the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev railed against party officials who "draw an absurd distinction between Party political work and economic activity." He declared: "One still meets so-called Party

[3] V. A. Vlasov, *Sovetsky gosudarstvenny apparat* [The Soviet state apparatus] (Moscow 1955), 201.

[4] Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies: Documentary Record of the 19th Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization After Stalin's Death* (New York 1953), 17.

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'officials' who consider party work one thing and economic work and state administration as another. One can even hear complaints from such functionaries that they are being diverted from so-called 'pure party work' and compelled to study economics, technology, farming, and production."[5]

II. Khrushchev and the Party Apparatus

Khrushchev's exhortation to the Party to assume a more activist attitude toward administrative work was clearly connected with the struggle for power and position among Stalin's heirs. Khrushchev, as First Secretary of the Central Committee after crowding out Malenkov in the spring of 1953, found his power base deeply rooted in the party apparatus. Quite naturally, he vigorously fought to extend party prerogatives and thus enhance his own position and also build a strong command to govern Soviet society. During the Stalin period the Party had been only one string in the old dictator's bow of societal controls. At times it appeared to be eclipsed by the secret police and Stalin's personal secretariat, supervised by Poskrebyshev. Under Khrushchev the party apparatus achieved a clear supremacy over its rivals and took on a number of burdensome tasks. The secret police were discredited by the Beria affair in mid-1953 and shorn of their independent powers. The party apparatus at the grass roots in the fall of 1953 was directly charged with jacking up seriously sagging agricultural production. In 1957 its control over industrial management was firmly consolidated by the industrial reorganization that facilitated supervision of industry by regional party secretaries. Party control of the military was reaffirmed after the ouster of Marshal Zhukov in the fall of 1957.

To be more specific, Khrushchev by late 1957 had made the party cadre preeminent. It was the approximately 250,000 *apparatchiki* spread throughout the Soviet Union who were given the power and administrative responsibilities to govern the Soviet state. Khrushchev, as First Secretary, was the boss of the apparatus. This more intensive involvement of the party apparatus in direct administration was, of course, contrary to the theoretical tenets of Party-State relations.

Thus, by October 1957 the party apparatus was firmly in charge and bearing the operational responsibility for implementing the leadership's policies. However, the enormous burdens placed on the party bureaucracy threatened to overtax its capacities and to undermine party discipline and militancy. Its effect on the state administration was also dele-

[5] Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies*, II (New York 1956), 57.

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terious. Beginning in late 1957, the administrative responsibilities of the party apparatus have been somewhat retrenched and greater burdens again placed on the state bureaucracy. Moreover, party control has been refashioned so that it is more indirect (though still powerful); the party bureaucracy has been pruned, and party discipline tightened. Statements at the 22nd Congress summarize the latest stage of this process. It should be noted that the initiation of this new phase in Party-State relations coincided with Khrushchev's defeat of his most serious rivals for power. When he replaced Bulganin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in early 1958, it followed that his personal power position had been broadened and was no longer exclusively tied to the party cadre. Thus, he was freer to cope with the serious problems raised by employing the party apparatus more extensively in administering the state.

III. Administrative Restructuring and Party Control

A reorganization of the administrative structure in the mid-1950's both enhanced the capabilities of the party apparatus to control the governmental administration and, at the same time, made necessary more effective party supervision to ensure the proper functioning of the remodeled state bureaucracy. A territorial form of administrative organization was more widely instituted in place of vertical, centralized, and functionally specialized chains of command. The 1957 reorganization of industrial management eliminated most of the centralized industrial ministries headquartered in Moscow and placed daily management of the great bulk of industry in the hands of over 100 regional economic councils. Steps were also taken to strengthen regional control over public education, local industry, public health, and other state functions by reducing the powers of central and republic ministries and granting more authority in these matters to the executive committees of local soviets and territorial party organizations. In the party structure also, the territorial principle was reinforced by the abolition of special Central Committee inspectors and political departments and the elimination of separate party control commissions at each administrative echelon. This reorganization increased the authority of the territorial party secretaries by permitting them access to realms of state activity that previously had been largely beyond their ken.

Connected with the shift to the territorial form of administrative organization has been a cautious decentralization of day-to-day administration. This decentralization is exemplified by the industrial reor-

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ganization, designed in part to bring daily management closer to production activities; the revamping of agricultural planning in 1955; numerous decrees granting lower bodies authority for making administrative boundary changes, allocating resources within centrally established limits, and several other matters; and campaigns to encourage local officials to exercise initiative with this newly granted authority. The intent has not been to make lower administrative bodies independent. Rather, it became painfully apparent to the leadership in the mid-1950's that for continued economic growth there had to be some modification of the fantastic centralization of decision-making during the Stalin reign. Paradoxically, efforts to push decision-making down the bureaucratic hierarchy were also in part intended to strengthen central controls by permitting the leadership to take a broader and longer-ranged perspective of societal development without the burden of constant attention to minutiae. By removing the squabbling, centralized, industrial ministries from Moscow, the top leadership hoped to achieve a more balanced view of the society as a whole.

To ensure local response to central directives, several centralized levers of control that cut across the prevailing territorial form of organization were retained and strengthened. The State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the Procuracy, and the Commission of State Control were assigned responsibilities to keep territorial administrators on the straight and narrow. As might be expected, some of the major points of administrative friction in the Soviet Union now exist between these centralized levers of direction and the territorial administrators. Officials of the regional economic councils and local soviet executive committees have publicly damned the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance for interfering in what they judge to be local affairs.

The party cadre, however, was looked to as the main instrument of central control. In contrast to the other arms of central guidance, the Party's responsibilities are general and so broad as to embrace all local activities. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the success or failure of the post-Stalin system of administration rests on the ability of the party apparatus to synthesize local activities with national plans. The burden placed upon the discipline and unity of the Party was very heavy—in fact, so great that the party apparatus showed signs of cracking. Some recentralization of the governmental administration, the partial withdrawal of the party apparatus from administration, and the revamping of party controls have resulted.

The major danger in the post-Stalin emphasis on the territorial form

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of organization and decentralization has been that of "localism," a term that covers a wide variety of sins but generally connotes the adoption of a localist point of view contradicting national interests. It may entail a cavalier attitude toward the delivery of products to another region, the diversion of investment funds from items of national importance to those of more local consequence, attempts to make an area as self-sufficient as possible and thus violate plans for economic specialization, or any number of machinations (including outright fraud) to mislead central authorities about the true state of affairs in an area. In sum, "localism" contains the seeds of local autarky that might disrupt central plans and policies.

Let us now review in more detail the activities of the Party in the administration of agriculture and industry since 1953.

IV. The Party and Agriculture

In the autumn of 1953 Khrushchev initiated his multifaceted campaign to pull Soviet agriculture out of the doldrums. As a central feature of his program, he charged the raion (district)[6] party apparatus with direct responsibility to administer his agrarian policies, and shoved aside the raion governmental bureaucracy. The raion department of agriculture was abolished and a raion party secretary with a group of instructors, each responsible for one or two kolkhozy (collective farms), were assigned to a Machine Tractor Station (MTS). Daily management of agriculture at the grass roots passed into the hands of the local party cadre.[7]

By early 1956 suggestions for a fresh reorganization were aired behind the scenes by those who believed that direct supervision of agriculture by the party cadre was unwise and violated party canons about usurping governmental functions. At the 20th Party Congress, however, Khrushchev summarily rejected these proposals.[8] Nevertheless, in December 1957 *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, the official party organ, announced that during the fall instructor groups for MTS zones had been abolished and the raion party apparatus extensively restructured.[9] This set

[6] There are approximately 3,200 rural raions in the USSR.

[7] Merle Fainsod, "The Communist Party Since Stalin," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 303 (January 1956), 32.

[8] Gruliow, II, 58.

[9] "Sel'skii raikom partii i ego apparat" [The rural raion party committee and its apparatus], *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, No. 23 (December 1957), 3-8.

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the stage for Khrushchev's announcement on January 22, 1958, that the MTS itself was being discarded. In this same speech in Minsk, Khrushchev came around full circle when he proposed that the raion soviet executive committee again be equipped to take over the daily management of agriculture by, as it later developed, the establishment of inspectorates.

The significance of Khrushchev's reversal in December 1957—and it should be remembered that by now he had consolidated his position and eliminated his Presidium opponents and, hence, was less restricted by his ties to the party apparatus—extends beyond agriculture, since it illustrates the difficulties of party control and the ambiguous relationship between party and government apparatuses. The withdrawal of *raion party functionaries from direct agricultural administration had* several motivations. On the positive side, the agricultural outlook had substantially brightened after the 1957 bumper harvest. The mobilization of thousands of Communists to head collective farms had improved the quality and reliability of kolkhoz chairmen and increased the number with party affiliations. By intensive recruiting and by commandeering Communists from the cities for work on the collectives, the primary party organizations of the kolkhozy had been strengthened and their forces had been concentrated by kolkhoz amalgamations. Thus, the need for irregular party controls was lessened.

The overriding consideration, however, was the harmful effects of direct party administration. MTS party secretaries and instructors were unduly interfering in the management of the kolkhozy and usurping the prerogatives of kolkhoz chairmen and primary party organizations. The article announcing the liquidation of the MTS zones commented: "As an organizational form of the party apparatus [they] were good for a certain period of time and under certain conditions. . . . Their tendencies to interfere directly in the operative activity of kolkhozy and the MTS had begun to fetter the initiative and the autonomy of the primary party organizations and the managing cadres of kolkhozy."[10]

Moreover, it was found that by assuming direct supervision of agriculture, members of the local party cadre were no longer able to maintain that detached critical attitude toward management demanded by *partiinost,* or party spirit, or to serve as arbitrators of local disagree-

[10] *Ibid.*, 3.

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ments. "We recently analyzed in the office of the raion committee the problem of the relations between the director and the secretary of the party organization of the MTS. They seriously argued with one another and it was not simple to decide who was right and who was wrong. The instructor dealing with the party organization of this MTS, Comrade Popov, asked to speak. Expressing his reasoned opinion, he assisted the raion committee in finding the correct solution to the problem. You may ask: What is unusual about this? But you see, earlier in the office of the raion committee, as a rule, there spoke out the secretary of the raion committee for the MTS, and it was he who evaluated all that was going on, not the instructor. Now, however, the instructor feels himself really not left to one side."[11] The situation outlined in this quotation carried with it the seeds of a more serious problem that became painfully apparent through charges of wholesale corruption in the countryside in early 1961: the temptation for the local party cadre to overidentify with kolkhozy and thus short-circuit their response to the center.

The withdrawal of the MTS zone party groups was only part of a comprehensive restructuring of the raion party apparatus aimed at cutting its swollen staff, reducing the overlap of party and government organs, and placing the raion party apparatus on a foundation from which it was less likely to take over the tasks of state administration. The raion party apparatus prior to 1957 was a dehydrated replica of the oblast (regional)[12] party structure with departments of propaganda and agitation, organization, and several others. In late 1957, after experiments in Latvia and Tadzhikistan, with some exceptions, all departments of the raion party apparatus were eliminated.[13] The apparatus came to consist merely of two or three secretaries and the rest instructors, each responsible for several primary party organizations in a wide variety of organizations. Previously, specialized departmental instructors had been in charge of one phase of the work of all primary party organizations in the raion.[14]

[11] "Kak raikom nachinaet rabotat' pasle perestroiki svoego apparata" [How the raikom begins to work after the reconstruction of its apparatus], *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, No. 2 (January 1958), 40-41.

[12] There are approximately 107 oblasts in the USSR. The oblast administration supervises the raion and in turn is subordinate to the republic. (The smaller republics do not have oblast divisions.)

[13] In the republics of Belorussia and Armenia, and the oblasts of Ryazan, Stalingrad, Kirov, Voronezh, and several others, the departments of propaganda and agitation and organization were retained. Even here, however, the great bulk of the staff became instructors reporting to the chief of the organization department.

[14] "The rural raion party committee," 4.

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Departmentless party committees have also appeared in some smaller cities. Larger cities and oblasts retain departments, but in many cases their numbers have been reduced by mergers and the party leadership has encouraged republic and oblast officials to take the initiative in proposing alterations in local party apparatuses.

The reorganization of the raion party apparatus fits neatly into the broader pattern of consolidation and administrative generalization pervading all of the Soviet Union's bureaucratic structures. However, it should be underscored that a major reason for replacing departments by instructors, each responsible for a wide range of primary party organizations, was to inhibit the tendency of party organs to duplicate and replace the raion governmental administration.

Between 1958 and 1962, agricultural administration presented a confused and frequently contradictory picture. This was a period of heated debate and indecision about the proper form of control over state and collective farms. It was also a time of production reverses. If one has difficulty identifying the locus of authority over agriculture during this period, perhaps it is because clear-cut lines of responsibility did not exist. Although hard data are difficult to obtain, one may reasonably speculate that several bureaucratic groups were maneuvering for position and that the leadership itself was torn, or at least undecided, about the proper course of action. One can, perhaps, identify at least two general issues under debate: the proper balance between central direction of agriculture and sufficient room for local initiative; and the degree and nature of party control over agricultural administration.

Although the raion party apparatus at the MTS had been clipped off, the raion party secretaries retained a powerful voice in agricultural matters. The Ministry of Agriculture, through its weak raion inspectorates, was not able to assert its authority effectively over the kolkhozy. Between 1958 and 1961 it appears that a power struggle took place between the party apparatus and the Ministry of Agriculture. The widespread debate over a plan to create kolkhoz unions for managing agriculture was an integral part of this jurisdictional maneuvering. It seems likely that regional party functionaries were pushing this scheme to increase even further their control of the collective farms. The Ministry of Agriculture opposed this plan and was successful at the December 1959 Central Committee Plenum in preventing its adoption.

The disappointing harvest of 1960, piled on the poor showing of 1959, resulted in fireworks at the January 1961 Plenum. An obviously angry Khrushchev castigated rural officials, including a number of raion and oblast party secretaries. Not only did he charge them with

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mismanagement and incompetence, but also with the serious matter of report falsification. The revelations of enormous fraud among territorial party secretaries and the dismissal of party officials in agricultural areas, which in late 1960 and the first half of 1961 reached bloodless purge proportions, demonstrated a serious failure of party discipline in rural areas. Local party officials, shouldered with the responsibility for meeting overly ambitious agricultural goals and fortified by substantial administrative autonomy as a result of decentralization in agricultural planning and management, took refuge in falsification of all kinds.

The severe cracks displayed in the monolithic party structure and poor harvests forced Khrushchev to devise new control mechanisms for implementing his policies. His response was drastic, but makeshift. The Ministry of Agriculture was shorn of most of its powers and turned into an educational and scientific organ. The Central Statistical Administration took charge of gathering crop data. Planning was entrusted to Gosplan. A new national cooperative was formed to handle kolkhoz supply. Raion agricultural inspectorates were replaced by model farms to propagandize agricultural techniques.[15] Most important, a centralized State Committee for Agricultural Procurement was formed to contract for purchases from the collective farms. Care was taken to isolate procurement inspectors from localist pressures. It seems reasonable to conjecture that by splitting functions of agricultural management among several centralized state agencies, Khrushchev hoped to make it more difficult for local officials to hoodwink Moscow.

This solution was hasty and a stopgap. In the first place, responsibility for agriculture was not clearly defined. As a Stalingrad agronomist asked shortly after the reorganization, "Just who will direct agriculture?" This was a situation fraught with possibilities for buck-passing and leading to uncoordinated planning and administration. Secondly, the relationship between the governmental agricultural organs and the lower party apparatus was left indefinite. Thus it is not surprising that one year later, in March 1962, agricultural administration was forced into still another organizational mold that attempted to rectify these two shortcomings.

Agricultural production and procurement have now been placed in the hands of a unified bureaucratic structure, which in turn is to be supervised by a party-dominated network of agricultural committees.[16] "Territorial production kolkhoz-sovkhoz (or sovkhoz-kolkhoz, if state

[15] *Pravda*, February 21, 1961. [16] *Pravda*, March 24, 1962.

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farms predominate) administrations" at the grass roots are to provide "leadership in the organization of production and procurement of agricultural products." In most instances, an administration embraces several existing raions. Inspector-organizers, who work directly with kolkhozy and sovkhozy, are attached to each administration. These administrations are the lowest rung of an administrative hierarchy composed of oblast "administrations of production and procurement of agricultural products" (headed by a first deputy chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee) and republic "ministries of production and procurement of agricultural products" (headed by a first deputy chairman of the republic council of ministers).

At the all-union, republic, and oblast levels, agricultural committees have been created to coordinate agricultural activities and to assist and check on the agricultural bureaucracy. Composed of both party and governmental functionaries concerned with agriculture, these committees are chaired in republics and oblasts by party first secretaries and at the all-union level by a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, in each territorial production kolkhoz-sovkhoz administration, there is physically located an organizer from the oblast party committee (or republic central committee in republics without oblasts). The organizer, with a group of instructors, is charged with assisting primary party organizations of kolkhozy and sovkhozy in "organizational and mass-political work."

This organizational pattern is apparently designed to facilitate supervision of agriculture by the party apparatus, while, at the same time, inhibiting its usurpation of day-to-day agricultural administration. Obviously, however, there will still be considerable temptation for party functionaries to take over. Although the reorganization still basically adheres to a pattern of consolidated territorial administration and cautious bureaucratic decentralization, it does reinforce controls over local administrators and injects new elements of centralization into agricultural administration.

Khrushchev emphasized in his speech on March 9, 1962, to the Central Committee Plenum: "It [production administration] is not an organ of the raion organizations, but an organ entrusted with great authority by the oblast, krai, or republic organizations. With the raion, as well as with inter-raion administrations, there will be a party organizer of the Central Committee or of the obkrom as well as instructors to exercise a definite influence on the work of the party and komsomol organizations in the interest of developing production." The raion party and governmental bureaucracy has been substantially undercut by the

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inter-raion territorial administration and its party organizers. The party organizers represent a recentralization within the party apparatus and indicate firm direction from above of primary party organizations in state and collective farms. Almost inevitably the inspector-organizers of the territorial administrations will interfere with the chairmen of the collective and state farms, despite admonitions to the contrary. Finally, within a republic, the agricultural administration is centralized and consolidated. The agricultural apparatus shows no sign of withering away.

V. The Party and Industry

As previously noted, the 1957 industrial reorganization was in part designed to allow oblast, krai, and republic party secretaries a greater voice in the management of the most important industry. Similarly, local industry (e.g., brick works, furniture factories) was placed more firmly under the jurisdiction of local soviets, thus providing party secretaries at all local levels with greater opportunities for influencing the local economy. The lower party apparatus was not only charged with assisting the regional economic council to meet production goals, but also with ensuring that national interests were at all times taken into consideration in daily local decision-making.

Judging by production results, the regional economic councils have been rather successful. Industrial goals for the Seven-Year Plan, although somewhat lower than for previous plans, have been overfulfilled by a respectable margin. Nevertheless, territorial industrial management has not been without its troubles. The former industrial ministries were charged with "parochialism" on an industrial branch basis —i.e., with jealously guarding their far-flung industrial empires and cooperating only hesitantly with each other. Difficulties in the present system are lumped under the rubric "localism." In either case, the Russian saying, "One's own shirt is closer to one's body," is applicable. Localism, although a thorny problem, at least to date has not become impossible. It has, however, occasioned in the last two years some reversals in administrative practice toward centralized control that run counter to the stated purpose of the reorganization: to bring management closer to production.

Never have the regional economic councils had absolute jurisdiction over their bailiwicks. As noted earlier, the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance from the very beginning exercised strong central controls over the councils—much to the frustration of their officials and oblast party secretaries. Throughout 1957 and into the spring

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of 1958 there was much talk of expanding the rights of the councils when the new system had shaken down. Even today lip service is given to further decentralization. In actual fact, the reorganization never decentralized as much as was originally suggested and recent innovations have, on the whole, been in the opposite direction—primarily because of the dangers of localism. All-republic economic councils were established in mid-1960 to oversee and coordinate the activities of the regional economic councils in the Russian, Ukrainian, and Kazakh republics. More currently, the country has been divided into 17 large economic regions. Councils have been established to coordinate economic activity within each region.[17] Rather stringent restrictions have been placed on the use of investment funds by regional economic councils; and in the spring of 1961 Khrushchev cryptically indicated that even further central direction of investment would be imposed to stop wasteful dispersion of investment funds.[18] Supply and sales of a wide variety of important commodities have been retained by central authorities; and efforts to rationalize the inefficient and duplicative supply organizations have been frustrated by the reluctance of authorities to transfer these functions to the regional economic councils.

The gradual attrition of the rights of regional economic councils has resulted from a complex set of factors, but shortcomings in the party apparatus bear their share of blame. As early as May 1958 a Central Committee resolution condemned regional industrial officials for localism in the use of capital investment funds and, significantly, took a verbal slap at responsible provincial party authorities who failed to prevent such abuses.[19] *Pravda* in September 1958 enlarged on the charge: "Unfortunately, there are party workers who not infrequently promote antistate practices. Not having themselves delved into the heart of the matter, they begin to support the incorrect proposals of managerial officials and in some cases even force such officials to carry out work not included in the plan in order to suit local interests."[20] Rather ominously, during denunciations in 1961 of fraud in agriculture, it was noted that industry too is not free from fraudulent practices.

Thus, in both agriculture and industry, intensification of party controls over the state administration has created problems that have necessitated substantial modifications in the initial pattern of administrative reform. While official doctrine sees no conflict between national and local interests, which by definition must coincide in the Soviet socialist democracy, this unity of interests is perhaps more difficult for a

[17] *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, May 28, 1961. [18] *Pravda*, June 25, 1961.
[19] *Pravda*, May 19, 1958. [20] *Pravda*, September 1, 1958.

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local party secretary to define. This is particularly true when he is given fuller and more direct administrative responsibilities for his territory. How can a local party secretary retain a detached party point of view when he is in the dilemma of the following district party secretary? "Looking at it from the outside you would never make out what I am—the secretary of the party committee or the chairman of the soviet executive committee or an employee of the Sovnarkhoz. Really, I am a kind of multiple tool! Of course one has to take part in economic affairs, but surely there ought to be a difference in the approach, in the style of work of a district committee and a district soviet, of a district committee and a factory, or a district committee and a sovnarkhoz? But somehow or other the boundary lines have disappeared."[21]

Since the first secretary is the most powerful person in any territorial unit, if he should evade central directives and take refuge from overwhelming production goals in fraud, the consequences are most serious. If the first secretary is corrupted, then most probably it will be discovered that a number of other key officials in the area are associated with him in a mutual protection society. The revelations in 1961 of thorough corruption in Tadzhikistan are a poignant confirmation of this generalization.[22]

To counteract these harmful tendencies, the regime has gradually been reinstituting more centralized levers of state control. In addition to the new controls over agriculture and industry already mentioned, in July 1961 the Soviet Control Commission was transformed into a State Control Commission. This, along with numerous proposals in the press for new kinds of state inspection, indicates a heightened role for state control and inspection after the recent exposures of fraud.[23] Finally, legal codes are being rushed into the battle. A May 1958 law provides criminal sanctions for repeated violations of interregional deliveries. A law passed in May 1961, providing stiff penalties for falsification of reports, has already been widely employed.[24]

VI. New Emphases in Party Functions

The retardation of administrative decentralization and in some cases a shift of administrative duties from party to governmental functionaries are not, however, the sole reactions to the dilemmas of Party-State

[21] Leonard Schapiro, "The Party and the State," *Survey*, No. 38 (November 1961), 112, quoting M. Ivashechkin, "Thinking out loud: Diary of a district party committee secretary," *Nash Sovremmenik*, No. 3 (1961), 5.

[22] *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, April 21, 1961.

[23] *Pravda*, July 23, 1961. [24] *Sel'skaya Zhizn'*, May 16, 1961.

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relations raised in the last eight years. Of equal importance has been a pervasive effort to reshape the party control system. The thrust of the argument heretofore is not that the Party in the last several years has been discredited and reduced to the secondary position it sometimes held during the Stalin period. The new Party Program literally shrieks about the great tasks of the Party in building communism. Khrushchev has confirmed the durability of the Party, which will remain long after the state has withered away. The Party, and especially the apparatus, is still the central nervous system, the motive force in Soviet society. The party first secretary continues to be the most authoritative and powerful figure at every territorial-administrative echelon and bears ultimate responsibility for all occurrences in his bailiwick.

On the contrary, a determined effort is being made to refashion the Party into a more subtle—and, hopefully, therefore more effective—instrument of central control and direction over society. The major elements in the new character being fashioned for the Party are a debureaucratization of the Party, combined with increased reliance on party activists; greater emphasis on the use of indirect controls over the state, and concomitantly a partial retrenchment in direct party administration; greater attention by the Party to mass-organizational, propaganda, and agitational work; tightened discipline; and, at least in the case of the new party organizers in territorial agricultural administrations, some recentralization in the apparatus at the lower levels.

The regime has applied pressure on lower party secretaries to prune the party cadre substantially. A Central Committee decree of March 24, 1956, ordered a reduction in oblast, krai, and republic party staffs; and in mid-1959 the chief of the Central Committee Department of Party Organs wrote that "in recent years" the apparatus of republic central committees and oblast party committees had been cut by 40 per cent.[25] In December 1957, in connection with the reorganization of the raion party organization, a 20 per cent reduction in the cadre was ordered. Several oblast party secretaries at the 22nd Congress bragged about personnel economies in their party organizations. The second secretary of the Moscow oblast, for example, claimed a reduction in the oblast's apparatus of nearly 30 per cent in the last five years.[26]

On the other hand, the apparatus has demonstrated considerable ingenuity in propagating itself and hence efforts to trim it have probably met with only partial success. In fact, the recent campaigns largely

[25] V. Churaev, "Rasvitie vnutripartiinoi demokratii v KPSS" [Development of interparty democracy in the CPSU], *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, No. 6 (June 1959), 25.
[26] *Pravda*, October 30, 1961.

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resulted from a sharp growth in the apparatus during the early and mid-1950's. A. F. Gorkin, head of the Central Auditing Commission, took note at the Congress of several oblast party committees that had violated instructions by inflating their staffs through one means or another.[27] Nevertheless, the campaign to slice the party bureaucracy appears real enough and undoubtedly some successes have been scored.

Staffs have been reduced either by outright elimination of positions or by merging territorial party committees. Through consolidations, some 12 oblast and 1,186 raion and borough party organizations were eliminated between 1956 and October 1961. Again, through mergers of enterprises, kolkhozy, institutions, and administrative units, the number of primary party organizations since the 20th Congress in 1956 has declined from 350,000 to a little less than 300,000. In addition, the minimum membership of a primary party organization required to support a full-time paid secretary has been raised from 100 to 150.[28]

In place of party functionaries, the official line now urges the use—whenever possible—of party activists, such as "non-staff" instructors, lecturers, and voluntary standing commissions, to perform staff functions. Second secretary Frol Kozlov last year asserted that over 230,000 such party activists were attached to party committees at all administrative levels.[29] In mid-1959 party control commissions were established in primary party organizations to give more form and regularity to party supervision of state management. Kozlov reported to the Congress that over 600,000 Communists are now participating in these commissions. One of the rituals performed at the Congress by regional party officials was to cite statistics attesting to the upsurge in activists clustered around the apparatus.

By reducing the size of the party apparatus and retracting it somewhat from direct day-to-day involvement in state administration, it is hoped that the militancy and discipline of the Party will be improved and that it will become a more effective instrument for central direction of society. The cadre, unencumbered by its own red tape and daily administrative responsibilities, will be able to concentrate on steering the ship of state on the hazily chartered course toward communism.

Hopefully, also, by pruning party staffs, deadwood will be eliminated and the caliber of party functionaries improved. Khrushchev has re-

[27] *Pravda*, October 18, 1961.

[28] *Ibid.* The head of the CC Department of Party Organs in mid-1959 wrote that 8.8 per cent of the primary party organizations had full-time secretaries. This would mean that these organizations have roughly 26,500 full-time secretaries, a figure 2,500 less than that given to a group of visiting Italian Communists in 1957.

[29] *Pravda*, October 29, 1961.

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peatedly emphasized that he will reward achievement and dispose of second-raters. The turnover of one-third of oblast and krai party secretaries in the first ten months of 1961 alone—largely for agricultural failures—emphasizes his search for talent. The educational level and technical training of the cadre have also shown marked improvement. Kozlov reported that nine-tenths of the republic, oblast, and krai secretaries and three-fourths of the city and raion secretaries have a higher education. It is hoped that if a party functionary is technically trained, he will be better equipped to judge the state administration and to perform his control function in a more enlightened manner.

The territorial party secretaries and their staffs remain ultimately responsible for all happenings and serve as the highest arbitrators and coordinators in their areas. But they are strongly advised to manage their districts in a less blatant and less arbitrary manner and to operate more indirectly and with more finesse: through the Party's prerogative embodied in the *nomenklatura* to make all key administrative appointments; by greater attention to agitation, propaganda, and education; and by more effective mobilization of party members working in enterprises, kolkhozy, institutions, and mass organizations.

The revised Party Statutes contain a new provision that underscores the requirement of more subtlety in direction by the party apparatus: "Party organizations must not supplant administrative, trade union, cooperative and other public organizations of working people and must not tolerate confusion between the functions of party and other organs, or superfluous parallelism in work."[80] It should be emphasized that this provision is placed under the rubric of duties of republican, krai, oblast, city, and raion party organizations. At the all-union level, the Party Presidium serves as the top policy-making and policy-coordinating body.

The streamlined lower party apparatus has been advised to make its influence felt by devoting greater care to selecting and screening appointments of local administrators (factory managers, trade union heads, collective farm chairmen, school principals, etc.). Apparently, all too often party organizations have merely given pro forma approval of such appointments or have abused this prerogative by favoritism or nepotism. It is doubtful, however, whether local party secretaries can effectively exercise this power unless the *nomenklatura* system itself is decentralized. This the leadership is probably reluctant to do in the face of dangers to party unity from "localism."

Several Central Committee decrees in recent years have demanded

[80] *Kommunist,* No. 12 (August 1961), 12 (Article 42).

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that more attention be devoted by the party cadre to agitation and propaganda. The regime apparently believed lower levels of the apparatus were slackening their efforts in this field (largely explainable by the great administrative load placed on local party officials); and as a result there was a growing skepticism among the populace toward ideological pronouncements and official policy statements. The party apparatus has also been commanded to beef up party schools and intensify its educational program among local officials of all types, both to raise their technical and political qualifications and to inhibit divergences in outlook between party and governmental bureaucrats by providing them with a common educational experience.

Finally, the leadership is attempting to broaden the base of the Party, to extend its roots farther into the most politically conscious segment of the population. The Party now stands at over 9.7 million members, an increase of 2.5 million since 1956. Thus, one out of every 14 adults is a Party member. By enlisting more of "the best people" into the Party's ranks, it is hoped they will more willingly and actively carry out the party leadership's policies.

The new statutory requirement of a high rate of turnover in the membership of party committees and the limitations on the terms of party secretaries is designed to pump a continuous supply of fresh blood into leading party organs (while providing loopholes to protect the tenure of the better party functionaries) and to provide a sense of participation in the Establishment for a greater number of average, noncadre, party members. The mandatory turnover in committee members also provides a method for recruiting capable party leaders.

Besides creating an extensive group of party activists to bridge the gap between the apparatus and the masses, the leadership is also attempting to make the dichotomy between the Party and the people less sharp. The new Party Program was reviewed in grass-roots agitational meetings not only by Communists but also by the nonparty masses—even though it was a party document. The Party is now characterized as the Party of the whole people. The speeches at the Congress and the Program went out of their way to assert the Party's humaneness and concern for the people. Presidium member Kosygin suggested as a party slogan, "All in the name of humanity for the benefit of man."

VII. Leading Party Bodies and Changing Party Roles

Efforts at administrative decentralization, the changing relationships between the party and state hierarchies, and the recent remodeling of

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the Party's role can be used as guides for explaining shifts in the composition of the Central Committee Presidium and Secretariat. Again, the caveat must be added that fluctuations in the membership of the leading party bodies result from a number of other factors, perhaps the most important of which has been maneuvers for power among the leaders. No attempt will be made here to explain any particular personnel action, such as the largely unexplained demotions of past Presidium members Kirichenko, Belyayev, Aristov, Ignatov, and Furtseva. However, the foregoing analysis of the role of the Party can shed some light on the changing gross membership structure of these top party bodies. The following, then, is an attempt to link the analysis of administrative practices with Kremlinology. (See Table 1.)

Between 1953 and 1957 the Presidium was weighted in favor of central governmental officials, though by 1956 the number of Party Central Committee secretaries with Presidium standing had been increased. In June 1957, in the aftermath of the abortive anti-Party coup, CC secretaries gained a numerical edge over central government officials as Khrushchev promoted his protégés. The superiority of the party apparatus and the position of Khrushchev were also strongly reinforced by the inclusion of nine provincial party secretaries. Thus, the party apparatus strongly dominated the Presidium at the same time that its administrative responsibilities had been greatly enlarged.

During the spring of 1960, several CC secretaries were shifted into the government, and thus the representation of the central state and party apparatuses was rebalanced in the Presidium. This was a reflection of efforts to separate more clearly the Party and State at the regional level. The new Presidium announced at the 22nd Congress manifests a continuing balance between central party and government officials.

The representation of regional functionaries in the Presidium through time is also consistent with the general analysis of administrative developments. Between 1953 and 1957, never more than two regional officials sat on the Presidium. Nine provincial functionaries (eight party and one governmental) were elevated to this august body in June 1957. By December, a number of these provincial officials had been assigned to positions in Moscow, but regional functionaries still numbered seven and constituted 28 per cent of the Presidium. They continue to be represented in the new Presidium at about the same ratio. In large measure the packing of the Presidium with provincial functionaries in June 1957 was Khrushchev's way of ensuring control of this body by promoting his protégés to its membership. It was also part of his hunt for new, vigorous administrative talent. This is confirmed by the subse-

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TABLE 1. COMPOSITION OF THE CC PRESIDIUM 1953-1961

		March 1953	*Feb. 1956*	*June 1957*	*Dec. 1959*	*July 1960*	*Nov. 1961*
Party Functionaries	*Secretariat*	*Khrushchev Ignatyev Pospelov Shatalin	*Khrushchev *Suslov †Brezhnev †Furtseva †Shepilov Belyayev Aristov Pospelov	*Khrushchev *Suslov *Belyayev *Aristov *Brezhnev *Furtseva *Kuusinen †Pospelov	*Khrushchev *Kirichenko *Suslov *Aristov *Brezhnev *Furtseva *Kuusinen *Mukhitdinov *Ignatov †Pospelov	*Khrushchev *Kozlov *Kuusinen *Mukhitdinov *Suslov	*Khrushchev *Kozlov *Kuusinen *Suslov Demichev Il'chev Ponomarev Spiridonov Shelepin
	Provincial Secretaries	†Melnikov †Bagirov	*Kirichenko †Mukhitdinov	*Ignatov *Kirichenko *Kozlov †Kalnberzin †Kirilenko †Mazurov †Mukhitdinov †Mzhavanadze	*Belyayev †Kirilenko †Mazurov †Mzhavanadze †Podgorny	*Podgorny †Kirilenko †Mazurov †Mzhavanadze	*Podgorny †Rashidov †Mazurov †Mzhavanadze †Shcherbitsky
	Others		†Shvernik (Control Com)	*Shvernik (Control Com)	*Shvernik (Control Com)	*Shvernik *Aristov (Buro, RSFSR) †Pospelov (Buro, RSFSR)	*Shvernik *Voronov (Buro, RSFSR)
Government Functionaries	*Central Government*	*Beria *Bulganin *Kaganovich *Malenkov *Mikoyan *Molotov *Pervukhin *Saburov *Voroshilov †Ponomarenko	*Bulganin *Voroshilov *Kaganovich *Mikoyan *Molotov *Pervukhin *Saburov *Malenkov	*Bulganin *Voroshilov *Mikoyan †Kosygin †Pervukhin	*Khrushchev *Kozlov *Mikoyan *Voroshilov †Kosygin †Pervukhin	*Khrushchev *Brezhnev *Ignatov *Kosygin *Mikoyan *Furtseva †Pervukhin	*Khrushchev *Brezhnev *Mikoyan *Kosygin
	Provincial			†Korotchenko	†Polyansky †Korotchenko †Kalnberzin	*Polyansky †Korotchenko †Kalnberzin	*Polyansky
	Other	†Shvernik	†Zhukov (Military)	*Zhukov (Military)		*Voroshilov	†Grishin (Trade unions)

* Full member, Presidium
† Candidate member, Presidium

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quent promotion of several regional figures to posts in Moscow—e.g., Kirichenko, Mukhitdinov, Ignatov, Kozlov. In the last several years, however, perhaps the overriding explanation for regional representation in the Presidium is related to efforts to decentralize administration. Given the increased responsibilities laid upon provincial functionaries and the consequent dangers of localism, it is necessary for these provincial officials to have a voice in Presidium deliberations.

The changing role of the party apparatus is also indicated in a review of the Secretariat membership since 1953. In early 1955 the Secretariat had been reduced to a mere three men. By December 1959 it stood at nine and its responsibilities had been enlarged in correspondence with the increased administrative burden of the party apparatus. It appeared that at least Ignatov, Mukhitdinov, Furtseva, Brezhnev, and perhaps Aristov were not directly, or at any rate not fully, occupied with more strictly party matters, such as cadre and organizational work, propaganda and agitation, or the world Communist movement. By July 1960 the Secretariat had been reduced to five. Those secretaries who had appeared to be specializing in such fields as agriculture, industry, culture, and women's affairs were transferred to the governmental hierarchy.

At the 22nd Party Congress the Secretariat was again enlarged to nine, although five of the new secretaries were not, at least for the time being, placed on the Presidium. While on the surface this might appear to signify a return to direct party administration, a closer examination of the likely responsibilities of the new secretaries indicates no retreat from the policy of a clearer separation of Party and State. Rather, it buttresses the analysis of the new direction in party activities. Although it is too early to speak definitely, it would appear that the Secretariat has been loaded with ideologists and agit-prop specialists, party organizational experts, and men experienced in Communist bloc affairs. P. N. Demichev and I. V. Spiridonov[31] were previously First Secretaries of the Moscow and the Leningrad party organizations, respectively, and hence are intimately familiar with the problems of provincial officials. They may be considered experienced hands in party organizational and cadre matters at the regional level. M. A. Suslov and O. V. Kuusinen, who for some time have been thought to be occupied with bloc problems, have now been joined by another old pro in the international Communist movement, B. I. Ponomarev, former chief of the CC De-

[31] Spiridonov was demoted in the late spring of 1962. His position was taken by A. P. Kirilenko, former party first secretary of Sverdlovsk oblast, who was promoted to full membership in the Party Presidium and First Deputy Chairman of the Bureau for the RSFSR.

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partment for Liaison with non-Bloc Communist Parties. That one-third of the Secretariat is now involved in the problems of the international Communist movement is a result of the challenges to Soviet leadership by the Peking-Tirana axis and the growing complexity and sensitivity of bloc relationships. I. F. Il'ichev, former head of the CC Department for Propaganda and Agitation, has replaced Pospelov as the Secretariat's primary ideologist and agit-prop authority, although both Suslov and Ponomarev also have reputations in this field. Second Secretary Frol Kozlov, Khrushchev's second-in-command, appears to have general supervisory duties over the Secretariat. Finally, A. N. Shelepin, as former chief of the secret police and before that head of the Komsomol, may have responsibilities in either or both of these areas. Or, it may be speculated that he will be concerned with the broad problem of mobilizing public opinion to enforce socialist legality through such devices as workers' brigades, comrades' courts, and so forth.

Two other top leaders merit attention: Presidium members V. V. Grishin and L. I. Brezhnev. Grishin, who in 1960 was appointed candidate member of the Presidium, is head of the trade unions. His elevation suggests the increased importance that the leadership has placed on mass organizations like the trade unions in recent years as a major technique of mobilizing and controlling society. A similar comment can be made about Brezhnev, an important party official who is a full member of the Presidium and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This position previously had been held by the doddering Voroshilov and was largely honorific as the titular head of state. Brezhnev's appointment indicates a more vigorous direction of the soviets and the mass organizations clustered around them; again, in sum, a more active campaign to mobilize the populace through mass organizations.

VIII. Tensions and the Future

The projected role of the Party outlined at the recent Congress indicates that Khrushchev is striving to develop a more artful and, at the same time, more pervasive and penetrating structure of party supervision throughout society. This does not imply a dilution of party unity or discipline or a relaxation of party control. Frol Kozlov emphasized that "the CPSU is not a federative party or a party of committees . . . the party resolutely fights against any manifestations of localism, against viewing problems of party policy from a position of 'our own personal interests.' . . . the party has no right to exclude from its arsenal

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the means of fighting for ideological and organizational unity in its ranks. . . ."[32]

Successes in these new directions of party development are far from assured. The heavy burdens and responsibilities placed on the apparatus create great pressures for increasing staffs and directly intervening in state administration. By broadening the base of the Party and transforming it into a mass organization rather than a tightly knit, militant conspiratorial party, it could lose its dynamism and *élan*, its sense of the uniqueness of its role in shaping and running Soviet society. On the other hand, antagonisms between the cadre and the average party member may be heightened. The regime apparently believes that these dangers are not overwhelming, because 44 years of party rule and propaganda have erased major antagonisms and differences of view between the people and the party leadership. Obviously, the elite believes that the mass membership will conform to the discipline and attitudes of the Party, not that the Party will succumb to the attitudes of the mass. Further, it is believed that any threatening deviations or signs of decay of purpose and dedication can be corrected by heavy doses of agitation and propaganda, rigid insistence on ideological and organizational unity and, if necessary, a whiff of grapeshot.

There are a number of tensions built into the conception of the Party as it has been outlined. The Party is the container of a large segment of the "best people" and is concerned with the welfare of the people; and at the same time it is a monolithic, disciplined organizer of the masses. The Party is to direct society more vigorously, but less blatantly. The party apparatus and the state administration have been somewhat decentralized and there is to be increased comradely criticism within the Party; but it is to remain monolithic and centralized. Manifestly, given these tensions, the nature and role of the Party are far from stable.

[32] *Pravda*, October 29, 1961.

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A PARADIGM FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL UNIFICATION*

By AMITAI ETZIONI

A PARADIGM is more than a perspective but less than a theory. It provides a set of interrelated questions, but no hypothetical answers or account of validated propositions. It provides a "language," a net of variables, but it does not specify the relationships among the parameters of these variables. It is less vague than a mere perspective, providing an ordered, specific, and often logically exhaustive and tightly ordered focus for research and speculation. A paradigm is often a stage on the way from an old perspective to a new theory.[1]

The test of a paradigm is not only the validity of the theories constructed with its help, but also its fruitfulness in terms of the spectrum of significant problems whose study benefits from it. First we turn to delineating the subject matter of our paradigm and then we present the paradigm itself. The major body of this article is devoted to an indication of the kinds of problems that can be handled by this instrument; at the same time, we hope to point out some of the issues that are essential to an understanding of political unification.

I. Delineation of the Subject and Concepts

Our paradigm provides a set of dimensions for the study of a process—specifically, the formation of political communities out of units that previously shared no or only a few political bonds. This process is referred to as *unification*. We are particularly interested in the unification of already existing nations. But the paradigm applies also to the formation of other political communities, such as national communities, out of tribal, village, or feudal societies.

A community is fully established only when it has self-sufficient integrative mechanisms—that is, the continuation of its existence and form[2] is provided by its own processes and not dependent upon those

* This article was written while I was a Research Associate at the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. I am indebted to Ernst B. Haas for valuable comments on an earlier version of it.

[1] Two paradigms that had a lasting impact on sociology have been constructed by Robert K. Merton, one for functional analysis and one for the study of sociology of knowledge. See his *Social Theory and Social Structure* (rev. ed., Glencoe, Ill., 1957).

[2] Most functional models deal only with the conditions under which a collectivity survives. I spelled out elsewhere the need to study the conditions under which a col-

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of external systems or member-units. A *political community* is a community that possesses three kinds of integration: (a) it has a monopoly over the legitimate use of means of violence (though it may "delegate" some of this monopoly to member-units); (b) it has a center of decision-making that is able to affect the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and (c) it is the superior focus of political identification for the large majority of the politically aware citizens.

The degree of integration is the main characteristic that distinguishes political communities, whose member-units are nations, from other international systems. *International system* is the more encompassing concept, indicating that changes in the action of one nation affect actions in others *and* that these changes, in turn, have repercussions on the unit or units in which or from which the change was initiated.[3] While the parts of a system are, by definition, interrelated, its level of integration—on each of the three counts specified above—may be high or low, and its interdependence may be self-maintained or sustained by the component units (e.g., nations), or be a product of the external environment (e.g., forced by a superior power, not a member of the system). One cannot, for instance, deduce from the fact that the USSR and the United States have become part of one global system—that they affect each other—anything about the integrative level of this relationship.[4] Even countries engaged in war are parts of one system. In short, parts of systems are interdependent; members of communities are integrated.

Several of the most frequently used terms in international studies, usually defined inductively and eclectically, can be viewed as applying to international systems that differ consistently in their degree of integration. International organizations, blocs, and empires are all international systems that are more integrated than *mere* international systems but less integrated than political communities. They can be fruitfully ordered according to their relative position on the three dimensions of integration. First let us consider monopoly of the legitimate use of means of violence. *International organizations* command no

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lectivity maintains its form or structure (or, in the case of organization, its level of effectiveness). See Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and a Suggestion," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, v (September 1960), 257-78.

[3] See Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957), 4.

[4] Cf. Talcott Parsons, "Polarization and the Problem of International Order," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, vi (Spring 1961), 130ff.

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such means,[5] let alone a monopoly over their legitimate use. Members of *blocs* (and alliances) often coordinate their military efforts (as did the Allied Forces in World War II) but the forces remain chiefly under the control of the member-units, the nations. *Empires* have armed forces of their own, but their claim to legitimate monopoly is frequently challenged by member-units. Only political communities are international systems that have well-established, legitimate monopolies.

All of these types of international systems have some common decision-making center, but they differ greatly in the capacity and scope of this center. *International organizations* are consultative bodies, whose decision-making scope is limited to one or a few spheres (e.g., postal services, or health, or labor, etc.), and to functions that are not essential to the survival of the member-units, nor do these functions have a significant bearing on their ability to pursue their national interests. The decision-making of *blocs* (and alliances) tends to be consultative, like that of international organizations, but their scope is larger. They are often multi-functional (e.g., political and military; cultural and economic), and the functions affected are more highly valued by the member-societies than those involved in typical international organizations. *Empires* have a considerable amount of decision-making power that binds member-units—i.e., their decisions are enforceable. Their scope is larger than that of blocs, frequently encompassing political, military, and economic functions as well as those of communication, culture, education, and the like. The decision-making centers of empires are not as encompassing as those of political communities, not in regard to their power but in the legitimation of the decisions made. Since membership in empires is not voluntary, and responsiveness to member-units is not high, it might well be said that empires have "supranational" power, but only limited "supranational" authority.[6]

Finally, *international organizations* rarely serve as a focus of political identification. *Blocs*, historically, have been lacking in this value, though since World War I blocs have acquired some ideological meaning (as the contemporary "Free World" has). *Empires*, on the whole, are not much more integrated on this score than blocs, but they usually have at least one core unit (Rome, Britain) that strongly identifies with the empire, a commitment only approximated but not matched by bloc leaders. There was a paternalistic element in the orientation of the

[5] The League of Nations and the UN differ from most international organizations on so many counts that they should be treated as a distinct category.

[6] Following Max Weber, "authority" is defined as legitimate power.

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core-country of empires to those subordinated to it; the orientation of bloc "superpowers" to other bloc members tends to be governed more by expediency. The core-countries used to view the empire as an extension of their own polities; they often attempted to assimilate the subordinate units into the superordinating one. They even granted citizenship to the indigenous populations. The bloc superpower, on the other hand, usually views the bloc as a limited partnership with outsiders. (The Soviet system comes closer to an empire than a bloc from this viewpoint.[7]) At least some local elites in the subordinate countries responded by identifying with the empire, a phenomenon less intensively reproduced in the attitude of members of blocs to the superpower (e.g., it seems that there were more Romano-philes in Greece than there are U.S.-philes in England). In short, empires drew more identification than blocs but neither attracted the kind of encompassing and intensive identification that political communities command.

Thus, in sum, on these three counts, international organizations are less integrated than blocs, blocs less than empires, and empires less than political communities.[8]

The concepts of international organization, bloc, empire, and political community are used in the literature of international relations only approximately as defined here. Since these concepts were originally employed by historians and journalists, they do not constitute part of a formal language or theory. Hence it is not surprising that when they are defined deductively and viewed as positions in a multi-dimensional space, some discrepancies between their definition and their traditional usage occur. By our definition the Soviet bloc, between 1945 and 1953—at least some parts of it—was not a "bloc," but an empire; parts of the Roman Empire, at least in its heyday, were not an "empire," but a political community. It would be futile to search for deductive definitions that will exactly fit concrete cases or inductive concepts. Actually it is a point in favor of our approach that it calls attention to the fact that behind the commonly used labels lie analytically different phenomena. We gain from this distinction by being able to note that since 1953 the Eastern European part of the Soviet system (with the exception of Albania) has changed from an empire system to a system somewhat closer to that of a political community, rather than stating

[7] See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "The Organization of the Communist Camp," *World Politics*, XIII (January 1961), 175-209, and *The Soviet Bloc* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

[8] An hypothesis emerges from this comparison: the broader the scope of an international system in terms of the number of sectors (e.g., economic, cultural) included, and the more significant they are to its survival and goals, the more integrated the system is on all three counts of integration (monopoly, decision-making, and focusing of identification). I return to this point below.

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that the Soviet system—all of it—was and is a bloc, just as, let us say, the Free World is. Similarly, it might be useful to state that the Roman system, during its heyday, at least for the countries other than those at its periphery, came much closer to a political community than, let us say, the Ottoman system, which was chiefly an empire. Such statements require keeping our definition analytically pure, and viewing reality as being composed of various configurations of our analytical concepts.

Our paradigm serves not so much to study this or that state of integration but the process of unification, a process through which integration is increased. Since systems that are moving toward a community—that is, a high level of integration—are often confused with those that have *reached* such a state—as when one refers to the present European or Scandinavian system as a supranational community—we introduce a concept to avoid this ambiguity. We use the term "unions" to refer to potential political communities, systems that are in the process of increasing their integration. "Political communities" is used to refer strictly to highly integrated systems.

II. A Unification Paradigm

Four major questions have to be asked about every process: Under what conditions is it initiated? What forces direct its development? What path does it take? And, what is the state of the system affected by the process once that process is terminated? We use this paradigm of processes to construct one for the study of political unification, especially for the study of unification of nations. We ask first, what is the state of the international relations and the various political units when the increase in integration is initiated? Which factors enhance, and which hinder, unification? Once unification has been initiated, we ask what forces are applied to control the process, and how are these forces distributed among the various participants? What pattern does unification itself follow? Do all societal sectors unify simultaneously or successively and, if successively, in what order? Which sector comes first, which later? Finally, we ask, once unification is interrupted or has ceased, what degree of integration has the system reached, how encompassing has it become, and what function does it serve?

Whatever the independent variable—background conditions, integrating forces, retarding factors—we turn to the same dependent variables: the degree and scope of unification; that is, we wish to out-

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line the problems involved in determining the effect these various factors have on the success or failure of unification.

More specifically, our paradigm includes the following dimensions:[9]

1. *The Pre-Unification State*
   - (i) Unit Properties
     - a. Individual properties
     - b. Analytical properties
   - (ii) Environment Properties
     - a. Non-social (ecological) properties
     - b. Social properties
   - (iii) System Properties
     - a. Pre-unification integration and scope
     - b. Shared properties (other than integration)
2. *The Unification Process: A. Integrating Forces*
   - (i) Effective Configurations
   - (ii) Effective Distributions
     - a. Degree of elitism
     - b. Degree of internalization
3. *The Unification Process: B. Integrating Sectors*
   - (i) The First Stage: Take-off
     - a. Determinants of take-off
     - b. The take-off sector
   - (ii) Expansion of the Union's Scope
     - a. A stable scope
     - b. Sequences of unification
4. *The Termination State*
   - (i) Degree and Scope
   - (ii) The Dominant Function

In the following pages we briefly discuss some of the conceptual problems involved in applying our paradigm, devoting the main body of this article to a discussion of the specific researchable questions that the paradigm raises for those who study political unification.

III. The Paradigm: Conceptualization and Illustrations

1. THE PRE-UNIFICATION STATE

The question of under what condition the process of unification is initiated must be answered from four viewpoints. First, what is the

[9] This should not be viewed as a table of contents, since conceptual digressions are not included.

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state of each societal unit that is to become a member of a particular union? Is it likely to resist unification or is it willing and able? Second, what is the aggregate of these units like: are most or all units "ready" for unification, or only a few? Third, what are the units like that do not participate—that is, are environmental factors favorable for unification? Finally, to what degree was there international independence and integration before the process of unification (i.e., of build-up in the degree and scope of integration) had occurred? Many specific questions have to be answered before any such general questions can be tackled. In the following pages no attempt is made to examine specific problems or provide any inventory of all or most of the issues involved. We will only illustrate each of the four basic perspectives by discussing one or two of the questions raised by an effort to establish the conditions that existed before or during a unification process.

(i) *Unit Properties*

(a) *Individual properties: Integration and resistance to unification.* The unification process is one in which control of the means of violence, resources, and rewards and identification are transferred from member-units to the system in which they are members. This obviously involves at least some reduction of the integration of the member-units (they become more dependent on the system). It is, therefore, clear that the degree to which these units have been initially integrated greatly affects their potential resistance to unification. The question is, what level or levels of unit-integration are most conducive to unification? One possibility is low-level integration. Haas, for instance, showed that the internal fragmentation of European societies (e.g., sharp cleavages between labor and management) enhanced the development of the ECSC and the EEC.[10] Another possibility is high integration. Countries that fall apart, like the Republic of the Congo, can hardly form a union with other countries. The efforts of Ghana to unify its tribes impede its effort to give substance to the Union of African States that it founded with Guinea and Mali. Actually, most developing countries are less integrated than developed ones, and less often engage in successful inter-country unifications.[11] Thus lack of unit-integration might hinder super-unit integration.

Other possibilities also have to be entertained until research answers

[10] Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford 1958), passim.

[11] Lincoln Gordon, "Economic Regionalism Reconsidered," *World Politics*, XIII (January 1961), 235-36.

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these questions: A medium level of unit-integration might be optimal for unification. Or, medium unit-integration might be conducive to the first stage of unification; low unit-integration, to later stages. Or, unit-integration might be high in countries supporting unification, and low in those resisting it.

Further specification of the study of the effects of unit-integration might proceed by studying the effects of differences in the degree of integration on the three dimensions spelled out above. For instance, we may need to know how much control over means of violence the government of a member-nation has, how responsive the national center of decision-making is to various groups of the population, and how legitimate the government is. What is the nature of the unit-legitimation: is it chiefly religious or secular? In either case, is it national (like the tradition of the English Church or the American "heritage") or cosmopolitan (as Catholicism and communism are)? What effect do these differences have on unification?

The reader may have noticed by now that we studiously avoid the term "supranational communities," which is often used in referring to regional political communities. This term should be avoided because it turns one possible parameter of a variable into part of the definition of a concept. In supranational communities the legitimation of the unit-members is high, and it is of the secular-historical type called "nationalism." But many historical *and* contemporary unions have been initiated among units that either were expressing their nationalism by creating the union (e.g., Germany, Italy) or took place before nationalism significantly affected either the units or the system (e.g., the federation of Nigeria). In short, unification might be initiated in a prenationalist period, in a post-nationalist one, or be, itself, an expression of nationalism. It would seem that post-nationalist unifications would be more difficult to attain than the other two kinds, and that unification that expresses nationalism would be the easiest to accomplish. But, so far, the fact is that the two most successful contemporary unions—the Scandinavian one and the EEC—are post-nationalist. Thus, this question, too, must be left open for further research.

(b) *Analytical properties: Heterogeneity and unification.* Analytical properties are not the property of any single unit but are derived from a study of the distribution of unit-attributes.[12] Unlike unit-properties

[12] Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Herbert Menzel, "On the Relation Between Individual and Collective Properties," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., *Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader* (New York 1961), 422-40, esp. 427.

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and relational properties, analytical properties cannot be observed. They are "second order" abstractions.

The most important analytical property for the study of prerequisites of unification seems to be the degree of heterogeneity of the merging units. It is commonly assumed that the less homogeneous a group, whether it is a small group, community, or nation, the less likely it is to be highly integrated. It would seem that this is also the case on the international level. Differences in income per capita (or, national wealth) have been one of the factors that hindered or undermined unions. The higher income per capita of Nigeria and of the Ivory Coast was one reason they did not join the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union; it affected Jamaica's vote against the constitution of the Federation of the West Indies (September 1961); it contributed to the secession of Syria from the UAR, and to the Katanga secession from the Republic of the Congo. Richer Senegal broke a union—the Federation of Mali—with poorer Mali. In all these cases, unification would or did entail some "leveling" before the citizens of the unit to be adversely affected were committed to the evolving union. In Syria, for instance, many army officers, politicians, and journalists lost their jobs as the result of the union, and foreign trade privileges, important to the large Syrian merchant class, were concentrated in Cairo.

Most contemporary unification efforts have been made among countries that have not only a similar level of income per capita but also a similar level of literacy, civilization, and culture, and a similar degree of industrialization. This holds for the Central American Union, the two West European unions, two West African unions, and the East European one (all to be discussed below).

Political homogeneity is given as one of the necessary prerequisites for unification,[13] and as one of the reasons why the European Economic Community (EEC)—which includes only democratic countries—was more successful than the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and NATO, which include both democratic and nondemocratic countries (e.g., Portugal).

It would, however, not be safe to conclude that heterogeneity necessarily hinders unification. Because nationalism initially tended to unify people with a common ethnic background, a shared cultural tradition and language, the impression was created that these were necessary

[13] On this property, see Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton 1957), 62, 66ff.; Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," *International Organization*, XV (Summer 1961), 374-75, 378.

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prerequisites for unification. Actually, an increasing number of nations, like Switzerland and Canada, are highly divergent on all these counts. Nigeria, for example, holds 250 different tribes. When the Nigerian government issued pamphlets to explain its new constitution to its citizens, it had to publish them in 12 languages in addition to English. Many nation-unions are multilingual, including Benelux, the EEC, the Scandinavian union, and the East European union.

Moreover, there is at least one major type of heterogeneity that enhances rather than hinders unification. Differences in economic specialization of countries, such as between agrarian and industrial countries, or light and heavy industrial concentrations, are supportive to unification. Thus, the question as to whether heterogeneity indeed hinders unification, or under what conditions it does or does not, has yet to be answered. Nor has the question been solved as to how various properties differ with regard to the degree of homogeneity necessary for unification: Is economic heterogeneity as detrimental as cultural heterogeneity? Is political homogeneity as necessary as similarity in income per capita?

While we are interested here only in these properties as prerequisites, it might be worth while to note in passing that, once unification is launched, it is not only affected by but also affects the degree of heterogeneity. For instance, linguistic heterogeneity is reduced when one language becomes the common *second* language of the participant countries (like Russian in East Europe, and English in those Commonwealth countries for which it is not the primary one). Cultural heterogeneity is somewhat reduced by developing shared educational institutions such as the *Collège de l'Europe* in Bruges, the new European University of Florence, the Scandinavian Academy (both now planned) as well as increased communication, tourism, and cultural exchange programs. Economic compatibility among the East European countries is promoted by a twenty-year plan of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.[14] The Agreement on the Regime for Central American Integrated Industries and the Multilateral Treaty on Central American Free Trade Area and Economic Integration, both signed in June 1958 by the five Central American countries, spell out an inter-country specialization program, according to which new industry developed in one country will not be developed in the others.[15] Finally, political

[14] See Margaret Dewar, "Economic Cooperation in the Soviet Orbit," *Yearbook of World Affairs* (London 1959), 45-61.

[15] "The Emerging Common Markets in Latin America," *Monthly Review* (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) (September 1960), 156.

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homogeneity was maintained in an earlier Central American union by dropping Guatemala during the period it was under the rule of the left-wing Arbenz government.[16] Thus, the study of the effects of heterogeneity on the success of efforts to initiate unification has to take into account not only that heterogeneity may not necessarily hinder unification, but that when it does, part of the effort to initiate a union might be channeled toward a reduction of the heterogeneity. The degree to which such effort is successful depends, in part, like that of other unification efforts, on the environment in which the effort is made.

(ii) *Environment Properties: Ecological and Social*

Environmental properties include ecological factors, such as the physical environment in which the union is initiated and by which it is surrounded, and social factors—properties of nonmember units that effect unification.

(a) *Nonsocial (ecological) properties: Union of nonadjacent territories.* Many ecological factors affect the probability that a union will be initiated, including the morphology of the region, the distribution of natural resources in it, the existence (or nonexistence) of a natural border that marks the area. High mountain ranges, for example, have been an important barrier to unifications of Central America and South America; the recent development of a Pan-American Highway is reported to improve chances that the new unions will be successfully initiated.[17]

Territorial unity of political communities seems to be so important that there is a question as to whether a union of nonadjacent territories—that is, one in which the ecological base of the union is broken up by a "no man's land" (e.g., seas) or by nonmember countries—can be successfully formed at all.

Lack of adjacency is an unsettling, tension-provoking factor even for national political communities. West Germany and West Berlin, and West and East Pakistan are two well-known cases. The separation of a small Israeli enclave on Mt. Scopus in the Palestinian part of Jordan is similarly a source of tension. Adjacency of all member countries seems to be one factor in favor of the EEC, and lack of it seems to be one factor undermining EFTA, in which Austria and Switzerland share a union with Portugal, Britain, and the Scandinavian countries. (Interestingly, the three adjacent members of the EFTA constitute a

[16] Norman J. Padelford, "Cooperation in the Central American Region: The Organization of Central American States," *International Organization*, XI (Winter 1957), 46.
[17] *Ibid.*, 50.

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stronger union, the Scandinavian community.) The United Arab Republic was adversely affected by the lack of a shared border between Syria and Egypt. Albania's low integration into the East European Communist union is in part explained by the lack of a shared border between it and other member countries. (It was much better integrated with the union as long as Yugoslavia was also a member.) Mexico is the only country of the seven members of the Latin American Free Trade Area that shares no borders with the others; it remains to be seen if Mexico will be a viable member. The nonadjacent Ghana-Guinea-Mali union has so far acquired little substance. The stretches of the Caribbean Sea that separate Jamaica from Trinidad and from other islands of the Federation of the West Indies certainly hinder the Federation's development. Rebellions against the national government of Indonesia invariably are initiated on another island than Java, the seat of the government.

It would be hasty, though, to conclude that political unification is impossible without territorial unity. The island groups of both Japan and New Zealand are well integrated; so seem the Philippines; the union of England with Eire disintegrated in 1949, but England maintained its ties with North Ireland; Canada's union with Newfoundland is viable. Denmark is an integral part of a union with Norway and Sweden. One might suspect that these unions maintain themselves because the water stretches that separate their parts are fairly small, but the United States seems to have no difficulties in bridging the 2,000 miles that separate Hawaii from the mainland. Moreover, the British Commonwealth includes countries on five continents, only two of which share a border, and the union now has lasted more than four decades.[18]

The study of the effect of territorial contiguity on unification will have to proceed by examining the underlying sociological and political variables that are affected by lack of adjacency in order to determine what compensating mechanisms are used to overcome its negative impact. The most often cited of such factors is hindrance to *transportation of goods and people*, which in turn hinders the integration of the societal units and cultural interactions.

Second, integration is negatively affected by the lack of freedom of *movement for military units*. Nasser might have suppressed the 1961 Syrian secession, or it might not have occurred, if the Egyptian army had been free to interfere from its home bases, unhindered by the

[18] For a fine study of this rather exceptional form of international association, see J. D. B. Miller, *The Commonwealth in the World* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).

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intervening states, Jordan and Israel. This seems also to account, in part, for the ability of small Albania to be the only pro-China country of the Eastern European Communist union.

Third, because of the long association with statehood and nationalism, territorial unity has become a *symbol of political unity*, and its lack has therefore become an expression and symbol of division, as is the case in the West Indies, where the islands, rather than their federation, are the major frame of political identification. It would be of interest to establish to what degree being on a separate island bolstered the distinct social identity of Ireland, or of the various islands of Indonesia. To what degree command over modern means of communication and transportation, which these countries are gradually acquiring, will allow them to overcome differences in cultural tradition, language, and historical experiences created by the lack of such means in earlier generations is a question that has to be answered before the impact of lack of adjacency on unification can be determined.

(b) *Social properties: Enemies, partners, and diffusion.* The threat of a common enemy is probably the factor most often credited with initiating a union of countries. But Deutsch and his associates have already pointed out that this is much less common than is believed, and when a union is initiated to counter an enemy, it tends to disintegrate as the threat passes.[19] The question is, of course, why a defensive alliance sometimes does mature into a more encompassing and lasting union, while in other cases its life is as short, if not shorter, than that of a real or conceived threat. We will return to this question below when the development of unions is discussed; suffice it to say here that the study of "initiation under threat" will have to take account of the predisposition toward unification of sectors *other* than the military, to determine the chances for such a union to succeed.

While the importance of common enemies may well be overemphasized, the desire to unite in order to avail against an overwhelming partner is underplayed for obvious reasons. This seems to be a central factor in *accelerated subregional* unification. We find frequently that when a region is uniting, one subarea is uniting more rapidly than the rest, and that this subarea includes the weaker members of the region. This holds for the Scandinavian countries in the EFTA,[20] for the Benelux countries in the EEC,[21] and for the South in the United States.[22]

[19] Deutsch and others, 44-46.

[20] On the pre-EFTA period, see Frantz Wendt, *The Nordic Council and Co-operation in Scandinavia* (Copenhagen 1959).

[21] See F. Gunther Eyck, *The Benelux Countries: An Historical Survey* (Princeton 1959), 87ff.

[22] W. J. Cash, *Mind of the South* (New York 1960).

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But since in each of these cases stronger ties already existed among the subarea units than among the others before regional unification was initiated, the desire to countervail an overwhelming partner—England in EFTA; West Germany and France in the EEC; and the Northeast in the United States—has yet to be established. This would require demonstrating that these subareas continue to maintain a higher level of integration than the rest of the union, and that they are more integrated, the more "overwhelming" the superior partner or partners are.

A third way in which social units that are not a member of a specific union (or subunion) can affect it is through diffusion or imitation, a process often studied by anthropologists but rarely by students of international relations. There seems to be such a thing as "fashion" in international relations, in which institutions that function in one region are transferred to another. The Marshall Plan directly affected the formulation of the Molotov Plan; the formation of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation, in West Europe, under the initiative of the United States, affected the foundation of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), in East Europe, by the USSR. The EFTA, created three years after the EEC, often imitated it. For instance, when the EEC accelerated cuts in customs for its members, the EFTA did the same for its members. Even the rates of cuts were similar.[23] While the formation of economic unions in Latin America and Africa was discussed and planned before the development of the EEC, the particular treaties finally signed by LAFTA, the Central American Union, and the *Conseil de l'Entente* were affected by the text of the Treaty of Rome, and the institutions created for its implementation.[24]

While the present vogue is for common markets, the earlier one was for regional commissions. The South Pacific Commission (est. 1947), for instance, "took its model" from the Caribbean Commission (est. 1946). An Economic Commission for Europe was founded in 1947, and one for Latin America in 1948.[25]

The question arises whenever social patterns or political institutions (e.g., the American Constitution) are transferred from one region to

[23] Miriam Camps, *Division in Europe*, Policy Memorandum No. 21 (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1960), 50.

[24] The Arab League was sufficiently affected by the vogue to review twice the suggestion to form an Arabic common market. *New York Times*, October 12, 1958; *Arab News and Views*, July 1, 1961.

[25] This is not an instance of pure diffusion, since all commissions are UN organs, but without a "vogue"—based on diffusion—they would hardly be so acceptable to the various countries represented. For another instance of diffusion, see Padelford, 43.

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another: Are the conditions that allowed for the functioning of the pattern in region X available or reproducible in region Y? When this is not the case, one of two things is bound to happen: (a) the vogue for unification, like other fashions, follows its own dynamics—a rapid rise in popularity is succeeded by an equally rapid extinction. The imitation fails because of the different conditions, and the new institutions are rejected. Or (b) the imported institutions survive, maintaining the same formal structure, but actually fulfilling different functions. For example, EEC-type institutions in Central America might enhance development by reducing inter-country competition and coordinating development plans without much increase in the small inter-country trade. Thus, while the EEC serves chiefly to enhance the welfare of the participant countries through large inter-country trade, the Latin American unions will enhance industrialization through inter-country cooperation and coordination. If implemented, they will form development alliances, while called, in deference to the source of the vogue, "common markets" or "free trade areas."[26] To what degree these unions are hampered by the use of an instrument originally forged for different purposes and to what degree the same international treaty can be used without negative repercussions to serve different functions—and which functions—are further questions that this paradigm raises but cannot answer.

(iii) *System properties*

Theoretically a unification process might start among countries that have had no previous relationship or were not interdependent and did not constitute an international system. Actually all the unification movements that we are aware of were initiated among countries that were previously interdependent. In any case, the study of the pre-unification stage is not complete unless the relationships among the potential participants in a union are investigated, even if the finding is that no such relationships existed. Both the pre-unification level of integration and its scope have to be assessed and other relevant properties (see below) of the system have to be determined. These properties will be remeasured when the unification process is terminated, and a comparison of the two sets of measures will inform us of the extent of the process.

(a) *Pre-unification integration and scope.* Unification is a process in which the integration of a system is increased, a process that tends to

[26] See Gordon, 245-50.

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be accompanied by expansion in the scope of the system in terms of the sectors that are "internationalized." This means that pre-unification integration and scope can be very low (just sharing a few international organizations), low (sharing membership in a bloc), or medium (as in empires); it is pre-unification as long as both do not grow, whatever the parameters happen to be (unless, of course, they are already maximal).[27]

(b) *Shared properties: The example of culture.* The pre-unification system may have many shared properties; which one or ones we chose to study before and after unification depends on the specific problem at hand. Let us examine briefly the effect of culture[28] shared by the participants upon the initiation of unification.

According to widely held opinion, shared culture is an essential prerequisite for unification. It is pointed out that, under the impact of nationalism, old political units broke up (especially empires) or formed larger unions (Germany, Italy) in an effort to bring units that shared a culture and political unions in balance. Deutsch, for instance, shows in his important study, *Backgrounds for Community*, that sharing cultural symbols, ethnic origin, a language, a religion, a sense of identity, etc., preceded the formation of a union in practically every case he studied.[29]

On the other hand, many unions do not have most or all of these elements of shared culture. This holds true for Canada, the Union of South Africa, Switzerland, Belgium, Nigeria, India, and, of course, for most of the supranational unions from the EEC to the Eastern European one and from the British Commonwealth to the Union of African States.

One might view these two positions as completely contradictory and await additional findings and reexamination of earlier ones to determine which position is valid. It is possible, however, to view this contradiction as more apparent than real. Each of the following interpretations could resolve the contradiction, but which one does, if any, has to be determined empirically.

First one might claim that most cultural values are politically irrelevant. Information can be exchanged, aesthetic values be held in common, religious beliefs draw similar commitments—and the countries

[27] For additional comments on the integration of the international systems in this stage, see the delineation of the subject above.

[28] Culture being viewed in the broadest sense of the term, including religion, secular ideologies, civilization, language, arts, etc.

[29] Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Backgrounds for Community* (in progress).

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so disposed still may not share a sense of political identity or have the necessary foundation for a shared legitimate government. All Russian scientists might subscribe to American journals and all American scholars read Russian ones, and all Russians see *My Fair Lady* (and like it) and all Americans appreciate the Moscow ballet, etc., and the two countries might still go to war the next day, not to mention failing to form a union. After all, the European societies shared culture and civilization during many hundreds of years and scores of wars. This position suggests that sharing culture is not required for unification, nor does the lack of a shared culture prevent it; it simply has little effect on political unification.

True, there is a limited set of values and symbols directly related to all unification, including legitimation of the new power center, a sense of national or supranational identity, shared political rituals, and the like. But it is the emergence of these shared political values that the study of unification has to explain; their existence is part of our definition of integration. If we view the same factors as our dependent variable (integration) and as our independent one (culture), we are spinning tautologies.

Another possible way to resolve the apparent contradiction is to claim that unions whose members do not share a culture may be initiated but will not develop successfully, at least not until their culture becomes shared. Thus, the Union of African States may well have little shared culture, and the British Commonwealth come to have less and less as non-Western societies join it, but the first union has yet to become a political-social reality, and the Commonwealth shows a parallel decrease of integration as the degree to which culture is shared is declining. Similarly, the success of the union of Nigeria and India is certainly not guaranteed; and to the extent that they increase their integration, they also increase their shared culture.

This view suggests that shared culture is not a *pre*requisite for unification but a requirement that has to be fulfilled before the process can be completed. No union, one might suggest, is safely integrated unless a shared culture has evolved. This would also imply that while cultural exchange programs can hardly trigger a unification process when other factors are missing, once unification is progressing—let us say, owing to economic, military, or political factors—cultural integration fulfills an independent role in an "advanced" stage of the unification process.

We would like to point out in passing that there may well be other such *solidifiers*—that is, factors that can operate effectively only in a

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later stage of a process. Shared scientific projects, international professional associations and conventions, increased tourism, international television networks, sister-cities movements, supranational holidays, and multicountry universities may all then be able to play a role in those unions where they originally seemed "unnecessary" or impossible.

2. THE UNIFICATION PROCESS: A. INTEGRATING FORCES

Socio-political processes such as unification do not proceed in a trial-and-error fashion. Once initiated, they tend to follow one of a limited number of patterns (to be discussed in the subsequent section), according to the direction given to them by the integrating forces. This raises the question as to what kinds of integrating forces are applied in the unification process and who is applying them.

A CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES: A CONCEPTUAL DIGRESSION

To decide which integrating force is the most effective in launching a successful unification endeavor requires clear conception of the kinds of integrating forces that exist. The following threefold classification seems to be satisfactory; integrating forces, we suggest, are either coercive (e.g., military forces), or utilitarian (e.g., economic sanctions), or normative (e.g., propaganda). The classification is exhaustive; each concrete power is either one of the three or is composed of their various combinations.[30] The classification covers both "real" (coercive and utilitarian) and "ideal" (normative) elements. It directly represents the three major sociological schools: the Italian school of Pareto and Mosca, which was especially concerned with force; the economic-Marxist one; and the Weber-Durkheim tradition, which emphasized sentiments and ideas. However, it avoids a flaw common to all three: their tendency to see one set of factors—means of violence, ownership, or sentiments and ideas—as *the* major determinant of history and hence also of international relations.

On the most general level, one might state that international relations are characterized by the frequent use of coercion by one unit against another as compared with the interaction of other social units, and by less frequent and less effective exercise of normative power. Utilitarian powers are frequently used in international as well as intranational relations. Unification processes are directed by all three kinds of powers. Some unions are largely forced, as is the Federation of Rho-

[30] This classification is extensively discussed in my *Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (Glencoe, Ill., 1961).

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desia and Nyasaland. Some are "encouraged" mainly by economic means, as European unification in the OEEC initially was. In order to receive American reconstruction funds under the Marshall Plan, a country had to commit itself to cooperate with other European countries. Still other unions are initiated chiefly by propaganda pressures, as was the United Arab Republic. Other unifications were directed initially by a more balanced combination of various powers: Prussia, for instance, used them all—in good measure—to force, bribe, and persuade the German states to unite. Nor are all "subordinate" countries necessarily treated in the same way. Certainly the larger and more powerful Chile is more coddled and less subjected to pressure by the Latin American leaders, Argentina and Brazil, than is the small, weak, and highly dependent Paraguay.

(i) *Effective Configurations*

The question of which configuration of forces is most effective for unification has no one answer. It is quite evident that different kinds of unions (e.g., military only, economic only)[31] develop effectively when different kinds of forces are used. Each stage of unification, of the same kind of union, might well require also a change in the forces applied to maximize the development of the union. Does one, perhaps, best start with coercion and gradually increase normative pressures as the member-countries become more responsive to normative appeals, or does one best apply normative forces initially and resort to others only if the normative ones are not effective? What role do economic forces play in the different types of unions?

One question deserves special attention in view of its high political, ideological, and moral nature: does the use of coercion in the initial stage of unification necessarily undermine its long-run success?[32] If this is not the case in general, under what conditions is coercion detrimental and under what conditions is it not? Is the *extent* of coercion a major determinant, so that limited coercion (as used by Prussia to unify Germany) will not undermine the emerging union, but extensive use of force (as in Hungary in 1956) will undermine it? Does extensive use of coercion become less ineffective when combined with extensive propaganda (normative) efforts? Is there a "cut-off" point at which reliance on extensive coercion can be stopped? Can, for in-

[31] Types of union are discussed in the last section of this article.

[32] The answer depends in part on the criterion of success that one chooses to use. A union can be *maintained*, at least in the short run, by extensive use of force. How *effective* it is, in terms of the level of integration attained, the scope of the unification, or resistance to external hostile powers, are different questions altogether.

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stance, the Soviet Union keep its Red Army out of Orthodox Communist Czechoslovakia without risking its loss to the union?

There could hardly be more significant questions to the architects of unions—or to those who wish to undermine them—but there are few systematic answers available.

(ii) *Effective Distributions*

Whatever the forces employed to initiate and bring about a union, the way these forces are distributed among various units—i.e., the relative power the units have over each other—is of much consequence to the unification process. Two major dimensions have to be taken into account: (a) the degree of elitism—that is, the degree to which power is concentrated in the hands of one or a few units, as against a more or less even distribution among many—and (b) the nature of the unit (or units) that have more power than others (if any), in terms of membership in the emerging union. Is the elite unit (the power-holder) a member or does it impose unification from the outside?

(a) *Degree of elitism.* Many unification processes are carried out under the leadership of one elite. In most of the historical cases studied by Deutsch and his associates, one unit was by far superior to the others, both in its interest in and preparedness for unification, in terms of resources as well as communicative and administrative capacities, and thus was able to bring about a union.[33] England played such a role in the union with Wales and with Scotland; Britain played this role in the formation of the EFTA as well as in its disbanding; Egypt was the dominant partner of the UAR; the USSR obviously has this position in Eastern Europe; Guatemala was the central force in first building and later disintegrating the Central American Federation (1823-1839). In several other cases, two countries appear to hold an elite position: Argentina and Brazil seem to be the two prime powers in the LAFTA; and West Germany and France seem to be the major powers in the EEC.[34]

Other unification efforts, while not completely egalitarian, seem to come considerably closer to an even power distribution. The major participants of the Scandinavian union—Sweden, Norway, and Denmark—have similar power positions (though Sweden may have a little more than the others); the same holds for the members of the present Cen-

[33] Deutsch and others, *Political Community*, 50ff. See also Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York 1953).

[34] Up to now neither of these countries appears to have used its superior power to gain special concessions from the EEC authorities.

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tral American Union, and the two main members of Benelux. It seems safe, however, to generalize that equalitarian or near-equalitarian unions are considerably less frequent than elitist ones.

The most frequently found pattern is not necessarily the most effective one, though when a process is at least partially planned, and effectiveness constantly assessed, frequency and effectiveness tend to be associated. The question is whether hegemony is a better way to unification than dual leadership, and dual leadership more effective than lack of any clearly superior unit. Is hegemony the most effective power-distribution when the member-countries are quite willing to unify, or is it effective only when some or most potential participants are unwilling or at least reluctant to join a union or stay in it?[35]

A closely related question concerns the association between the configuration of forces applied and the power distribution. It would seem that when power is relatively concentrated in the hands of one or two units, coercion is more likely to be used; when it is fairly evenly distributed, normative appeals are more common; and economic sanctions are frequently used in both elitist and comparatively egalitarian power-distributions, but are more frequent in the elitist type. Whether this is really the case or whether these are the most effective combinations are open questions.

(b) *Degree of internalization.* The second dimension for examination of the effect of various power-distributions on unification is the membership status of the elites (equalitarian unifications are of members only). Membership has to be viewed as a continuum; there are partial members in varying degrees, full-fledged members, and non-members. The United States, for instance, for a number of years has supported many unifications (and other forms of international co-operation) of non-Communist countries, participating in some (e.g., NATO, OAS), being an "informal member" in others (e.g., CENTO), and not a member in still others (EEC, EFTA). Similarly, Britain is a member of the Commonwealth but not of the Federation of Nigeria that it engineered and launched. France is a member of the EEC, but not of the *Conseil de l'Entente*, though it has much influence over each of the four members (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey) and their collective action.[36] The question is, what difference does the

[35] The frequency of forced integrations as distinct from voluntary ones has been pointed out by Crane Brinton in *From Many One* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948). See also Harold D. Lasswell, "The Interrelations of World Organization and Society," *Yale Law Review*, LV (August 1946), 889-909.

[36] See Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Independence* (New York 1961), 108, 116.

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membership status of the elite make? Does effective leadership require membership? Do outside elites tend to be rejected after the initiation period, and to be replaced by member-elites—i.e., is the elite role internalized? Are outside elites limited in the kind of power they can effectively exercise; in particular, is effective use of normative power chiefly limited to member-elites?

An interesting phenomenon that deserves further exploration from this viewpoint is that some external elites become themselves "internalized," to varying degrees, in the process of unification. The United States, for instance, had no intention of becoming involved in the Baghdad Pact when it was originally formed in 1955 (it became CENTO after Iraq's withdrawal in 1959), but since then there has been a growing pressure on the United States to deepen its participation, a pressure it only partially resists. By 1960 the United States had signed bilateral agreements with each of the members—a procedure frequently used to join a union without formally joining—in which it pledged itself to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces," to help each country to resist aggression. In 1961 it committed itself to appoint a permanent military staff commander for CENTO.[37] Similarly, France not only did not intend to become an informal leader of the *Entente* (Ivory Coast is the semi-official, on-the-scene leader), but resisted its original formation.[38] Finally, the United States—when it supported the formation of the EEC in 1957, and later the inclusion of the non-neutral EFTA countries—did not fully realize the heavy pressures that the success of this union would put on it to create a larger union—sometimes referred to as the Atlantic Community—in which the United States is expected to be a member. It is far from clear why this "sucking-in" process occurs, why it remains "unanticipated," why elite countries become involved in more unions, and to a larger degree, than they intended to. The central question remains: does internalization of elites make them more responsive to non-elite members, and does this increased responsiveness enhance unification?

3. THE UNIFICATION PROCESS: B. INTEGRATING SECTORS

When the prerequisites are present and integrative forces are operative, and the level of integration of the international system grows, its scope tends also to expand. That is, more and more functional needs of the member-units are fulfilled through collective actions, more and

[37] *New York Times*, April 29 and 30, 1961; and *The Reporter*, July 20, 1961.
[38] Immanuel Wallerstein, "Background to Page Paper II," *West Africa*, August 5, 1961, 861.

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more sectors of the member-units are unified, and the process of unification develops momentum of its own. In the following section, problems concerned with how the process is initiated are outlined first, then various reasons why it picks up momentum and the directions in which it might continue to grow on its own are discussed; and finally, an exhaustive list of the functional spheres that can be shared is presented and questions are raised concerning the order in which unification spreads into these spheres.

(i) *The First Stage: Take-Off*

TAKE-OFF: A CONCEPTUAL DIGRESSION

Most social scientists, until recently, when studying the beginning of a process or the formation of a polity, focused on the initiation period. The granting of a charter, the signing or ratification of a treaty, the founding convention, and similar events were considered the birthday of organizations, societies, and political movements. The concept of take-off, first used by students of aerodynamics, then economics, and recently introduced into political sciences by Rostow, Deutsch, and Haas,[39] calls attention to a second point in the "beginning" of a process that is in many ways more important than its formal initiation. Take-off occurs when a process has accumulated enough momentum to continue on its own, without support of non-system units. This is not to suggest that the initiation point is irrelevant; on the contrary, the virtue of the concept of take-off is that it calls attention to the fact that for many processes the initiation stage and the take-off stage are not identical. A plane starts rolling, but only after it accumulates a certain speed can it continue without the support of the runway. Economic development is often initiated by contacts with Western civilization, but it "takes off" only after the production capacity of a country has increased to a degree that it can answer the increasing current needs and still show a significant balance to be invested in the build-up of production means. In this way, self-sustained growth is ensured.

Unification at the initiation stage is dependent on external units or member-units; it has no momentum of its own. Any significant change in the position of these units can bring the initiated union to an abrupt end. We know that at some later stage elements of community-authority develop (e.g., the High Authority of ECSC; the Economic

[39] W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), chap. 4; Deutsch and others, *Political Community*, 83-85; and Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," *International Organization*, XII (Autumn 1958), 440-58.

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Commission of the EEC), that the process gains speed (e.g., EEC cut tariffs ahead of schedule), and that unification seems to become a force in itself, one that counters attempts to halt the evolving union. It is then that unification has taken off.

(a) *Determinants of take-off.* What actually happens, what factors change, is far from clear. At least two changes in the nature of the process seem to occur that might account, at least in part, for the take-off phenomenon. One change is that the flow of people, goods, and communications across the national boundaries is increased. Some of such increases, though by no means all of them, require an increase in the amount of international decision-making. Increased *shared* activities—like running a common defense line—seems to increase the need for common decision-making even more than increases in intercountry flows. The intergovernmental procedure is cumbersome for a large volume of decisions. Hence the tendency is to form a "supranational" bureaucracy to make secondary decisions, leaving policy decisions to a superior, intergovernmental body. This was the case in the ECSC, EEC, LAFTA, NATO, and other unions. Once a supranational bureaucracy is formed, its evolution tends to follow that of other bureaucracies: it strives to increase its functions, power, and legitimation and to resist attempts to reduce them.

The other factor accounting for take-off is secondary priming; that is, unification in one sector of society tends to trigger unification in others.[40] For instance, a steel and coal customs union (ECSC) created the need for supranational cooperation on matters concerning transportation of those goods and on sources of energy other than coal (which led, among other things, to the formation of the Western European atomic energy agency, Euratom).[41]

Cooperation on these matters created the need for coordination on working conditions and finance in the affected industries. Cooperation on a large number of specific economic issues led to the Treaty of Rome, which covers the economies of the Six in general. Generalized economic unification, in turn, produced considerable pressure toward political unification, though up to date it has not gone much beyond electing a powerless but symbolically important European Parliament, holding frequent meetings of the Prime Ministers of the six countries, and attending talks about a European federation or confederation. Economic

[40] See Rostow, 52, on "derived-growth sectors."

[41] William Diebold, Jr., "The Changed Economic Position of Western Europe," *International Organization,* XIV (Winter 1960), 12ff.

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and political unifications have affected some cultural cooperation (e.g., the formation of a European University, to be opened in Florence, Italy). The main point about this expansion of the original unification effort, or "spill-over," as Haas called it,[42] is that it is based on secondary priming. Unification in one sector triggers a similar process in others, rather than any external force doing the triggering. Hence, the significance of the study of secondary priming for take-off. Once secondary priming sets in, it might continue up to complete unification of the countries involved, even if the external powers that initiated the process have ceased to exist or are now trying to hinder its evolution.

In sum, the foundation of supranational bureaucracies and secondary priming accounts for the take-off of unions. This raises two questions: what patterns does unification follow once it has taken off; and what is the optimal sector in which to initiate unification?

(b) *The take-off sector.* Unions may be initiated in many ways, including military alliances, economic unions, political coalitions, and normative communities (sense of shared norms and values). The question is, which one of these unifications provides the optimal base for take-off? Almost all possible functional spheres have been considered as optimal from this viewpoint by one authority or another. Deutsch points to the importance of the existence of a community of consent (or normative union) at the first stage.[43] Kissinger sees in military alliances an effective way of binding nations together; he believes, for instance, that NATO could serve as an effective base for unification of the fifteen member countries.[44] Haas finds that economic unification (common markets) has the highest spill-over value, and therefore is obviously the best take-off base.[45] "Functional" organizations, increases in tourism, and cultural exchange have been viewed as effective ways to increase international integration and unification.[46] The effort to establish which sector (or sectors) is the optimal take-off base will have to draw on an analysis of the internal structure of the societies that participate in the unification process. Various societal sectors seem to differ in the degree that they are interrelated. The more articulated they are, obviously the more spill-over will occur. What is far from obvious is

[42] Haas provides a most stimulating and insightful analysis of this process in *Uniting of Europe*, esp. chap. 8.

[43] Deutsch and others, *Political Community*, 71.

[44] Henry A. Kissinger, "For an Atlantic Confederacy," *The Reporter*, February 2, 1961, 16-21. See also his *Necessity for Choice* (New York 1960), 165-68.

[45] "International Integration," 372ff.

[46] For a review of this approach, see Stephen S. Goodspeed, *The Nature and Functions of International Organization* (New York 1959), 505-6.

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whether there is one "most articulated" sector in each society, if it is the same in all societies, and which one (or ones) it is.

(ii) *Expansion of the Union's Scope*

(a) *A stable scope: Alternative propositions.* Once the first stage has been completed and a union has taken off, the question arises as to what elements are needed to form a stable union; more specifically, is high integration and unification of all sectors required, or will a lower level of integration and a less inclusive union be the most stable one (i.e., persist in time)?

A stable union is formed, we suggest, only when a full-fledged political community is established—that is, when integration on all three dimensions (monopoly of violence, center of decision-making, focus for identification) is high, and unification has penetrated all major societal sectors. Unification might stop short of high integration and full scope, and the resulting union might exist for considerable periods of time. Moreover, high integration and full scope might be more difficult to attain, and more risky to aim at, than some less integrated and less encompassing form of international association. All that we hypothetically suggest is that in the long run, once attained, unions that have become highly integrated and have a broad scope are more stable than those that are less integrated or less inclusive.

The opposite view is represented by Deutsch and his associates. They found that the less integrated "pluralistic security communities" were more stable than the "amalgamated" ones. Only one of the former failed, while seven of the latter did.[47] Since the Princeton authors have a mountain of data to support their position, it is incumbent on us to explain why we hold to the alternative proposition. The reason lies in the different conceptions of integration. Deutsch and his associates see a union as amalgamated (integrated, in our terms)[48] once a common government has been established. The United States in 1789 became an amalgamated community; the Hapsburg Empire—and, for that matter, all empires by the definition introduced above—was an amalgamated

[47] Deutsch and others, *Political Community*, 30.

[48] Deutsch and his associates use "integration" to refer to the relationship among countries that no longer consider engaging in war with each other (*ibid.*, 31). This is of course a different definition, one that has a lower threshold, than ours. Haas uses "political integration" to refer to "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (*Uniting of Europe*, 16). The threshold of this definition is much higher than that of Deutsch, almost as high as ours. Cf. Haas's discussion of "political community" in *ibid.*, 4-11.

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community. From our viewpoint, these are partially integrated unions. They lack at least one central element of integration, that of being the focus of political identification of the citizens. Second, their scope is rather limited. It seems to us, then, that what Deutsch and his colleagues are suggesting is that low-integration, low-scope unions are more stable than *medium*-integrated, low-scope ones; this does not preclude the possibility that highly integrated, broad-scope unions will be the most stable type. In other words, we suggest that future research will still have to decide which unions are more stable—low-integration, low-scope ones, or those that matured into political communities.[49]

(b) *Sequences of unification.* Naturally, the next question is: In what order, if any, are the various sectors unified? Do they have to be "assembled" in a specific order? If one is skipped, will this disintegrate the union, merely retard it, or allow it to continue in a limping way until the missing link is added (though in the "wrong" order)? Here, more than with any of the other questions raised, we are in the realm of speculation rather than knowledge. Following the Parsonian model, one would expect the more functional sequence to be the one that starts with military or economic unification and introduces political and normative unification later.[50] It is of interest to note that the attempts to start with European unification politically, by electing a European Parliament and "government" in the late 1940's and early 1950's, got virtually nowhere,[51] while the economic unification of the ECSC "spilled over" effectively into the EEC, which in turn seems to point in the direction of political unification.

Deutsch and his associates present an alternative hypothesis. Discussing the "assembly line of history," they state: "Generally speaking we found that substantial rewards for cooperation or progress toward amalgamation had to be timed so as to come before the imposition of burdens resulting from such progress towards amalgamation (union). We found that as with rewards before burdens, consent has to

[49] We defined "political communities" above as systems that have reached a high level of integration on three dimensions (monopolization, decision-making, identification). Since the discussion suggests that such integration tends to exist in unions that penetrate all the major societal sectors, the question arises as to what these sectors are. Following Parsons, we suggest that a full collectivity is one that solves autonomously its four basic functional problems: it adapts to its ecological and social environment, allocates means and rewards among its subunits, integrates its subunits into one polity, and establishes as well as reinforces the normative commitments of its members. A union that matured into a political community would thus include "supranational" activities of all four types.

[50] This point is considerably elaborated in my "Epigenesis of Nation-Unions," *American Journal of Sociology* (forthcoming).

[51] Goodspeed, 591.

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come before compliance if amalgamation is to have lasting success."[52] If we may extend the right of interpretation to its limits, we would read the Princeton authors as suggesting, in Parsons' terms, that allocation (of rewards) ought to precede adaptation to the environment (burdens), and that normative unification (consent) ought to come before a political one (compliance).

This of course does not exhaust the possible sequences; the four sectors might be assembled in 24 different ways, and other scholars may find it fruitful to distinguish between more than four sectors. Moreover, we should be open to the possibility that there is, in fact, no one optimal sequence for unification but that each kind of union is "assembled" best in a different fashion. And this brings us to the last tier of our paradigm.

4. THE TERMINATION STATE

A union has "taken off," "spilled over," following one sequence or another, until it reaches a "termination" state. That is, for a period of time—before additional unification or regression sets in—the union remains basically unchanged.[53] Unions differ greatly in the level of unification at which they stabilize—i.e., stop increasing their integration and expanding their scope. These "termination" states provide a fruitful base for the classification of unions not only because they provide a relatively fixed frame of reference (unlike the fluid state of the unions in other phases), but also because differences in termination states might associate significantly with variables examined so far; that is, unions that differ in the state at which they stabilize might differ also in the conditions under which they are initiated, in the forces that integrate them, in the sequence they develop, etc.[54]

(i) *Degree and Scope*

The state at which unification is terminated or interrupted can be measured in terms of the closeness of such a state to that of a political community. The preceding discussion suggests the following criteria:

(a) *The degree of integration is calculated on the basis of the degree of integration of each one of the three dimensions.* Unions integrate gradually; hence, when unification stops, a union might be only par-

[52] *Political Community*, 71.

[53] The length of the period is, like all such "cut-off" points, largely an arbitrary decision of the researcher, affected more by the scope of his study and problem than by "reality."

[54] One reason such a relation is expected is that actors in earlier stages sometimes view the termination stage as the goal toward which their efforts are directed.

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tially integrated. Part of the means of violence, but not all, might be under the control of the new collectivity (as is the case in NATO); some, but not all, parts of the economy might be controlled by the supranational authority (agriculture was until 1962 largely exempted from the Treaty of Rome and hence the authority of the European Commission); and identification with the new collectivity might be partial, both in terms of the percentage of the citizens whose identification has been transferred to the new polity and the intensity of the identification of those who did make the transfer.

(b) *The number of sectors in which unification has taken place and their nature in terms of the secondary priming potential of the sector.* The higher the secondary priming potential, the more likely the union is to continue to grow or to regress after a period of stabilization; the lower this potential, the more likely the union will be to continue in its "stable" state, unless outside forces interfere.

(c) *The degree of unification in each sector, e.g., the ratio of international versus intranational trade.* It should be noted that even political communities whose scope of integration and unification is high—i.e., they possess all three kinds of integration and their unification has penetrated into all four sectors—may differ as to how high their integration is and how encompassing their scope. While all political communities have, by definition, a center of decision-making—i.e., "supranational" government—they differ in the scope of the decisions of their governments. In this connection, a distinction is sometimes made between communities with a federal government (high decision scope) and those which have a unitary government (even higher decision scope). Actually, federal structures may themselves become more centralized (as the United States has over the last three decades) or less centralized (as the Soviet Union has since 1953), and unitary governments may be either highly centralized (e.g., France) or comparatively less centralized (e.g., Britain). Similar, more "subtle" distinctions can be made on the other dimensions (subtle in the sense that high scopes are compared with very high ones instead of merely high to medium and low ones). While previously we advanced the hypothesis that highly integrated unions are more stable than ones with medium or low integration, this does not necessarily hold for the *most* highly integrated ones. It is quite possible that a less centralized structure will prove more stable, since it allows for more expression of the ex-national powers and loyalties. By the same token, though, it leaves more power in potentially secessionist units. An hypothesis suggests itself: namely, that the

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more integrated a community is (by other standards), the more political decentralization it can tolerate.

(ii) *The Dominant Function*

Another major difference among various termination-states is the dominant function that the new collectivity serves. This criterion not only differentiates unions (e.g., military, economic, normative unions), but also political communities. True, a political community encompasses all major societal sectors and in this sense serves all major functions, but communities can be characterized according to the function in which they invest more resources, manpower, and energy, and which they value higher as compared with other communities. While this dominant function changes over time, it is usually possible to point to one that dominates a given historical period. Thus, it has been suggested that the United States, viewed as a model of a political community that emerged from earlier autonomous units, stressed adaptation in the industrialization period (1875-1930); that concern with welfare and consumption took the place of the production emphasis after 1930; and that this was superseded in the late 1940's and early 1950's by "other-directedness"[55] and concern with ideological positions. At that same time, the cold war with communism intensified and the struggle with radicals at home reached a peak.[56] Renewed emphasis on adaptation marked 1958, when the Russian space probes and long-range missiles provided a strong environmental challenge to the United States. Unlike the earlier production concern, the present one is focused on means of violence rather than on consumption, and on service to the national collectivity rather than directly to the individual.[57] The scientist, the space-technologist, and to a degree the executive, but not the merchant or entrepreneur, are the new cultural heroes. Similar statements can be made about the changing focus of other unions. Yet many may have a "persistent" function that is stressed in the long run (though not

[55] This is, of course, the central thesis of David Riesman and others, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven 1950).

[56] Underlying this statement is the idea that, over the last 75 years, the United States moved from the adaptive to the allocative, social integrative, and normative integrative phase. It is derived from Talcott Parsons' treatment of the subject, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, eds., *Class, Status, and Power* (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), 92-129. See also Parsons, "'McCarthyism' and American Social Tension: A Sociologist's View," *Yale Review*, XLIV (December 1954), 226-45.

[57] The stress on the need to shift resources from private to collective consumption is championed by J. K. Galbraith in *American Capitalism* (Boston 1952) and *The Affluent Society* (Boston 1958).

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necessarily "forever") despite short-run ups and downs—e.g., expansionism (adaptation) in the case of the Soviet Union.[58]

Before statements about the dominant function of a society or larger political collectivity at a given period can be formulated with proper precision and responsibility, much more theoretical work and empirical research are required. But it should be pointed out that it seems quite evident even now that the nature of the dominant function is an important variable for the study of unions and political communities. Some functions—especially the political, social, and ideological ones—require higher integration and broader scope than others (e.g., individual-oriented consumption). Hence, the level and scope at which the unification process terminates are crucial variables that both are affected by and affect the dominant function of the new political unions.

No paradigm is ever complete, in the sense that additional work in the area, whether theoretical or empirical, continues to add dimensions to its structure. It can be exhaustive only in the sense that all additional dimensions will find a place in one of the categories already included. The only way to assure this is by deriving the categories instead of inducing them. This we did when we used as our major three tiers the beginning (initiation state), middle (the process), and end (termination) states of unification. Similar procedures were used in arriving at the other dimensions—for instance, at the distinction between the take-off stage and expansion (i.e., between the first and later stages) of unification. Other distinctions—e.g., between integration and scope—are derived not from simple logic but from substantive sociological theories. Like all other distinctions that are derived, their test is in the fruitfulness of the questions raised. The major effort remains, of course, to determine through empirical research the validity of the various alternative answers that one could give to the questions raised by the paradigm.

[58] This is a central thesis of George Kennan's *The Sources of Soviet Conduct: American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago 1951).

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THE RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

The Case of East and Central Africa*

By ROBERT I. ROTBERG

"Now the British government having manifested itself as the leading power we hope it is going to extend more fully than it did before to all its British subjects irrespective of colour, race, or nation, the same equal rights, privileges, and advantages of freedom, liberty, and justice."—Northern Rhodesia: Paramount Chief Yeta to Prince Arthur of Connaught, 31 March 1919.

"Unless Justice be done, we can have no confidence in the pronouncements made on behalf of the British government that their primary object is to lead the African people along the path to self-government. What virtue can there be in self-government if the land on which and by which we live is alienated from us?"—An Appeal by Jomo Kenyatta addressed to James Griffiths (Colonial Secretary), 14 May 1951.

IT is all too often assumed that African nationalism is a product of very recent manufacture. One supposes that World War II and its aftermath brought about new forces of change, loosely called "nationalism," which in a few short years swept African prison graduates into undreamed of positions of power and world importance. To some extent, of course, this presumption is correct: those elements of change unleashed by the war and by the subsequent estrangement of two of the victors did indeed accelerate the emergence of popular movements in Africa south of the Sahara. More rapidly than even the aspirants themselves could have hoped, colonial powers made it evident that freedom could be obtained for the agitation. Some achieved it incredibly swiftly; some are achieving it stubbornly. But the point of importance for our discussion is that the contemporary awareness of African political demands is simply belated recognition of a movement sixty or more years old. This article demonstrates that the triumph of African nationalism since World War II is but the final coordination and intensification of all the tangled strands of an earlier, usually unrecognized, disaffection. It focuses on two of the main ways in which this early nationalism expressed itself despite an inhospitable environment. Analysis is limited to the case of East and Central Africa, which has been less well studied than corresponding situations in West Africa.

One problem immediately arises: What do we mean by "African

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nationalism"? Or, to put the question more usefully, what can we mean by the phrase? Until recently nationalism in Africa has not meant a "devotion to one's own nation," particularly since the borders of colonial Africa were artificial and often divided tribes indiscriminately. Nationalism in Africa (the word was first used in English in 1844, and was given wider currency when it described the program of the Irish Nationalist Party in 1885) has also never meant a policy of national independence—at least, not until recently.[1] African nationalism, critically defined, is not the ethnic rebirth of Central Europe. Nor is it the bathetic cry of Wales or Scotland. In its most precise sense there has simply never been any African nationalism in the way that there was a Chinese nationalism after Sun Yat-sen. In Africa there has been a common protest against white or alien rule—anti-colonialism. Still, it would be wasteful to coin a new phrase for a state of being that has results similar to historic nationalism. We use "nationalism" in the way it is popularly used, in the way Africans themselves use the term.

I

It is a truism that without colonialism there would have been no movements of protest. Nationalists of today, and their predecessors, all ascribe the ills of their various countries to the oppression of colonial regimes. Had it not been for the accident of European intervention, they are wont to say, Africa long ago would have developed politically and economically in ways conducive to the prosperity and contentment of the peoples involved. Indeed, there is little doubt that the roots of African nationalism may easily be found in the fertile soil of European conquest; we would logically expect such to be true. The one serious deficiency in this argument, however, is that we know far too little about the economic consequences of imperialism and not enough about ways in which African societies were developing before the onset of European rule.

From the Zambezi to the Nile, whites came first as explorers and adventurers, later as missionaries, administrators, and settlers. They found a small number of strong chiefdoms and many small ethnic groupings. The indigenous inhabitants enjoyed economies that were pastoral or agricultural or that were dependent upon raiding and hunt-

[1] Lord Hailey prefers "Africanism," and James Coleman gives "nationalism" restricted usage. For an excellent and thorough discussion, with further references, see Martin Kilson, "The Analysis of African Nationalism," *World Politics*, x (April 1958), 484-97.

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ing. They were linked, however tenuously, with the economy of the Indian Ocean via the ancient city-states of the coast. Slaves, gold, ivory, and iron were commonly traded for cloth or manufactured goods in these entrepôts.

The Western powers made their partition of East and Central Africa secure by outright conquest and by treaty arrangements often obtained by force. The pattern in nearly every case was the same. The Kaiser's or Queen's man promised protection and freedom from outside interference if the indigenous chief would sign over his lands and most of what were later considered his inalienable rights. Without realizing it, perhaps without even understanding the document he was signing, the chief proceeded to devolve upon Europeans his authority to decide allocation of lands, the application of tribal law, and the eventual policy-making role of the chief or headman himself. But if the indigenous ruler refused to accept a treaty or refused, like Chief Msiri of Katanga, to entertain the thought of foreign domination, he was speedily subdued. Military force was necessary to secure the colonies because even those Africans who at first had not objected to foreign rule began to regret its routine interference with their daily life. Chiefs saw themselves deprived of authority; the people were astonished to find that their new rulers were harsh and arbitrary.

What did colonial rule entail? Africans were taxed in each colony in order to raise revenues and in order to force them to work for Europeans. Africans were deprived of their lands and eventually restricted to crowded and less fertile reserves. They became subject to alien laws that were not always administered equitably. More crucially, Africans were deprived of elemental self-respect in their own country. They were made to carry passes or other forms of identification as a mark of their inferior status. The cruder forms of discrimination were perfected, especially on mission stations, and segregation of every variety was practiced.

Throughout East and Central Africa the indigenous inhabitants grew weary of insults and discrimination. They regretted low pay and regular tax increases, lack of representation in matters that involved their interests, and the onerous daily confrontation of race realities that can never be conveyed on paper. As Africans were absorbed into the urban labor force, they grew to understand white rule even more fully. They sought a betterment of conditions and learned to vent their frustration in the privacy of clubs and societies—the forerunners of congresses and

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modern political parties, by participating in the life of separatist Christian sects and chiliastic cults, and by the actual use of violence.[2]

II

The intermediate link in the causal chain that leads from the beginnings of colonialism to the negotiated triumph of radical African political parties was provided by those bodies that collectively may be called "associations." The term encompasses those voluntary groupings —clubs, societies, etc.—that are inherently political only in the wider sense, and those other organizations (African independent churches and labor unions) that often became vehicles of protest. Religious movements will be discussed in the following section. Labor protest also played its part in the rise of nationalism. The Copperbelt strikes of 1935 and 1940, the Tanga and Mombasa dock strikes before World War II, the formation of the Uganda Motor Drivers' Association, and recurring problems associated with the recruitment of plantation labor all reflected African dissatisfaction (with pay and housing for the most part), but more detailed research needs to be carried out before any conclusions may be advanced.

Associations, wherever they were formed, represented a precise response to the challenge of colonialism. They were both an urban and a rural response that to some degree "made it possible for Africans to recover . . . the sense of common purpose which in traditional African society was normally enjoyed through tribal organisations."[3] The white administrations subverted traditional means of obtaining satisfaction or redress for grievances, real or imagined, and thus made it all the more necessary for Africans to join together in order to protect and to further the interests of the otherwise unrepresented indigenous population. The Broken Hill Welfare Association of Northern Rhodesia, at its foundation, aimed to stimulate "cooperation and brotherly feeling, to interpret to the government native opinion on matters of importance, to encourage the spread of civilization, and to protect and further native interests in general."[4] These early mutual benefit societies were an imitation of similar white forms; settler pressure groups

[2] There is no need to detail the "Maji-Maji" rebellion in German East Africa, the Nyasaland Rising of 1915, or any of a large number of less well-known revolts that have been a regular concomitant of colonial rule.

[3] Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (London 1956), 84.

[4] P. J. Silawe to Secretary for Native Affairs, 25 August 1930, SEC/NAT/324, National Archives, Lusaka.

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existed from the early decades of this century and their success was as easy to perceive as it was difficult to copy.[5]

The new associations were both tribal and atribal. In Kenya and Uganda the number of distinct ethnic organizations is indicative of the reinforcement white rule and urbanization have given to the traditional social structure. To name but the more prominent: Abaluhiya Central Association, Bataka Association, Arab Central Association, Luo Union, Ukamba Members' Association, Comorian Society, Karamoja Union, Kisii Union, Kipsigis Central Association, Kalenjin Union, Masai Association, Fighi Union, Maragoli Society, Meru Meru Society, and, not last by any means, the Thija Mwaniki and Muhisija Union. Similarly, some of the important tribes of Central Africa and Tanganyika have always fostered urban and rural groups that have acted as friendly societies and organs of political protest. The conurban Copperbelt has always harbored various tribal affiliations; Livingstone, Bulawayo, and Johannesburg likewise have all had their Acewa Improvement, Lozi, Ansenga Young Men's, and Namwianga associations.

Tribal organizations were ideally situated to collate the grievances of their members and to seek to protect the collective ethnic interest. They were formed to preserve tribal loyalties in the face of inevitable detribalization in the cities or on distant farms. They tended to assist urban emigrants, to act as burial societies, or simply to serve as centers of social activity.[6] These groups were inevitably conservative. They frowned upon tribal intermarriage, on increased adultery (a product of the cities), and on the "alarming" rise in prostitution for profit. (The Luo Union sought to persuade government to deport all Luo unmarried women away from the bright red lights of the cities.[7]) Whenever land was alienated or other government measures posed a threat to the tribe, it was the tribal association, not the chiefs or elders (characteristically in government pay), which protested.

These associations were led by younger men who had drifted to the cities and who had found some need there for mutual succor within a

[5] See George Bennett, "The Development of Political Organizations in Kenya," *Political Studies*, v (June 1957), 113-30.

[6] Cf. Simon Ottenberg, "Improvement Associations Among the Afikpo Ibo," *Africa*, xxv (January 1955), 1-28; and K. A. Busia, *Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi* (Accra 1950).

[7] "The lit end of a cigarette in a woman's mouth is a sure sign of a prostitute plying for hire." Recurrent phrase in the minutes of the Ramogi African Welfare Association, 1945-1947. It is incorporated in the 1955 bylaws of the Luo Union, held *ultra vires* by the District Commissioner, Kisumu. Kisumu Archives.

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tribal context. They saw their elders, usually less well-educated, as unable or unwilling to press the demands of the tribe. Gradually they sought redress for wrongs to their people. They learned the vulnerabilities of whites. They learned to deal with the white man on his own terms; they agitated, drove shady bargains, talked, and wrote. In the tribal and atribal associations these younger men amassed valuable experience in administration, negotiation, and in the manipulation and propagation of protest.

The most interesting and most radical of all tribal associations were those based on the grievances of the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest tribe. Whether labeled the Young Kikuyu Association, the Kikuyu Association, or the Kikuyu Central Association, Kikuyu organizations have always had much the same foundation. Indeed, in more recent times their members have been the core of the Kenya African Union and the present Kenya African National Union. The first Kikuyu organization dates from 1919, when a small group of urban Kikuyu met to discuss "matters affecting the interest of the Kikuyu people" and to form a "focus of tribal loyalty."[8] From this inception Kikuyu associations sought to prevent government actions inimical to Kikuyu. They unsuccessfully made representations to district and provincial commissioners, and to the governor himself. They prepared reams of propaganda for African as well as white consumption. Before long they were able to transform minor disaffections into major tribal involvements, simply on the strength of their network of local branches and the skill with which their leaders played upon the very real disillusionment of the Kikuyu.

The Kikuyu had been deprived of their land. From 1902, when Commissioner Sir Charles Eliot chose deliberately to encourage the settlement of white farmers on fertile lands north and west of Nairobi, Kikuyu holdings had been expropriated.[9] Their traditional system of individual tenure, earlier recognized by the government of the East Africa Protectorate (as Kenya was then called), was regularly ignored.[10] The settlers took vast acreages—the most valuable 40 per cent of the

[8] Kikuyu Association to the East African Royal Commission, 1924. Kenya Archives.

[9] ". . . in East Africa [I had] the rare experience of dealing with a *tabula rasa*, an almost untouched and sparsely inhabited country, where we could do as we will[ed], regulate immigration, and open or close the door as seem[ed] best. . . ." Charles Eliot, *The East Africa Protectorate* (London 1905), 3. For an excellent summary of evidence and relevant literature, see Martin Kilson, "Land and Politics in Kenya," *Western Political Quarterly*, X (September 1957), 559-81.

[10] In 1897 the government admitted the principle of individual ownership of land and issued regulations respecting the sale of land by Africans. See Regulation No. 12 (1897), issued 8 July 1897. Copy in Kenya Archives.

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African land became the property of 2,000 whites—while Africans refrained from requesting the return of alienated land. Instead they simply asked for security of present occupation: "Our wish is not to claim the return of the land now in the possession of Europeans, we realize that they must now remain in occupation. We accept the present division of the land between us and them, but we earnestly beg that our anxiety as to the future may be finally removed and such legal security given us that we need not fear the possibility of any further encroachment."[11] But legal tenure was denied to them until after white farmers had ceased to enter Kenya in large numbers.

Lower taxes, better education, improved medical services, and a "voice in legislation affecting us" were other pleas addressed cogently, but abjectly, to the government and to visiting commissions.

> We pay large amounts annually in hut and poll tax but we see little coming back to us in direct benefits.
>
> Many laws are passed without our people having any say. We feel it is only right that when legislation affecting us is contemplated we should have the opportunity to say what we think about it. . . . Whites cannot speak for us or reflect our views.[12]

These pleas were denied as regularly as they were put forward. Large-scale alienation of land ceased, but tensions caused by insufficient land were exacerbated as the Kikuyu population increased and as sections of the Kikuyu reserve were overutilized. A second generation of militant Kikuyu assumed the association leadership, and men like Harry Thuku, the first Kikuyu nationalist, were distrusted for what had, after imprisonment, become their increasingly more moderate view. Jomo Kenyatta, a leader in the pro-female circumcision imbroglio of 1930, was among the first to assert himself within this context, but he soon went into voluntary exile in Great Britain.[13] A decade of almost total stalemate readied Kenya for Kenyatta's return, for an increasingly less obsequious approach to government, and for a widening of the base of political support.

Voluntary, atribal groupings were even more direct precursors of modern African political parties. They were wholly urban. They would not have existed had it not been for the de-emphasis on tribal ties that

[11] Kikuyu Association Memorandum presented to the East African Royal Commission, November 1924. Copy in Kenya Archives.

[12] Kikuyu Association to the East African Royal Commission, 1924.

[13] George Delf, Kenyatta's unofficial biographer, was unable to talk with Kenyatta himself, but his book, *Jomo Kenyatta* (London 1961), is useful for a superficial outline of Kenyatta's life. Kenyatta was reluctant to discuss his early activities with me, but Thuku was both willing and articulate (11-12 September 1961).

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was apparent fairly early among the more educated, and more urbanized, Africans. Clerks, teachers, *capitãos* (foremen), tailors, artisans, drivers, and messengers were the leaders of welfare societies, recreation committees, and football clubs in Northern Rhodesia by 1935.[14] After 1928 these men had begun to meet together, to speak out against what they believed were injustices, and to seek redress of grievances through channels that they had been taught were appropriate. Like nonconformists, they preached a simple gospel and learned to speak and to debate in the little societies constituted ostensibly for social reasons.[15] With utmost patience, they sought to influence their governments, which could easily deny them permission to meet. Although their methods were hopelessly ineffective, they tried diligently to obtain satisfaction by the passage of innumerable resolutions and by the presentation of frequent petitions to governors and chief secretaries.

What did these organizations want? There was no mention of self-government or independence: "We are here to make a recognition that should cement the existing friendship between the government, the settlers, and the Africans. Whatever we are going to discuss must be in line with the government because they are our fathers upon whom we should rely for our progress and welfare."[16] But there was much talk about the need for legislative representation by directly elected speakers. Most of the other demands were not directly political. They wanted improved sanitation: "We hereby resolve that the present compound latrines are in an obscene state . . . and it is doubtful in the present condition of the compound to expect Europeans interested in native development to visit native residents."[17] They wanted better boots and clothing to be supplied to prisoners. They desired markets in the urban compounds. They wanted better educational facilities and decent hospitals. They wanted the government to control dogs. And they wanted better housing and better burial grounds.

There were regular appeals for "justice"—that vague and undefinable benefit which they had been taught to expect from whites. So they asked, "Why is it only Africans who need to carry passes in their own country?" The trains do not provide places for Africans to eat or to purchase tea; the accommodation is not comfortable. "May we have improvements, please?" Query: "When a white man commits adultery

[14] For an early breakdown, minutes of 21 December 1935, SEC/NAT/311, National Archives, Lusaka.

[15] Cf. L. F. Church, *The Early Methodist People* (London 1948); and J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Town Labourer, 1760-1832* (London 1917), ii.

[16] Minutes of meeting of Welfare Societies at Kafue, 10-11 July 1934.

[17] Minutes of Livingstone Welfare Association, 5 May, 7 July 1934.

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with an African woman he is not punished. When a native is suspected of committing adultery with a European woman he is punished. Why?" Africans assembled to petition the police to cease assaulting prisoners, particularly those handcuffed to others. They asked for legal assistance to help them puzzle out the white man's court procedures.

Even in aggregation, there is little evidence that this form of constitutional protest ever brought about improvements. It did serve to air grievances publicly and to provide an avenue down which anger and frustration could be channeled nonviolently. The disaffection of the masses could be focused and verbalized and local associations could gradually join in concert. Individuals could conquer feelings of inferiority and begin to assert leadership; indeed, they accumulated that experience so necessary for an informed opposition. Most importantly, the associations afforded nationalist leaders informal professional training of inestimable value. Furthermore, the first modern parties had the heritage of numerous debating societies, and supposedly nonpolitical associations, on which to base their initial mass appeal.

Governments failed to deal realistically with these early associations. Civil servants were prohibited from speaking publicly or taking an active part in the associations. The associations were forbidden to discuss matters "entirely outside the scope of activities for which they were formed."

> Native welfare associations should look after nonpolitical interests of detribalized natives resident in various townships. . . .
>
> . . . welfare associations [are] not representative and government could not regard their views on political matters as representing those of the people as a whole.[18]

The governor of Northern Rhodesia suggested that the leaders of welfare associations, and the associations themselves, should be ridiculed and treated as errant children.[19] Alternately, government was exceedingly careful never to permit the associations to criticize the mine owners or white settlers and it regularly ostracized any whites who were wont to talk politics with the associations. Until World War II, government successfully resisted any amalgamation of African associations or the formation of any political parties of a territorial variety. And when they eventually were formed, government was unsure of the best ways in which to cope with them.

[18] Chief Secretary's circular minute, 4 September 1933, and Chief Secretary's minutes, 21 February 1946, SEC/NAT/311, National Archives, Lusaka.

[19] Chief Secretary to Secretary for Native Affairs, 24 February 1931, SEC/NAT/321, National Archives, Lusaka.

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III

Colonialism almost everywhere in the non-Western world produced reaction, and where this reaction could not be expressed directly, or where healthy protest failed to bring about any appreciable amelioration, the conquered people expressed their rejection of colonialism religiously. Sundkler views the formation of African independent religious bodies as inevitable whenever there are no other outlets for protest available.[20] The Bantu quasi-Christian movements also permit those who are ambitious to come to prominence without direct reference to the colonial context. Furthermore, as Mair has rightly concluded, the separatist sects and prophet cults of Africa (like the related cargo cults of Oceania and the ghost groups of Indian America) demonstrate the need for "a religion that corresponds to widely held aspirations."[21]

In East and Central Africa one may differentiate two varieties of anti-colonial religion. The separatist sects have seceded from mission churches or have simply been formed by a small cadre of dissatisfied adherents. They emphasize African control of the present (not necessarily the future) and they model themselves on the prevailing Protestant mission form of organization (although the BaEmilio Church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, of Northern Rhodesia, represents a Roman Catholic schism). These separatist sects have always asserted strong claims for African self-government within the congregational context.[22] They have baptized readily, revised the orthodox rules of mission Christianity to permit polygyny and beer-drinking and, wherever conditions were ripe, led overt, sometimes violent, and always abortive revolts against colonial authority.

The second variety, African versions of chiliastic cults so common to the Western world, depends on the inspiration of a prophet or a mys-

[20] Bengt G. M. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa* (London 1948), 297.

[21] Lucy Mair, "Independent Religious Movements in Three Continents," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, I (January 1959), 135. Cf. George Eliot, who writes of ". . . eager men and women to whom the exceptional possession of religious truth was the condition that reconciled them to a meagre existence, and made them feel in secure alliance with the unseen but supreme ruler of a world in which their own visible part was small."—*Felix Holt* (London 1866), 42.

[22] The literature of separatism in Africa is extremely varied in scope and quality. In addition to Sundkler, see Katesa Schlosser, *Propheten in Afrika* (Braunschweig 1949) and *Eingeborenenkirchen in Süd und Süd-West Afrika* (Kiel 1958); F. B. Welbourn, *East African Rebels* (London 1961); George Shepperson, "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism," *Phylon*, XIV (March 1953), 9-18. See also Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya* (London 1961), 269-79.

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tic.[23] Their members are converts from mission churches or from the ranks of nonbelievers. Their organization is loose and unstable, their dogma is frequently nonexistent, and their ritual is usually syncretic, spontaneous, and highly emotional. They emphasize confessions, faith healing ("Only pure water will do"), drumming, dancing, speaking with tongues, intercession by mediums and communication with ancestors or gods, divining, purification, elimination of sorcery and witchcraft, a fraternity of the elect who are sanctified by being "born again," and baptism by total immersion.[24] They are millennial. With the apocalypse will come a new and totally black Jerusalem. No longer will Africans be hewers of wood and drawers of water for the white man. These movements represent a reordering of daily life in preparation for the apocalypse and a structuring of a black godly pantheon or, in some cases, the deification of the local prophet as a Son of God to replace Christ or Muhammed in African minds.[25]

Religious separatism in Bantu Africa dates from the formation of the Tembu National Church in 1884.[26] By 1900 it had reached Barotseland, transmitted by Sotho evangelists, and Nyasaland, where it was furthered by the Australian evangelist Joseph Booth. The sequence of events that led via Booth to the formation of John Chilembwe's Providence Industrial Mission in Nyasaland, the first dynamic African separatist church in Central and East Africa, has been thoroughly described by Shepperson and Price.[27] By 1915 Chilembwe, backed by American Negro money, had brought about a unique religious experiment that was exclusively African. More intelligent or courageous than most other separatist sect leaders, or perhaps simply more persuaded of his own understanding of Africa's destiny, Chilembwe was active in opposing any government measures that he deemed an affront to Africans. He protested against the employment of African troops in Ashantiland, Somaliland, and against the Germans. He championed the cause of Nyasaland's landless proletariat. He opposed tax increases. Foreshadowing similar activity years later in Kenya, he established a chain of independent schools in the Shire Highlands

[23] An excellent theoretical discussion is Bryan Wilson, "An Analysis of Sect Development," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (February 1959), 3-15.

[24] For some examples, see R. I. Rotberg, "The Lenshina Movement of Northern Rhodesia," *Rhodes-Livingstone Journal*, XXIX (June 1961), 63-78.

[25] See Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa* (New York 1928), II, 601-12.

[26] Sundkler, 38ff. See also G. M. Theal, *Basutoland Records*, II (Capetown 1883), 184, 229-31, 241ff.

[27] George Shepperson and Thomas Price, *Independent African* (Edinburgh 1958).

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(Nyasaland). Eventually he saw himself as the leader of an independent black Nyasaland, and he directed his Christian followers in a brief, bloody, and wholly unsuccessful rising against European rule.[28] Most other separatist churches have, since Chilembwe, confined their activities to more peaceful paths (governments have been more wary), although the Watu Wa Mngu in Kenya and the Lenshina movement of Northern Rhodesia have had clashes with the police.[29] Even where the independent churches have failed to demonstrate violently, they have remained in continual opposition.

Chiliasm in Africa is an American export. But Russell's "millennial dawn doctrine,"[30] popularized by the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, has been improved almost out of recognition by the African genius for the cult. Elliott Kenan Kamwana Achirwa preached the coming of the Kingdom wherein Africans would soon have full independence and control of taxes. The government would go. "We shall build our own ships; make our own powder, import our own guns."[31] Mwana Lesa, the self-styled Son of God, promised his followers immediate entrance into the select circle of believers and a reserved seat in the Garden of Eden. He proposed first to rid the earth of witches. At one performance a spirit seized him, ". . . for his eyes were red as coals of fire, and on his lips flecks of foam were appearing. He swayed and tossed his arms about like a mountain tree in the grip of a tempest, and the women of his retinue were swaying and moaning as though in fear and terror. . . ."[32] The African Watchtower movement that frightened Northern Rhodesia after World War I taught the immediate end of the world. It followed that there was no need to obey chiefs or government, to cultivate or to work; it was only necessary to be baptized—and baptism was easy—and to wait expectantly for the millennium. But in the meantime disobedience impelled conflict between white government and African anarchy. It led to warfare and to the eventual imprisonment of large numbers of tribesmen possessed of a simple eschatology.[33]

[28] *Ibid.*, 265-320. Cf. Nyasaland Protectorate, *Report of the Commission Appointed . . . to Inquire into . . . the Native Rising within the Nyasaland Protectorate* [6819] (Zomba 1916).

[29] Rotberg, 76.

[30] Charles Taze Russell, *Studies in the Scriptures*, 7 vols. (Allegheny, Pa., and Brooklyn, N.Y., 1886-1904).

[31] Quoted in George Shepperson, "The Politics of African Church Separatist Movements in British Central Africa, 1892-1916," *Africa*, XXIV (July 1954), 239.

[32] Carl Von Hoffman, *Jungle Gods* (London 1929), 53. Also Frank Melland in *Glasgow Bulletin*, 14 January 1939.

[33] The details are contained in ZA 9/2/2/2, Lusaka, and RC 3/9/5/29. Salisbury.

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Government treated separatist sects and chiliastic cults with amusement, a measure of contempt, and some fear. Orthodox missionaries always sought to persuade their governments to forbid independent churches, and for long administrations limited the dissemination of religious propaganda and the spread of most independent African churches. In Northern Rhodesia the government unsuccessfully tried legal subterfuge to curb the influence of the Lenshina movement, and to eliminate the Ethiopian Catholic Church in Zion. Government feared the millennial movements more, however, and prohibited most Watchtower literature, censored the rest, and generally invoked sedition laws whenever prophets became too important. Prophets thereby became martyrs and objects of subsequent veneration by national political parties.

What has been the contribution of these religious movements to the development of African nationalism? Most important, the many cults and sects have helped to revive African self-respect. They have shown that change is indeed possible and that Africans are capable, given some solidarity, of asserting a measure of influence within the colonial context. They have diffused new, often heretical ideas about the importance of Africans for Africa. They have provided an alternative to total submission to white power, and they have brought about ties that substituted mutual belief and purpose for traditional kinship arrangements. Together with the proliferation of associations, the religious movements helped to make possible the rapid rise of modern nationalist parties.

IV

The nationalist struggle for power, as distinct from plaintive requests for improved conditions, dates only from the formation of congresses or parties.[34] In East and Central Africa determined direct political assault on colonialism was a product of those forces unleashed by World War II and so neatly summarized by Hodgkin.[35] The prewar associations, usually local interest groups favoring gradualism and fearing militancy, were subsumed in the organization of new entities, the Kenya African Union, Uganda National Congress, Nyasaland African Congress, Northern Rhodesia Congress, and the Tanganyika African National Union. Younger and more aggressive men—a new elite—replaced traditionalists, the long-time champions of moderate change,

[34] See James S. Coleman, "The Emergence of African Political Parties," in C. Grove Haines, ed., *Africa Today* (Baltimore 1955), 225-56.

[35] Hodgkin, 142.

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just as they did in the Gold Coast, in Senegal, and in Western Nigeria.

The heritage of protest was the same as it was in West Africa, except that the rising leadership was less articulate, less well-educated, less accustomed to the ways of Western rule, and less free economically to risk anti-government activity. Hence the retarded pace of nationalism in East and Central Africa, particularly with white settlers added to the equation. Not until the 1950's did these nationalist movements demand self-government followed by independence. It has taken time, and the inspiration of events elsewhere in Africa, to bring about the rapid political change that shocks well-settled colonists and jolts foreign newspaper readers.

The post-World War II parties represent, for the first time, mass support. They have become highly organized, even bureaucratic. They have elaborate constitutions and emphasize their democratic procedures while, in fact, they remain oligarchic in the extreme. Branches have been formed and are wisely regarded as basic to the smooth and effective functioning of the particular national machine. The parties use every technique of modern propaganda to disseminate nationalism; they rely on the overseas press and television more than on the local, often settler-controlled, press and radio for a development of their "case" against the particular colonial government. Some parties keep permanent representatives in London, to influence the colonial government, and in New York, to fraternize with the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations. The party leaders make frequent visits to world capitals in order to dramatize their national struggle and to consult with others who have passed successfully through the same phase of revolt.

Only with the rise of a new urban middle class could full-time politicians, so necessary for the prosecution of modern nationalism, be afforded by those interested in change. Without them, of course, no mass parties would have been possible, and no nationalist movement would have remained unbought or otherwise uncompromised. Kwame Nkrumah represents the most illustrious of the early paid secretaries, but the efforts of Oscar Kambona of Tanganyika, Harry Nkumbula of Northern Rhodesia, and Dunduzu Chisiza of Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were equally important. Fund-raising, based on subscriptions, badges, flags, slogans, rallies, and the peripatetic campaigner in his gaily painted van or microbus, naturally follows, particularly after the franchise is broadened. The party is brought closer to the rural villager, both for internal party needs and in order to prevent whites from intimating that the nationalist groups represent only an urban

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elite. The more successfully the party can harness the rural and tribal element, the more it can become a truly atribal and national entity.

Gandhi and the Indian example persuaded the new nationalist movements that nonviolence was an efficacious weapon in their struggle against colonial rule. Indeed, they could publicly advocate little else, and financial and military weakness naturally made them press instead for rapid constitutional change. As a first step, nominated members of the legislative council must be replaced by elected Africans, then by a majority of African unofficials and, as the pace quickens and the demands intensify, by responsible government, self-government, and independence within the Commonwealth. Similarly, successive extensions of the franchise are requested until at last the parties can demand, and obtain, universal adult suffrage. As one would expect, the successful parties, at first extra-parliamentary, take advantage of any constitutional changes that afford them a reasonable chance of advance toward self-government. The 1956 elections gave the Nyasaland Congress a majority of the African seats and a certain encouragement to move rapidly toward a more anti-colonial position. Similarly, the tradition of African legislative representation in Uganda and Kenya made it easier, at first, for national movements in those countries to seek change through constitutional rearrangement. But in general they received relatively little encouragement from the governments concerned; not surprisingly, governments jailed leaders for sedition or for possessing prohibited literature (a Gandhi pamphlet in Northern Rhodesia). Nationalism became more aggressive in the face of white resistance to fundamental shifts in the power relationship. "Positive action"—the use of boycotts and strikes—came into vogue, interspersed before very long with violence—a violence that need not have been deliberately encouraged by nationalist leaders.

Over and above other factors, it was the charismatic leadership of a few men that caused modern nationalism to flourish after World War II. Jomo Kenyatta came home, leaving his wife and son in England. Dr. Kamuzu Banda encouraged and exhorted from afar. Harry Nkumbula returned from London. Oscar Kambona came to Dar-es-Salaam. Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika returned from Edinburgh. They were joined by others, but the encouragement of nationalism was, until recent years, primarily their contribution. They accumulated support with ease; the African grievances were many and evident, racialism was not unknown. In a relatively short time these leaders transformed their associations into modern mass parties. The people of Tanganyika,

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in 1961 the first to receive self-government and independence, campaigned for it from 1954, when Nyerere formed the Tanganyika African National Union. Nyasaland, which entered the stage of "responsible" government in 1961, had an African National Congress with modern aspirations as early as 1944. Uganda, which obtained self-government in 1962, experienced the birth of a national party only in 1953, after Great Britain had exiled the Kabaka of Buganda. A modern national party was evident in Kenya from 1947, after Kenyatta reasserted his leadership of the Kenya African Union. The onset of Mau Mau interrupted the growth of African politics in Kenya, but national parties were permitted to emerge again in 1956. In Northern Rhodesia the phase of modern politics began in 1951, when Nkumbula assumed direction of the African National Congress.

These various parties were the direct successors to the associations of an earlier era. Since 1920 the indigenous inhabitants of East and Central Africa had sought to ameliorate their colonial condition by organizing themselves in such associations or by participation in schismatic sectarian movements. But these were ineffectual avenues of protest. They were parochial. The African associations and sects sought improvement rather than change. The leaders requested equal opportunity within a white-dominated system, although, in some cases, these proto-nationalist movements idealized the traditional, pre-European society and sought to achieve it by a withdrawal. The early leaders did not envisage a radically altered society. They did not seek the political kingdom. Theirs was, in sum, a tentative approach adapted to the circumstances of colonial rule. But it did represent legitimate protest and it did provide the necessary bases for a later, "modernist" and more thoroughgoing nationalism. The parties drew their inspiration from the earlier forms of anti-colonialism. Their followers sought redress for the same grievances. But after World War II they wished to achieve a transformation; the parties sought the political kingdom in order to reassert themselves racially and in order to claim a national heritage originally stimulated by the European partition of Africa and later nurtured by colonial rule.

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OPTIMIZING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING

By CHARLES WINDLE and T. R. VALLANCE*

I. Introduction

THERE are many means employed by the United States to maintain and advance its position throughout the world during the current period of bipolar conflict. The most conspicuous of these are subsumed under what is known as the Mutual Security Program. Nearly half of the approximately $4 billion budgeted during fiscal year 1962 for mutual security went into military assistance. Of this, about $125 million was devoted to the training of foreign military personnel. This Military Assistance Training Program, including the training of foreigners in the United States and that administered overseas by Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's), missions, overseas commands, and third countries, constitutes by far the largest effort the world has known on the part of one country to educate and train citizens of others. The number of foreigners given military assistance training in the United States each year—about 16,500 in 1960—exceeds the number trained here under the Fulbright, Smith-Mundt, and Agency for International Development (AID) programs combined.[1]

Since the first postwar provision in 1946 for military aid to the Philippines, the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) has become formalized and grown to include approximately 60 countries,[2] providing training through 1960 to about 120 thousand students in the United States alone, and is now regarded generally as a long-range program, in spite of Congressional reluctance to grant long-term appropriations. Training of foreign military personnel has become a recognized part of the U.S. defense mission. In calendar year 1960, MAP training in this country was given to about 1,870 Latin Americans,

* This article was prepared while the authors were at the Human Resources Research Office of George Washington University. However, it represents their own views, and not those of the Human Resources Research Office or the Department of the Army, or of the Special Operations Research Office of the American University where they are now employed.

[1] W. A. Nielson, "Huge Hidden Impact of the Pentagon," *New York Times Magazine*, June 25, 1961; Committee on Government Operations, *Government Programs in International Education*, House Report No. 2712, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1959.

[2] Statement of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, *Hearings on International Development and Security*, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, 606.

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3,730 Near Easterners and South Asians, 3,840 Europeans, 130 Africans, and 6,950 Far Easterners.[3] A high percentage of these trainees (e.g., 73 per cent in the Army FY 1960 program) were officers.

Through this extensive and growing involvement with foreign military forces, our own armed forces have come to assume, more or less inadvertently and inevitably, major political responsibilities in the underdeveloped nations. The gradual nature of this evolution has been advantageous in permitting orderly change. However, it has had two distinct disadvantages: (a) emerging functions may not always have been clearly perceived, and thus not performed with maximum effectiveness; and (b) evolution, being slower than revolution, may not have permitted administrative organizations to respond as promptly as necessary to changes in international situations, many of which seem revolutionary in character.

The Kennedy administration has greatly increased military emphasis on special types of warfare, including counter-insurgency. This article proposes that a comparable change in emphasis, from traditional military skills to paramilitary capabilities, should take place within the Military Assistance Training Program. Parts of this program, such as the training in counter-insurgency given at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, have pursued nonmilitary objectives. It is felt that many other parts of the Military Assistance Training Program could—and should—be redesigned to capitalize more fully on the potential this program offers for furthering economic, political, and social growth in recipient countries as a necessary accompaniment of military strength. This article will be concerned particularly with the training given foreign military personnel in the United States. However, many of its arguments also apply to training given in overseas schools and in foreign countries by mobile training teams, missions, and MAAG's.

The view that military assistance training should be increasingly oriented toward nonmilitary objectives is not new. Indeed, it has been expounded by media ranging from newspaper articles to the report of the President's Draper Committee.[4] However, this view has been only slowly and partially adopted. There remains need for more detailed examination of the reasons for and against broadening the perspective

[3] Calculated as 80 per cent of the number of formal training courses completed.

[4] President's Committee to Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program, *Conclusions Concerning the Mutual Security Program* (Washington, August 1959) [cited hereinafter as Draper Report]; W. P. Davison, *Political Side-Effects of the Military Assistance Training Program* (The RAND Corporation, July 1960); Nielson, "Impact of the Pentagon."

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of military assistance training, and for suggestions as to the form these changes might take.

II. Objectives

It has been fairly widely recognized that the Mutual Security Program has several objectives, some of which are in partial conflict.[5] They include economizing in the provision of defense resources, establishing bases of influence, combating aggression, and maintaining internal security in foreign countries.

The Military Assistance Training Program, as part of the Mutual Security Program, may be expected to pursue the same objectives. However, the avowed goals of this portion of the overall program are considerably less sweeping and maintain a military orientation. These goals were described in 1955 as follows: "(1) To train personnel to insure that MDAP [Mutual Defense Assistance Program] equipment is properly maintained and operated when sent abroad. (2) To establish an indigenous training basis or faculty within the various countries so that in the future each country, insofar as possible, can train its own specialists and technicians. (3) To assist in the attainment of combat effectiveness at the earliest possible date."[6] However, over the years these purposes have broadened. The Mutual Security Act of 1959 provided that "to the extent feasible . . . the military assistance program shall encourage the use of foreign military forces in . . . activities helpful to economic development."

A more recent description of MAP training objectives, in addition to providing more detailed statements of the foregoing aims, adds two further ones: "create friendship and good will toward the U.S. by exposing foreign personnel to American institutions, wherever practical," and "meet internal security requirements" of various types.[7] It is also noted that "inherent in training assistance are certain political, social, and economic benefits," but these benefits are treated as side-effects, incidental to rather than coordinate with strictly military goals.

Changes in the orientation of the Defense Department are occurring, primarily in response to the need for Special Warfare and other un-

[5] Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *Some Perspectives on American Military Assistance*, Policy Memorandum No. 13 (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1957); A. A. Jordon, Sr., *Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia* (New York 1962).

[6] Statement of W. J. McNiel, Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Hearings on Mutual Security Appropriations for 1956*, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955, 198-99.

[7] Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Military Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1962 Estimates*, Congressional Presentation, 1961, 21.

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conventional military personnel to carry out paramilitary functions in Southeast Asia. However, except for a few courses associated with the Special Warfare build-up, economic and political purposes of MAP training still seem insufficiently explicit relative to other objectives.[8] This lack of explicitness is unfortunate, for it permits confusion, misunderstanding, and self-deception. Even worse, the Military Assistance Training Program fails to realize its full potential through short-sighted acceptance of salient military objectives and near-silence about broader objectives. Thus, most of the efforts of military assistance training are aimed at increasing the capabilities of foreign military personnel to operate their armed forces more efficiently in combat. Other potential benefits of training, such as improving the political, social, and economic status of foreign countries, are treated as collateral benefits, by-products that should be aimed for only if they can be achieved simultaneously with military benefits at little or no extra expense.

III. Changing Perspectives

The Military Assistance Training Program was designed over a decade ago, when international conditions differed considerably from what they are today. While this training program has expanded greatly in extensiveness, intensiveness, and duration, it has not been greatly modified in design. During the program's early years, the United States was faced with a series of external aggressions against friendly or neutral countries: the Soviet Union's consolidation of its hold over Eastern Europe in 1948-1950; the strife and threat of strife in Greece, Turkey, and Iran; and, most important, the Korean War, extending from 1950 to 1953. These challenges developed the concept of the United States as the guardian of the safety of the free world through its military power. The education and training appropriate for the United States to provide to other nations were seen as military training to assist in withstanding aggression, and education to develop intercultural understanding so that other countries would be "on our side" in the bipolar conflict.[9]

Following the death of Stalin, Communist strategy extended the types and areas of international conflict. Attention shifted from Europe to the underdeveloped areas of the world, where the growing pressures

[8] Furniss, *American Military Assistance*.

[9] R. A. Humphrey, "Cultural Communication and New Imperatives," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 335 (May 1961), 141-52.

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of nationalism in developing countries permitted Communist exploitation through revolution, subversion, and guerrilla action.

With a lag that may be characteristic of a democracy, it is becoming apparent that the old concept of the United States as a military bulwark restraining communism is insufficient. A more active leadership role must be accepted in order to counter the range of threats to our well-being, including a concern for the internal security and even the internal development of friendly and neutral countries. This expansion of the role that the United States must play in order to counter Communist aggression makes it necessary to reexamine programs designed in the past to determine whether they meet present-day needs.

IV. Reasons for Broadening MAP Training

Since security now appears to depend so heavily upon the internal stability and technical development of underdeveloped areas, the Military Assistance Training Program should give greater recognition to traditionally nonmilitary objectives. A number of arguments support this proposal:

(1) *Military forces have many advantages as an instrument of modernization.* Lucian W. Pye recently made an acute analysis of the advantages that armies have as means to modernize underdeveloped countries.[10] Briefly, he suggested that our model of a proper government as being one in which societal values shape governmental action does not apply to underdeveloped countries, since in these countries changes toward modernization are generally stimulated and guided from outside. Military forces of underdeveloped countries, because of their close contact with the outside world, are available channels through which new values may flow. They are relatively modernized, industry-oriented institutions, sensitive to the need for technological competition, and in positions of leadership to direct technological development. Other conditions, such as separation from traditional family ties and vocational practices, permit unusually complete acculturation of personnel. Examples of the many kinds of functions that properly oriented indigenous military resources may accomplish to aid economic and social progress have been described in the Draper Report.[11] These potentialities of

[10] Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962), 69-89.

[11] Brig. Gen. D. G. Shingler, "Contributions of Military Resources to Economic and Social Progress," Annex D to Draper Report.

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the military of underdeveloped countries can, of course, be used either for good or ill. The point is that the military is an unusually potent institution in such countries, and these potentialities can be ignored only at our peril.

(2) *U.S. military forces offer an inexpensive way to achieve development.* The United States is committed to military assistance training for the foreseeable future. This means that foreign military personnel will continue to come to the United States and be exposed to the American culture, and that American personnel, equipment, and advice will continue to be used overseas, influencing in some way the peoples of those countries. Efforts expended to shape the culture contacts and influence of military programs will be less expensive than setting up new programs to achieve developmental objectives. Insofar as military resources can achieve development while performing the necessary military functions, economy will result.

(3) *The functions for which foreign military personnel require training combine military and nonmilitary capabilities.* During the early history of the United States, our armed services were used to assist in economic development by providing engineering skills, conducting explorations, constructing roads, canals, and railroads, assisting flood control, and maintaining internal security. This model of military functions seems considerably more appropriate for underdeveloped countries to follow than does that of our present military system, in which almost exclusive attention is paid to combating external aggression with highly advanced technology.

The distinction between "military" and "collateral" benefits of training arises from our own administrative distinction, not from logical requirements in order to fulfill the objectives of a foreign government—nor even from our own overall national objectives. Actually, it is because foreign military institutions are required to perform a combination of military security, political leadership, and economic functions that the collateral benefits are desired. In order to be meaningful, political and economic education should be related to the conditions of the job the foreigner is expected to perform. An example of the way in which military and collateral objectives may be synthesized appears in the newly designed counter-insurgency course at Fort Bragg. This course, perhaps because it most closely approximates a realistic appraisal of the quasi-military and developmental tasks facing foreign military bodies, seems to maximize both the security and the broader educational objectives of training.

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(4) *Defense is relatively "dollar-tropic."* Granted that assistance to foreign countries is valuable, that economic, political, and military means and objectives are closely intertwined and best handled in an integrated package, and that several agencies are responsible for parts of the assistance package, why should the Defense Department be assigned responsibility for implementing some nonmilitary objectives of the State Department?

One excellent practical reason is that such a mechanism is more likely to be accepted by Congressional holders of the purse strings than the assignment of a major participating role to another agency. This tendency of Congress to prefer defense to foreign aid expenditures has been noted in the past and may be expected generally to continue in the future.

A second reason is the desirability of diversifying institutional commitments within the defense establishment to facilitate the possible future conversion of mission from a heavy investment in the production and use of weaponry to other socially useful activities.

(5) *Military forces are a part of political intercourse.* Clausewitz is generally credited with having pointed out most clearly and literately that war is an instrument of policy: "Thus policy makes out of the all-overpowering element of war a mere instrument, out of the fearsome battlesword, which should be lifted with both hands and the whole power of the body to strike once and not more, a light, handy dagger, which is even sometimes nothing more than a rapier, which it uses in turn for thrusts, feints and parries."[12] Just as this reasoning applies to the actual performance of war, so it should apply with less excuse of distortion to cold war activities.

V. Arguments for the Status Quo

In the light of the above arguments, what are the reasons given to support the relatively low priority assigned to political considerations in military assistance training? Some of these have been mentioned already, but will be summarized here for the sake of completeness.

(1) *Presumed unimportance of development for security.* A policy of exclusive reliance upon the threat of massive retaliation, for example, will give little support to developmental objectives in military training. Similarly, heavy policy reliance upon the threat of using conventional military forces to withstand lower levels of threat will dictate little

[12] Karl von Clausewitz, *On War,* trans. by O. J. Matthijs Jolles (Washington 1953), 597.

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emphasis upon development. Present trends in policy indicate that this type of reason for ignoring political implications is no longer tenable.

(2) *Fear of antagonizing foreign governments.* There are at least two classes of antagonisms that may be aroused. First, many governments would object to having their military personnel subjected to political indoctrination that might undermine the status of the present elite. However, this is not the intent—nor need it be the consequence—of broadening the perspective of military assistance training. Even under present training conditions, foreign military forces have often been found in revolutionary roles. This may indicate that alterations in present unintended political influences might, if anything, result in greater stability. In addition, the kinds of political content that might be considered for military assistance training would be generally the same as those that characterize economic assistance—namely, concern for social and economic development, which few, if any, countries find objectionable in our civilian schools or economic assistance teams abroad.

Second, many of the traditions and values of members of other cultures differ from those of Americans. Attempts to influence social change inevitably produce conflicts with a wide range of values. Members of foreign countries and especially organizations built around such values—e.g., religious groups—may find the conflicts produced by attempts to effect change objectionable. The greater the degree of change attempted—and the more such change involves social values rather than purely technical skills—the more resistance is likely to be encountered. There is, undeniably, a risk in attempting very fundamental changes. Furthermore, this risk is increased when the innovator tries to produce changes based upon his own cultural values, without recognizing the need to alter innovations to fit into the new foreign cultural contexts. There may be some justification for not attempting actions that, if successful, would be beneficial, because of the considerable harm that would result if they were unsuccessful. However, such judgments require fairly refined estimates of likely costs, gains, and probabilities of success. It is doubtful whether such evaluations of nonmilitary values have been made. It is likely that such evaluations would reveal many of these values to be worth the risk of striving for them.

(3) *The propaganda value of being "natural."* It is sometimes argued in defense of providing foreigners with training courses originally designed for Westerners that we can make our best impression on foreigners by being natural, by intentionally and obviously forgoing

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attempts to propagandize and thus letting trainees get to know and love us as we really are. This would be nice to believe. Unfortunately, the literature on the reaction of foreign students to education in America does little to reinforce the view.[13] More to the point is the question of whether being loved or even respected is by itself a meaningful national objective. The goal of developing other nations with whom we can cooperate peacefully may be better served by education in the skills that will enable foreigners to *be* like us rather than *to* like us.

It is possible, of course, that the ideal type of training for persons from other cultures happens to be precisely the kind we use for our own personnel. However, this would be a rather remarkable coincidence, considering how different many of the cultures are from which the trainees come and how different the potential applications of their skills. If the propaganda value of contact with American culture is so important that it should be a major determinant of the training program, certainly it is sufficiently important to justify detailed study of whether the most appropriate type of program orientation is the "natural" one or whether it should be modified in some fashion to relate modern technology to foreign cultural values.

(4) *The proper military role is apolitical.* This argument applies both to our own military forces and, more clearly, to those of underdeveloped countries. One of the basic principles of our Constitution is that the will of the people, channeled through appropriate political institutions, should provide the basis of government. This requires not only viable political institutions and an educated populace, but also military forces so directed and trained that they limit themselves to professional military duties in the service of governmental policies rather than attempting to formulate those policies. Consequently, there is frequent reluctance to see our military forces move into new activities such as civic action. This reluctance has been reduced by the strong injunctions of President Kennedy, based on increasingly apparent needs for counter-insurgency.

A proper role for military forces is particularly difficult to achieve in underdeveloped countries which, lacking an educated populace and democratic political institutions, find their politics resting inevitably on force. According to Lieuwen, such a situation has been dramatically

[13] R. L. Beals, "The Exchange of Persons: Research Developments," in National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, *Educational Exchanges: Aspects of the American Experience* (Washington 1956), 53-62; G. V. Coelho (issue ed.), "Impacts of Studying Abroad," *Journal of Social Issues*, XVIII, No. 1 (1962); F. J. McGuigan, "Further Study of Psychological Changes Related to Intercultural Experiences," *Psychological Report*, V (June 1959), 244-48.

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manifest in Latin America, where militarism has been rife.[14] Rule by the military has often been predatory and, even when initiated as social reform, has sometimes been distorted into an obstacle to social progress by the military leaders' lack of governing skills. Our military aid, in the absence of a realistic military objective, has generally served the political objective of keeping Latin America friendly and cooperative. This political potency of military assistance stems from the important political role of the military forces in Latin America. Unfortunately, military assistance also bolsters the military in playing a political role. Such a role is likely to retard social change, which is urgently needed to forestall an internal Communist threat. The United States, through its repeated unsuccessful attempts to develop nonpolitical military forces in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Nicaragua, is acutely aware of the danger that military forces pose for effective government. Lieuwen concludes that future U.S. policy in Latin America should de-emphasize military build-up. Recognizing that military assistance cannot be abruptly terminated, he suggests that it be used to produce greater professionalism, by which he apparently means concentration upon military technology to the exclusion of policy considerations that dictate how this technology is to be used.

We suggest that the type of training to be encouraged should not be merely technical, but should prepare military personnel to play a useful role in implementing policy. The Communist threat to Latin American security is primarily internal and political rather than military in nature. The military forces are needed primarily to aid economic and social improvement by use of such rare technical skills as engineering. Thus the appropriate professionalism would concentrate less upon principles of military action than upon the broader principles of technology that could be applied in nation-building.

(5) *Cost.* Since the assignment of the MAP to the Department of Defense, parts of this program have been in competition with regular service programs for scarce funds. The training program in the U.S. service schools has been designed for and must primarily accommodate American military personnel. Assuming that this program design is optimal, alterations to meet unique needs of foreigners would lower the quality of the training given to our own troops, who usually outnumber the foreign students in any given class. Providing special classes for foreigners has the same effect indirectly in drawing funds from other military programs. It appears that, in many cases, less than optimal

[14] Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York 1960).

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training (in terms of applicability, not technical excellence) must be given to foreigners for the sake of economy.

However, such a rule should not be applied blindly. Since the Military Assistance Program is based upon broader aspects of national policy than many military personnel must consider, the MAP has tended to have a stepchild status.[15] As the importance of this program gains greater recognition, ways in which service school training can be made more appropriate will be discovered. Individual courses should be carefully examined to discover ways in which material can be adapted to the needs of foreigners without loss to U.S. personnel. The probable increased importance of counter-insurgency in future military activities suggests that such revisions of training programs may actually be of increased rather than decreased value to U.S. military personnel as well.

VI. A Positive Approach to Military Assistance Training

As was noted earlier, there seems to be a tendency among foreign policy analysts to agree that military assistance training should have a more than purely military content. Perhaps the most authoritative expression of this trend has been President Kennedy's 1961 foreign aid message to Congress, in which he declared: "Military assistance will in the future more heavily emphasize the internal security, civil works and economic growth of the nations thus aided." However, one of the reasons why military values have dominated the program so exclusively is that the mechanisms for accomplishing military assistance have been purely military. This suggests that, for real changes in orientation to occur, the present mechanisms of implementation should be reviewed.

Such a review would have to consider many factors and will not be attempted here. However, several ways can be suggested in which military assistance training might be redesigned to meet broader objectives.

(1) *The overall objective.* The Draper Report included a number of suggestions for improving the training and education provided under the assistance programs. Five major areas of concern were identified: "(1) development of high-level leadership; (2) expansion of indigenous educational systems; (3) better utilization of educational potential of the military structure; (4) improvement of U.S. advisory capacities; and (5) improvement of training environment within the United States." Within each of these areas, several suggestions were made—

[15] J. H. Ohly, "A Study of Certain Aspects of Foreign Aid," Annex G to Draper Report.

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for example, "Develop definitive guidance for the fruitful use of off-duty time for all trainees, particularly for those earmarked as present or potential leaders," and "Develop procedures to insure that the content of training and education in the United States . . . are adapted to the specific requirements of the individual's background and probable future utilization."[16]

Many of these suggestions would, indeed, improve military assistance training. However, they seem to lack cohesion; they are aimed at improving each of a large number of segments of the program without apparent or explicit relation to an overall objective. It might be of greater value for program administrators to adopt a superordinate objective that would help to guide them in designing and evaluating ways to improve training. A possible candidate for the overall objective might be to provide what Janowitz has called "adaptive career experiences." He described these as "additional and unusual experiences," such as association with experimental weapons, or "unique educational experiences or politico-military assignments, which . . . taught negotiative and innovative skills."[17] What Janowitz apparently has in mind here is an especially challenging experience with a problem that is sufficiently new and different to cause a thorough self-examination and lead to a significant revision or clarification of long-range personal goals and major purposes. He found such career experiences typical of high-ranking U.S. military officers identified as prime movers because of their contributions to the decision-making process. Similarly, military assistance training experiences in the United States could serve foreign military officers by broadening their understanding of technological development, policy formation, and administration, and shaping attitudes appropriate to serving as technological innovators in their home countries.

This suggestion is, unfortunately, extremely general. Relatively little is known about the development of creativity or attitudes leading to innovation in our own culture, let alone in foreign cultures. However, social science literature can provide some clues as to how educational experiences should be planned to enhance innovations, and administrators would, on the basis of their own experience, design training quite differently if they were aiming for a general orientation rather than being concerned only with transmitting specific skills. One of the main principles to be followed to increase the likelihood of adaptive

[16] Col. R. G. Stilwell, "Training and Education Under the Assistance Programs," Annex E to Draper Report, 157, 158, 159.

[17] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), 165-71.

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career experiences would be not only to permit but to encourage individuals to design and pursue their own particular interests. There are obvious difficulties, expenses, necessary boundaries, and even dangers in such a system. However, the potential benefits that might be achieved on this salient of the new frontier make efforts to pioneer desirable.

(2) *On-the-job training.* In many cultures a sharp distinction is made between education and practical application. Foreign students are accustomed to memorizing facts, but often look with scorn upon their application. Thus it may be more important to train such students in the practice of skills than in the abstract appreciation of them. The Military Assistance Program authorized on-the-job training, but in practice conducts relatively little, especially of the type in which foreign military personnel are integrated into U.S. training units, much as some Koreans (Katusas) are in U.S. units stationed in Korea. On-the-job training has its main advantages in the communicating of skills. Since most U.S. units are involved in strictly military (as contrasted with developmental) functions, the skills learned would tend to be almost entirely military. Both because the military skills needed by American personnel differ from those needed in underdeveloped countries and because typical training in American units does not integrate technical military skills with civic action for nation-building, the types of skills taught may often be inappropriate for foreign military personnel. This suggests that the mechanism of integrated on-the-job training should be used mainly when the units' operations are oriented toward development or technical activities of general value such as exist in a number of the technical services. The possible advantages of on-the-job training programs justify experimental evaluation under a wide range of administrative conditions.

(3) *Administrative responsibility.* Undoubtedly the most important step in redesigning military assistance training is to provide an administrative mechanism whereby developmental objectives can be included in the planning for training. This, of course, requires that developmental objectives be defined more clearly than they have been in the past. There are indications that such a clarification of foreign aid goals is being attempted.[18] In addition, administrative channels should be reexamined. At present there are several points in the system at which foreign policy considerations may enter. These include coordination in the field under the ambassadors, and policy guidance in Washington formulated jointly by the Departments of State and De-

[18] John K. Galbraith, "A Positive Approach to Foreign Aid," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXIX (April 1961), 444-57.

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fense. There are indications that neither of these sources of influence has been as effective as desirable.

Ambassadors frequently neither sufficiently understand nor are sufficiently interested in foreign aid to effect coordination.[19] At the Washington level, the fears expressed that transfer of primary responsibility for military assistance from the State to the Defense Department would sacrifice political objectives for administrative efficiency[20] seem to have been borne out by the general lack of attention to developmental goals in military assistance until strong executive pressure was brought to bear. So that continued executive attention is not needed, thought should be given to devising administrative mechanisms that would increase the recognition of foreign policy objectives in the operation of the Military Assistance Program.

For example, Galbraith has proposed that, in order to ensure that economic development includes all the necessary requirements for growth, a new system of organizing foreign aid be established.[21] This system would aim to set and guide the pursuit of appropriate developmental goals, including the requirements for education, social justice, reliable administration, and a clear concept of the nature of development. Because development requires joint donor and recipient participation, a development agency would be operated by panels composed of representatives of the agency and the recipient countries and functioning as development ministries in those countries. In the many underdeveloped nations in which the threat of Communist seizure of the social revolution exceeds the threat of military aggression, it would seem appropriate for military assistance to be handled by the same development agency. In countries such as those of Latin America, where even the ostensible reason for military assistance is limited to internal security and this in turn demands developmental work in order to win the cooperation of the people, the need for coordination between economic and military assistance is great and perhaps can best be achieved by a common administrative structure. In the past, military assistance was often described as an integral part of national defense and the interchangeability of MAP and other Defense Department funds was emphasized as a reason for giving Defense increasing operational control. It is here suggested that there are cases in which MAP could be better conceived and administered as a part of eco-

[19] Brookings Institution, *Administrative Aspects of U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs*, Document No. 52, U.S. Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957, 524.
[20] *Ibid.*, 529; Furniss, *American Military Assistance*.
[21] Galbraith, "Positive Approach to Foreign Aid."

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nomic development. Such arrangements will obviously not be appropriate for all countries—for example, NATO members. On the other hand, the transfer of responsibilities for military assistance from the Department of State to the Department of Defense was probably not optimal for all countries. Just as there has been a proliferation of administrative instruments to deal with special cases, so there would be advantages in having several categories of administrative responsibility for implementing the diverse functions now subsumed under military assistance.

In a system such as that proposed by Galbraith, with military as well as economic assistance being guided by the development agency, military training could be better coordinated with the overall needs of the recipient country than is now usual. Insofar as skills are to be developed in the military to aid general technological development, and the balance of skills is to be distributed in a rational manner among various parts of the economy, such country-wide planning of training seems more important than the present, predominantly piecemeal, equipment-oriented method.

(4) *Research needs.* Military assistance is a relatively new area of interest for the United States in general, and for the armed forces in particular. The military suddenly require information to guide them in performing these new missions. Yet the agency that has the most experience in assisting foreign countries to become developed technologically, the Agency for International Development, has performed little systematic research. As one AID planner described the situation: ". . . We (and I refer to the developed countries as a whole) are now trying to do one of the most difficult and highly specialized jobs that man has ever undertaken and we are gravely lacking in the knowledge and professional competence required to perform it. This is particularly true in, but by no means limited to, the area of human and institutional resource problems, an area wherein the developed nations do not now have, and can only acquire through the processes of painstaking research, the wisdom and information to devise adequate solutions; nor do they now possess, and here again research and development are critical, the trained manpower and institutional resources of their own that are necessary to carry out such solutions. . . . The gap in our knowledge in this area is much greater than the gap in our knowledge in 1940 with respect to the development of an atomic weapon. Yet I venture to predict, measured in terms of simple American security, that history will conclude that it was more important (and probably more

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difficult) to close the present gap than it was to bridge the atomic gap during World War II."[22]

The need for research to guide the performance and training of personnel for international security missions may for convenience be separated into three categories:

(a) *Doctrine and organization.* The most imposing class of problems concerns the "strategy" of assistance. In this area fall problems of optimal relationship among institutions in the attempt to change cultures. The type of research required to answer problems on this level will be operations research or systems analysis, with the action recommendations usually taking the form of administrative realignments and definitions of objectives. Wolf's recent attempt to develop a model to improve the allocation of foreign aid is a good example of this approach.[23]

In the area of military assistance training in the United States, such problems might include: To what extent are various Western administrative policies and political philosophies appropriate for other countries to employ in development? Or, what degree of integration (e.g., regional, country, by technical specialty, or by objective) should be attempted in development planning, and how can this integration be achieved?

(b) *Procedure.* The second class of problems concerns what may be thought of as the "tactics" of military assistance training. This involves determining the specific steps to be taken in diagnosing training needs and devising training programs. Examples of the kind of problems to be answered include: What is the relative effectiveness of various types of technical training given to military or civilian foreign personnel for internal security and development in the recipient country? To what extent will automated instruction techniques be effective with members of other cultures? And, how can the adverse technological and social conditions under which skills must eventually be applied in underdeveloped countries be simulated during training in the United States to maximize application of what is learned?

(c) *Training the trainers.* The third class of problems relates to the design of training for the U.S. personnel who conduct military assistance training. Until recently, the kinds of skills and knowledge needed

[22] J. H. Ohly, *Research and Development in the Field of Foreign Economic and Technical Assistance*, Secretariat Note 3 (International Cooperation Administration, July 1960).

[23] Charles Wolf, Jr., *Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia* (Princeton 1960).

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for intercultural communication have not been emphasized during a military career. In fact, many of them—such as cultural sensitivity, political sophistication, and belief in this type of mission[24]—were avoided as inconsistent with the traditional military role.

Now, however, widespread efforts are being made to prepare American troops to work with foreigners. Unfortunately, reliable scientific knowledge about crosscultural relationships is not available to support the development of training programs. For example, the relative value of such techniques as role-playing, academic training, or contacts with foreigners for sensitizing personnel to the views of other nations is not known nor are methods of developing within instructors interpersonal skills that would assist foreign students to discover the specific applications of course material most appropriate for their own cultural problems and individual abilities.

The Military Assistance Training Program consists of an extensive national effort with considerable political, social, and economic implications as well as military ones. It is suggested that the policies guiding the conduct of this program have not kept pace with changes in international relations and foreign policy objectives. Specifically, the increasing importance of nonmilitary objectives and the potentiality of military means to further these objectives should be given greater recognition in the training of foreign military personnel in the United States. Arguments for and against broadening military assistance training objectives have been discussed. Several proposals have been made concerning ways to increase the nonmilitary benefits of military assistance training of foreign troops in the United States. These include the orientation of training toward what Janowitz calls "adaptive career experiences" that would make a real difference in professional outlook; increased on-the-job training in the practical use of skills of both military and nonmilitary relevance to development objectives; the establishment of a development agency responsible for the coordinated planning of economic and military assistance; and the pursuit of research on which to base improvements in doctrine, organization, procedures, and training appropriate for the broader objectives of international security affairs.

[24] Harlan Cleveland, G. J. Mangone, and J. C. Adams, *The Overseas Americans* (New York 1960).

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Review Articles

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

A Review of the State of the Field with a Few Examples

By MANFRED HALPERN

Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Oxford University Press, 1961, 511 pp. 48s.

P. M. Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961, 242 pp. 27s/6d.

P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations?*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1961, 300 pp. $7.95.

Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1961, 440 pp. $7.50.

Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961, 298 pp. $6.75.

I

IN 1962, over four hundred scholars in the United States are teaching college courses devoted wholly or in large part to the Middle East.* Among the more prominent schools, Columbia, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Michigan, Portland, Princeton, UCLA, and McGill in Canada are offering interdisciplinary programs in Middle Eastern studies, and in all these programs the dominant concern is the contemporary and predominantly Moslem civilization of the Arabs, Turks, Iranians, Pakistanis, and Afghans.

This is a startlingly large and sudden flowering, especially since the seeds of scholarship in this field remain unusually scarce—scarcer by far than in Far Eastern or African studies. Not until 1940 did the American Oriental Society arrange its first panel on Islam; not until 1947 did the *Middle East Journal* appear as the first American quarterly concerned with the general contemporary problems of that area. In 1949 a Report of the American Council of Learned Societies noted

* This figure is based on a survey, "Undergraduate Instruction on the Middle East in American Colleges and Universities," conducted by J. C. Hurewitz in behalf of the American Association for Middle Eastern Studies, New York, May 1, 1962.

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that there still was no American professor employed full-time at any university who could claim to be expert in the economics, sociology, or politics of the contemporary Middle East.[1]

The strength of scholarly work in Oriental studies in the United States, as elsewhere in the world, is a humanistic interest in the language, culture, and history of eras now fascinatingly dead. In the USSR, a shift in favor of contemporary problems did not take place until after the 20th Communist Party Congress (1956), when Soviet Orientalists began to pay greater attention to "the correlation of economy and politics in countries of the East, internal and external conditions and factors relating to the realization of the development potential in Eastern countries by non-capitalist methods, and the distribution of social forces in these countries."[2] When, in the mid-1950's, friends of a recent American Secretary of State decided to present him with a book that would help him appreciate the underlying forces transforming Middle Eastern society, they selected *The Call of the Minaret* (New York 1956), written by Kenneth Cragg, an Oxford-trained English missionary. From its title, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago 1947), a sensitive study by another English scholar, Sir Hamilton Gibb (now director of Middle Eastern studies at Harvard), might have seemed appropriate, but it dealt primarily with religious reformist currents that had already lost much of their influence. There were, by this time, a handful of good books covering the Middle East's international relations,[3] but these still shared with both the products of their fellow-scholars and the policies of all Secretaries of State an incomplete awareness of the links between internal and external forces in the Middle East.

[1] American Council of Learned Societies, *A Program for Near Eastern Studies in the United States* (Washington 1949), 8.

[2] "XXI s"ezd CPSU i zadachi vostokovedeniya" [The XXI Congress of the CPSU and the Tasks of Oriental Studies], *Problemy Vostokovedeniya*, No. 1 (1959), 18-25. For an account of Soviet Oriental studies, see Ann K. S. Lambton, ed., *Islam and Russia: A Detailed Analysis of "An Outline of the History of Islamic Studies in the U.S.S.R." by N. A. Smirnov* (London 1956). Also four "Selective Bibliographies" of Russian materials on Arabs and Arab Countries, Islam and Islamic Institutions, Turkey, and Africa, all by Rudolf Loewenthal, Institute of Languages and Linguistics, Georgetown University (Washington 1958). W. Z. Laqueur, "The Shifting Line in Soviet Orientology," *Problems of Communism*, v, No. 2 (March-April 1956), 20-26.

[3] Among them, E. A. Speiser, *The United States and the Near East* (rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1959); J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas* (New York 1953); Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951); Halford L. Hoskins, *The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics* (New York 1954); George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (2nd ed., Ithaca 1956). An increasing concern with the impact of internal affairs on international relations is apparent in a later book, John C. Campbell's *Defense of the Middle East* (2nd ed., New York 1960).

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During the 1950's, therefore, a great gap remained between what information men had accumulated and what they still needed to learn in order to achieve a systematically organized body of knowledge or course of action in regard to some 230,000,000 people in what are now eighteen independent countries and thirteen sheikhdoms and principalities from Morocco to Pakistan. Policy-makers in the Department of State continued during the first half of the 1950's to concern themselves so much with the external defense of the Middle East that they were little prepared to cope with the effects of the internal revolutions that, by the second half of the decade, had destroyed most of the foundations on which Western defenses had been built.

Meanwhile, a number of initiatives were being taken to improve the state of contemporary Middle Eastern studies. The Social Science Research Council's Committee on the Near and Middle East sponsored a conference on "Social Dynamics and the Cultural Setting in the Middle East" in 1952. In his introduction to the published papers, the chairman of this conference pointed out that "Each chapter both explicitly and implicitly demonstrates with renewed clarity the inadequacy of the present state of our knowledge . . . about the social forces of the Near East."[4] In 1954 and 1955, the Committee held a series of meetings to assess the best direction for future research and training in Middle Eastern politics, sociology, history, economics, anthropology, and law.[5] In 1958, the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics joined with the Committee on the Near and Middle East to share in preparations for research on interest groups in the area.

These initiatives were all the more noteworthy in view of the fact that until 1960 no Center of Middle Eastern Studies at any American university was headed by a social scientist or contained a majority of social scientists on its staff. These meetings might not have come about had not a small number of Orientalists joined in accepting the need

[4] George G. Cameron, in *Social Forces in the Near East*, ed. by Sydney N. Fisher (Ithaca 1955), xiv. In presenting this volume, the editor adds that in the past 150 years more than 40,000 books on the subject of the Middle East have appeared in Western languages. In terms of the larger area under consideration here, the number is probably closer to 60,000.

[5] None of the assessments made by these committees, which were under the general chairmanship of T. Cuyler Young, have been published, but the causes of discontent and proposals for a change of course are highlighted, for the social sciences, by Dankwart A. Rustow's *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University (Princeton 1956); and, for history, by H. A. R. Gibb's "Problems of Modern Middle Eastern History," *Report on Current Research*, Middle East Institute (Washington, Spring 1956), 1-7.

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for a new kind of Orientology.[6] For while most Orientalists have remained interested in the past, Orientals themselves have become intent upon modernization and often heedless of the past, and most students (and foundations, governments, and corporations) have naturally become interested in catching up with the transformation of the Orient.

It is obviously too early to expect many sound fruits as a result of these new endeavors, nor can this incomplete inventory of the harvest of a single year be regarded as a fair sample. Nonetheless, we find among the books under review here new kinds of essays never attempted before, and deliberate efforts to fill long-felt gaps, so that even this partial survey should provide us with additional evidence about how the field stands.

II

Bernard Lewis' history, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* is certainly the best analysis of the subject that has so far appeared. It is scholarly, brilliant, and written with style. If the social scientist may complain that it lacks a systematic conceptual or theoretical framework, he must at least admire the logical clarity and pertinence of its ideas. The author's awareness of basic issues and problems persists not only through the pages that deal with various historical stages from the decline of the Ottoman Empire to 1950, but also through a large section devoted to particular aspects of change—community and nation, state and government, religion and culture, elite and class.

It is therefore especially welcome news that Lewis has been appointed General Editor of a series of modern histories of various countries of the Middle East, of which P. M. Holt's book on the Sudan is the first to be published. This is also the first history of the Sudan that reaches from the early nineteenth century into the period of national independence. The volume is, perhaps, slimmer in size than the subject deserves, but the former Archivist of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan has accomplished his task with great knowledge and sympathetic understanding of the problems of political development.

These two volumes, however, are among the very few that trace the course of modernization, whether generally, politically, economically, socially, or intellectually, whether descriptively or analytically, in the

[6] It would be quite impossible for students of political modernization to do any sensible work without, for example, drawing upon the works of H. A. R. Gibb, Gustave von Grunebaum, or Wilfred Cantwell Smith, to mention only scholars in the humanities now on this continent.

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countries of the Middle East and North Africa. For several countries there are no studies at all; for most, only one.[7] If the criterion were made any more precise—namely, books that are intended primarily to explain the relationships, ideas, forces, and problems that now affect the behavior of men and institutions in any of these eighteen countries—the count might not reach a dozen.

One might have expected that on two topics at least—Israel and Middle Eastern nationalism—the intense public interest of the West and the region itself would have stimulated a greater supply of books. Indeed, the supply is great. Yet, since the pioneering studies by Hans Kohn on Middle Eastern nationalism in the late 1920's and early 1930's, there have appeared only a handful of analytical studies, though there have been many symptomatic publications by partisans both inside and outside the area.[8] For Israel we have, at last, a volume analyzing the relationships among political, administrative, and economic problems (Marver H. Bernstein's *The Politics of Israel*, Princeton 1957), and a

[7] In addition to those discussed elsewhere in this article, but ignoring others covering earlier periods or more limited aspects, the following deserve to be mentioned: Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941* (Stanford 1961); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India* (London 1946); Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London 1957); W. K. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central Asia* (London 1950); Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq* (2nd ed., London 1960); Stephen H. Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900-1950: A Political, Social and Economic History* (London 1953); H. St. John Philby, *Sau'di Arabia* (London 1955); Benjamin Shwadran, *Jordan: A State of Tension* (New York 1959); Stephen H. Longrigg, *Syria and the Lebanon Under French Mandate* (London 1958); A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London 1946); Nicola Ziadeh, *Syria and Lebanon* (New York 1957); Charles Issawi, *Egypt at Mid-Century: An Economic Survey* (New York 1954); Keith Wheelock, *Nasser's New Egypt* (New York 1960); Marcel Colombe, *L'Evolution de l'Egypte, 1924-1950* (Paris 1951); Tom Little, *Egypt* (London 1959); Geoffrey L. Lewis, *Turkey* (New York 1955); Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton 1959); Douglas E. Ashford, *Political Change in Morocco* (Princeton 1961).

Four regional studies dealing with the course of modernization are particularly worthwhile: Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in History* (Princeton 1957); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958); Morroe Berger, *The Arab World Today* (New York 1962); and a lucid, fair, and well-wrought textbook by Hisham Sharabi, *Governments and Politics of the Middle East* (Princeton 1962).

[8] Kohn's studies included *Geschichte der Nationalen Bewegung im Orient* (Berlin 1928; London 1929) and *Nationalismus und Imperialismus im Vorderen Orient* (Frankfurt 1931; London 1932). Among later studies, one might select George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (New York 1946); Zeine N. Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Beirut 1958) and *The Struggle for Arab Independence* (Beirut 1960); Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism* (Ithaca 1956); Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London 1950); Fritz Steppat, *Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafa Kamil* (Leiden 1956). A valuable bibliography in this field is Fahim I. Qubain's *Inside the Arab Mind* (Washington 1960).

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small number of analytical works on the development of Zionism (most recently, Ben Halpern's *The Idea of a Jewish State*, Cambridge, Mass., 1961), but after some inquiry I have found only three scholars who hope, in the next few years, to produce jointly the first two books to focus on the highly unusual dynamics of internal Israeli politics.

The scarcity of general works in the field is a natural reflection of the scarcity of monographs. Since this is not intended as a systematic bibliographic article, but as an examination of a cross-section of current work in a context of basic needs, no review of all recent monographic contributions will be attempted here. Suffice it to say that, characteristically, Vatikiotis' volume is the only book-length treatment extant of any Middle Eastern army, Binder's is the only book-length treatment of the role of the *ulema* (the scholar-legists of Islamic tradition) in the contemporary politics of any Middle Eastern country, and Safran's is the only study of the evolution of political ideas from the nineteenth century to the present that we possess for any Arab country.[9]

Vatikiotis' work warns us, however, that the political scientist who is fluent in Arabic, highly trained and widely traveled in the area, and a beneficiary of the SSRC's Meetings on Comparative Politics and the Middle East does not thereby automatically become the best guide toward a new Orientology. There is a weakness that Vatikiotis shares with a number of other social scientists, historians, and Orientalists in this transitional phase in Middle Eastern studies. He has become alert to the inadequacies of traditional descriptive studies and the need for a more systematic framework of analysis, but for the moment he is still at a loss as to how to translate these new interests into concrete achievements. This is not entirely surprising. Just as in the relationship between modernizing Middle Eastern leaders and the industrial nations the illusion sometimes exists on both sides that a fully developed body of ideas and skills is available for adoption, so a similar illusion sometimes persists among humanists and social scientists. In fact, as nations and as scholars we are all in the process of development, except that this recognition has in each instance perhaps come later to the established than to the newcomers. The Orientalist or political scientist who wants to join in new quests for knowledge will, like Nasser, discover that he has to do his own homework. Little is al-

[9] However, an excellent book by Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism* (London 1960), concentrates on a more limited period, primarily the first two decades of this century.

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ready available, nor will it do to impose existing concepts rigidly on conveniently available facts.

In Vatikiotis' case, there are some initial handicaps for the reader to overcome—for example, learning the meaning he attaches to the terms "hypothesis" and "theory." This is how he uses "hypothesis": "We may be justified in hypothesizing that the army in Egypt since July 1952 has achieved a political revolution from the top by a swift seizure and consolidation of power, quickly followed by the elimination of all possible opposition" (p. 246). As for "theory": "The author doubts the adequacy of a developmental theory with empirical content to provide the basis of a stable modern polity in the U.A.R. without the commitment of both leaders and followers to certain values that are commonly associated with a secular political system" (pp. 235-36). Although the last seventy pages of the book are entitled "Theoretical Considerations," the author, because of his lack of clarity, has only the most contradictory conclusions to offer in dealing with one of his principal questions: whom does the army represent—itself alone as a special interest group, or a larger social class? His responses vary as follows (a tally not made easier by his tendency sometimes to call army officers a "class," and social classes "groups"): this question cannot yet be answered (pp. 3-4, 125, 219, 222, 257, 258); the army is a separate and distinct political interest group (pp. xi, xvi, 68); it is an elite but probably neither a class nor a professional group (p. xiii); it represents a new middle class (pp. 68, 121, 125, 147-48, 150, 155, 164, 166, 214, 217-18, 222, 230, 240); it does not represent a new middle class (pp. 219-20, 291); it may eventually create a social class of which the army will be representative (pp. 222-23, 225, 234, 244); the answer is immaterial (p. 256).[10]

Leonard Binder's qualifications closely resemble those of Vatikiotis; his book does not. Binder analyzes the religious ideologies that gained prominence during the formative years of Pakistani independence, in relationship both to the broad Islamic traditions from which they sprang and to the peculiar political conditions in which they now sought influence—a Pakistan that had become a state without possessing a com-

[10] The reader interested in the political role of the army in the Middle East may, however, find the following works useful: Majid Khadduri, "The Army Officer: His Role in Middle Eastern Politics," in Fisher, ed., 162-83; Morroe Berger, *Military Elite and Social Change: Egypt Since Napoleon*, Research Monograph No. 6, Center of International Studies, Princeton University (Princeton 1960); John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962); and a volume on *The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics*, edited by Sydney N. Fisher, to be published by Ohio State University Press.

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manding governmental apparatus or national political movement. Although, as in the books of most modern Orientalists (though not in the minds of most modern Moslems), Islam seems to be the core of his concern, Binder's approach is new. A "casual examination of public pronouncements might lead to the erroneous impression that the Islamic character of the state was the central issue of Pakistani politics. . . . The impression of the absolute importance of an Islamic constitution was produced by the fact that religious slogans and exhortations were used by the politicians to build morale in the face of unprecedented social and economic dislocations, to unite the country behind the Kashmir war despite divergent sectional interests, to encourage private and provincial efforts for the rehabilitation of refugees, to promote a tolerant attitude toward the Hindu minority in accordance with Islamic tradition, and to unite the population behind its central government through the contraposition of 'provincialism' and Islamic universalism. The proof of the merely contingent importance for the politician of the Islamic character of Pakistan will be demonstrated by an analysis of their deeds rather than their words . . ." (p. 117). Although Binder sometimes overcompliments the reader by assuming him to be as well acquainted with Pakistan and as interested in each detail therein as the author, both the substance and approach of this book constitute a major contribution to the field.

Nadav Safran's work is also the product of confluent studies in Orientology and comparative politics. His volume, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, is based on the propositions that such a political community "cannot be viable and stable unless it is founded upon a more or less generally shared set of ideas, modes of thinking, norms and values," that these are all intimately connected to economic, social, and political conditions, and that the problem facing Egypt is the evolution of a new community as it moves from a theological to a human belief-system. What distinguishes Safran's treatment from that of Orientalists who have dealt with similar issues, as he himself points out, is that he does not assume that the new community must concentrate on revitalizing the doctrines or the historical heritage of Islam. He also rejects the general sociological approach that would lose the specifically Islamic background within the overall category of "traditional" society. He asks both a more open question than the adherents of the first position and a more restricted question than those who adopt the second —namely, how Moslems can modernize the foundations of their community.

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It is an altogether excellent book, especially since, in its expert concentration on the evolution of ideas, it never neglects the political context to which such ideas addressed (or failed to address) themselves. And yet there is a dimension missing. In common with most books on the Middle East and North Africa, Safran's concentrates on the study of documents in preference to the analysis of action. This is an approach that is shared by both traditional political science and Orientology, but that has ceased to be the tendency in modern comparative and behavioral studies. The latent ideological significance of Nasser's *behavior* tells us even more about his ideology than his *Philosophy of the Revolution*, extraordinary as that book itself is as an *act*. What political leader before Nasser, in this civilization that was until recently so sure of its truths, ever told his constituency: ". . . I feel that I stand before a boundless world, a bottomless sea—and a trepidation restrains me from plunging into it since, from my point of vantage, I see no other shore to head for"?[11] In a society in which, to use Wilfred Cantwell Smith's perceptive words, "relief of distress is sought not in a revision of doctrine but in a redressing of history,"[12] actions are likely to antedate the explication of new philosophy.

III

In Safran's work, there is already a new balance: texts are placed in context, even if the assessment of words is still given preference over the analysis of deeds. Many traditional Orientalists, however, still suffer from the vices of their virtues. So great is their philological contribution to documentation that Middle Eastern actions are neglected, especially contemporary events that are accompanied by silence or demagogy, since these do not demand a high philological skill for interpretation. If Orientalists largely ignore contemporary ideology, it is also because they often sympathetically, but perhaps with Christian parochialism no less than forbearance, await a Moslem reconsideration of Islamic theology as a sign of an Islamic Reformation and hence neglect the social and political revolution that instead is under way. If Orientalists become so deeply attuned to the traditions of the Middle

[11] Gamal abd al-Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington 1955), 17.

[12] Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, 111. Kenneth Cragg writes in a similar vein in "The Modernist Movement in Egypt," in Richard N. Frye, ed., *Islam and the West* (The Hague 1957), which contains a number of valuable reassessments made during a conference at Harvard. He says: "Islam has always believed that the individual, not the community, is the source of 'heresy.' It is a corollary of this that social changes, not intellectual enterprise, must be the proper origin of religious redefinition" (p. 160).

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East that they are largely responsible for having given Middle Easterners themselves an accurate appreciation of their past, this empathy of Orientalists is sometimes borne of a discontent with the effects of modern life in the West. Such Orientalists are therefore least likely to pay willing attention to the modernization of the Middle East itself. Some Orientalists also enlisted themselves, especially in Europe, as advisers to colonial administrations. Some of them concentrated on the study of traditional ways in order to help perpetuate ancient divisions and traditional patterns of acquiescence, or at least avoid unintended offenses to religious taboos. And perhaps there is even a sense in which a scholarly and gentlemanly devotion to documents and traditional cultures creates a spirit that is not only unprepared but unwilling to analyze the likes of Nasser and Mosadeq.

The optimist, recalling the problems and handicaps of Middle Eastern studies only a decade ago, may feel reassured that so much more has already been accomplished. But if we consider the total needs of the situation, the matter is much less reassuring. It may even be that we are losing ground. For it is quite parochial and in certain respects even fruitless to pay exclusive attention to studies of contemporary problems. The Orientalists are right in pointing to the Middle East as the area with the world's oldest cultural tradition and one directly linked to our own. How little we yet know about this past! Our ignorance is worse than many Orientalists fear. To speak only of the Islamic past, we know most about orthodox Islam although most Moslems in most ages were heterodox. We know most about the ideal vision promulgated in the Islamic *shari'a* code of behavior although most Moslem actions in fact were seldom in conformity with it.[13] Until recently we have neglected social and economic history, which shaped men's lives far more than the constant succession of rulers to whom we have paid much attention but who affected their subjects but little. We know much more about the classical and early medieval period from the seventh to the sixteenth century than about the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in which the modern transformation of Islam

[13] In the study of Islamic law, there has been a tendency to follow the traditional Moslem method of commenting on the law without relating it explicitly to actual social or political behavior. A number of Western Orientalists have made a major contribution, in contrast to tradition-bound Moslems, by critically examining the historical development of Islamic law; but, even so, the historical context in which law had to be practiced (or in which custom and political expediency took the place of law) has seldom received equal attention. Such contextual rather than merely textual analysis is evident, however, in the work of the contributors to *Law in the Middle East*, 1 (Washington 1955), edited by Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny.

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begins.[14] We have developed few theories about traditional Islamic political, social, or economic relations. We have been devoting ourselves to a kind of stamp-collecting, neglecting to identify essential structures and relationships or to essay preliminary syntheses. In short, what still ails studies of contemporary Islam ails the study of traditional Islam even more. The study of the past cannot yet, for the most part, enrich the present. We do not possess the information that is most relevant, so that only untested intuition can now allow one, for example, to suppose—as writers frequently do—that modern communism, like traditional Islam, is apt to settle down to peaceful coexistence with Western Christendom.

There is not now, to recognize the truth, any field of Middle Eastern studies, Oriental studies, Islamic studies—call them what you will. The students in this field cannot effectively communicate with each other, or indeed create a common field in the future by proceeding, as they do now, in separate and discontinuous spans of Middle Eastern time and space. If we already knew more, it might not be as necessary for all of us to define the more fructifying types of research. If there were more scholars in the field, it might not be as necessary to enrich our resources through collaboration.

There would seem to be two general subjects that give most promise of providing a fruitful field of study. One involves research on the problems of the transformation of Islamic traditions—especially the interaction among social, political, economic, and intellectual change as the Middle East enters the modern age. Such attention to continuity and change may favor contemporary studies but need not do so. The second approach has no principal locus in time at all. It involves research on any topic, past or present, but systematically formulated so as to advance valid comparative analysis among institutions and relationships across Middle Eastern time and space, or with similar phenomena in other societies. This concern with systematic comparative analysis may baffle the humanist who has not yet discovered that the unique is not merely the jealously treasured but the systematically examined and validly incomparable. Systematic comparative analysis may also discourage the Orientalist who, "relying on his philological sword and buckler to strike true and to safeguard him from error, has tackled history and philosophy, art and sociology, literature and economics,

[14] How much we do not know about this latter period is set forth with great precision in the Introduction to H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Brown, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East* (London 1950), I, Part 1, 1-18.

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with equal readiness and often, alas, with equal competence."[15] But such discouragement would be all to the good, and particularly so if it leads to a new view of Oriental studies.[16]

Much, indeed, will depend on the leadership of an exceedingly small band of scholars. It may turn out in retrospect that this has been the Indian summer of Middle Eastern studies. Certainly the barriers to further growth are many. In the choice of careers, the field ranks not only after science, industry, and law, but, among non-Western areas, increasingly lags behind Soviet, Far Eastern, and African studies. For several decades we have been filling a portion of our needs by importing European and Middle Eastern scholars, who now compose an astonishingly high proportion of American faculties in this field. But there is no surplus abroad. The likely persistence in most of the Middle East of authoritarian regimes and of underpaid teachers and overcrowded universities without adequate freedom or resources will continue to inhibit important contributions from the area itself. There would seem to be more Japanese using modern concepts to study political, social, and economic change in Japan than there are Middle Eastern scholars in the entire Middle East studying similar problems. But there are not many good scholars in this field anywhere in the world. For example, "In England and Europe there are at most only some three or four orientalist scholars who are professional historians. . . . In the United States it would be hard to find as many."[17] There are not many more economists, sociologists, or social psychologists working on the Middle East, and if there are perhaps more anthropologists, they are only beginning to turn away from the study of the small, closed community whose disintegration marks the coming of the modern age. As for the category of scholars apparently destined in the

[15] Bernard Lewis, "Islam," in Denis Sinor, ed., *Orientalism and History* (Cambridge, Eng., 1954), 16. For one of the first carefully systematic, conceptual analyses of the origins of Islam, see W. Montgomery Watt's *Islam and the Integration of Society* (London 1961).

[16] My colleague, Professor Roger Le Tourneau of Princeton and the University of Aix-en-Provence, in a personal communication points up just such a shift in approach and interest among Orientalists in France, involving growing collaboration between scholars of past and present-day Islam. Among the contributors to this trend have been Jacques Berque, Robert Brunschvig, Claude Cahen, Robert Montagne, and Pierre Rondot. For projected developments in Great Britain, see University Grants Committee, *Report of the Sub-Committee on Oriental, Slavonic, East European and African Studies* (London 1961).

[17] Gibb, "Problems of Modern Middle Eastern History," 1. If one included some younger men who take a historical view of culture and religions (rather than only a cultured or religious view of history), one could surely increase that number, yet not escape scarcity.

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United States to increase most rapidly in this field—the political scientists—they are only beginning to notice the connection between diplomacy and society, and to pay more attention to the transformation of Moslems than to the reform of Islam.

Little help can be expected, at least for the time being, from the four hundred men and women who now teach courses on the Middle East. Most of them are non-specialists teaching a majority of their courses in other fields.[18] This diversion of interests alone need be no barrier to problem-sensitive research. On the contrary, it should allow such scholars to engage in comparative studies without the extra effort that confronts the pure area specialists. What really prevents so large a group from becoming important contributors to research is the great scarcity of relevant materials in their own university libraries, the inadequacy of their language training, and the scarcity of intellectual leadership in defining the most relevant questions and methods in the field.

There are intrinsic difficulties in popularizing the field of Middle Eastern studies. It entails the study not only of unfamiliar materials from incomplete sources but also of languages so exotic and difficult that graduate study takes longer than usual, requiring a mind at once acquiescent in rote-learning and critically alive in analysis.[19] It does not, like the study of the USSR or China, offer the fascination of investigating the workings of a great power, only reasons for the decline of earlier great powers and for the limits on the influence of present powers. It cannot yet offer the greater wealth of materials and analyses of the Far Eastern field, which freed itself earlier than the Middle Eastern field from a relatively undifferentiated concern with things "Oriental" to devote itself to systematic and often comparative studies of the area through various disciplines. Nor did the controversy over the "loss of China" ever drain off scholarly energies as seriously as did the Arab-Israeli conflict. African studies, which developed from the first with conceptual rooting in the social sciences, do not necessarily demand training in esoteric languages or a deep involvement in that continent's still largely hidden past.

The progress of Middle Eastern studies depends upon their capacity to attract pioneers in the face of unusual intellectual difficulties. The

[18] Hurewitz, "Undergraduate Instruction," 10 and *passim*.

[19] The National Undergraduate Program for Overseas Study of Arabic at Shimlan (Lebanon), and improved techniques for teaching Near Eastern languages during the Inter-University Summer Programs and in both undergraduate and graduate schools, may be of considerable assistance in this difficult task.

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challenge is to give new and richer insights—into Islam as a particular way of life, yet as one prototype of closed traditional societies; into a system of action and faith that constituted a great civilization especially vulnerable to the subversive force of modernization, yet only another example of the universal transformation of society today; into a single culture area offering extreme cases of the politics of despair and luxury; into relationships within nations containing a multitude of unintegrated or rebellious minorities, among nations engaged in more unresolved conflicts with their neighbors than any other region on earth, and within a region where NATO, the USSR, and the neutrals meet directly at the crossroads of three continents.

Middle Eastern studies grew out of a tradition which, left unaltered, can only do harm, and yet, if transformed, can still be most fruitful. In its nineteenth-century origins, Orientology was the study of the culture, language, and history of the exotic, defined hospitably as that which was neither European nor American. It is on such broad grounds that the International Congress of Orientalists has been meeting ever since 1875, divided most recently at its meeting in Moscow in 1960 into 32 panels because communication among the various specialists has become increasingly impossible. Yet the original concept of Orientology is, if anything, more sound and more essential than ever before. It is a concept explicit in Islam itself, as in all traditional societies—namely, that all aspects of life are and ought to be interconnected. As a concept it is no less crucial for the study of social change; the instability we witness in the Middle East today is the product of imbalanced development among the various institutions and functions of society. To understand Middle Eastern society as a whole must remain our great aim. Only a society that has already achieved a dynamic stability can afford to think of politics, economics, or culture as genuinely autonomous realms of existence and not merely convenient divisions for study. In a traditional society that does not separate the things of Caesar from those of God, or that is entirely in flux, the connection between, say, politics and all other aspects of life is the heart of the issue. Today, for example, whether a man is to marry four wives or one, fast or eat, gain or lose land, rely on revelation or reason, have all become political issues in the Middle East. If the attempt of Orientology to try to encompass everything Middle Eastern is no longer feasible or productive, then the division of labor among disciplines nonetheless requires a sense of the whole—so that the common purpose of divided labor is not lost. No less than the Moslem himself, the new Orientalist must

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inquire anew what the significant structures and relationships of Islamic society may be.

If students of the contemporary Middle East feel a special sense of urgency about the state of present knowledge, it is because their subject matter so dramatically refuses to stand still. We shall have barely discovered the rise of a revolutionary salaried middle class before that class, in several countries, gives birth to a new reactionary elite repressing, amid the growing pressure of population on scarce resources, the later emerging classes. We shall scarcely have learned to speak with new urban groups that know Western languages, even if they use words like "socialism" in novel ways, before we (and they) are challenged by new groups from provincial towns and rural areas to whom the spread of education and communication has brought a proud, yet belated strengthening of traditional thought. We have much in common with Middle Easterners. We have become unsure, as they are, of the relevance of much of our intellectual inheritance. We lack, as they do, a consensus on what the most serious questions are, and how responsibilities for answering are to be shared. We are in danger, as they are, of catching up so late with our present problems that we shall be still farther behind in meeting the questions of the next decade. We do indeed mirror the travail of the society we study.

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U.S.-ALLIED RELATIONS AND THE ATOMIC BOMB IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

By A. J. R. GROOM

Ronald W. Clark, *The Birth of the Bomb*, New York, Horizon Press, 1961, 209 pp. $3.95.

Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., *The New World, 1939-1946* (Vol. I of a History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission), University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962, 766 pp. $5.50.

Leslie R. Groves, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1962, 464 pp. $6.95.

I

ANGLO-AMERICAN relations are an endlessly fascinating and endlessly changing subject. At no time was this more evident than in the period of the Second World War, which saw not only an extraordinary *rapprochement* between the two states but also the final stage of the change in their relative power position. That these two trends should have occurred at the same time is highly unusual. Not unexpectedly, despite the *rapprochement*, the decline of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis the United States caused some friction between the two allies. This friction was considerable in the field of atomic weapons, and the books under review shed a good deal of light on the workings of the Anglo-American alliance in this vital sphere. They also point out the minor, but often neglected, contributions of France, Canada, and Belgium to the wartime enterprise.

Clark's book performs a much-needed service in that it concentrates on the early British efforts to build a bomb. The importance of these efforts was considerable and, until now, has not been readily acknowledged, particularly in the United States. Clark makes an exciting narrative of what must have been stirring and troubled days. Unfortunately, although he places the scientific program in its wartime setting in a satisfactory way, he perhaps dwells a little too long on descriptions of this program. Even though these descriptions are readily intelligible to the layman, they are of little interest to the historian or the general reader and find a more suitable place in a broader study such as that by Hewlett and Anderson.

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In other respects, Clark has much to offer. While he has not had access to the relevant documents, he has interviewed many of the participants on the British side. It is a great pity that he did not do the same for the major American participants. Moreover, the lack of reliability of personal memories of events that took place twenty years ago is notorious. Nevertheless this book partially fills an historical need.

Clark shows that just as a bomb became realizable, the British project became part of a predominantly American enterprise. Likewise, just as the United States changed from a more than benevolent neutral to a full ally, that power, having been convinced of the project's feasibility, determined to bring it to a successful conclusion. This resulted in a fading away of independent British work in late 1943. With the complete integration of the British and U.S. projects Clark ends his book, and it is Hewlett and Anderson and Groves who complete the wartime story.

The volume by Hewlett and Anderson is of an altogether different genre. It is the first volume of the official U.S. Atomic Energy Commission history and covers the period 1939-1946. As such, it contains many pages on the scientific progress of the project that adequately and intelligibly convey its magnitude and manifold difficulties. Hewlett and Anderson tend rather to minimize or ignore the contribution of the British in this field, particularly their contribution in the early days. Nevertheless, as the authors have had unrestricted access to the records, including classified material, they have had a unique opportunity to write an authoritative account of a subject about which, despite millions of words, little is known. Unfortunately, the pages on U.S.-Allied relations are curiously lifeless and inadequate—perhaps because the focus of the book is on the scientific development. Yet surely the important crises in Anglo-American relations due to the atomic project, especially during the immediate postwar period, are worth more attention than they receive. The historian will, however, be grateful for the chapters on inter-Allied relations and bemoan the absence of an equivalent British volume. Such a work is in an early stage of preparation and, if it reaches publication, should provide the natural complement of the volume by Hewlett and Anderson.

General Groves' book is of yet another type. Groves was the head of the Manhattan Project, the organization that built the bomb. He gives a personal and idiosyncratic account of his activities in that capacity and also of the role that he played in the inter-Allied negotiations on atomic matters. The latter was not inconsiderable and was quite re-

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markable, for it should be remembered that Groves was primarily an engineer. Yet he negotiated the details of far-reaching agreements that led the United Kingdom, in particular, to take the course she did in atomic affairs after the Second World War.

Groves is a blunt, frank man and his book happily reflects these characteristics. He has much to say about inter-Allied relations during the project and also during the immediate postwar period. He neither ignores nor minimizes this aspect, while at the same time including many anecdotes that enliven the narrative and help to offset the more demanding passages on the scientific development of the project.

Thus, by careful extraction from these three volumes, it is possible to gain new insight into a vital period in the growth of the Anglo-American relationship. These books are of interest to the political scientist as well as to the historian. They show how two states whose basic interests were in the closest alignment, and who tacitly agreed on such a basic issue as which was to exert the dominating influence, failed to integrate smoothly into their relationship a new and vitally important factor—atomic weapons. How and why this happened are the main considerations of this review article. Briefly, this example indicates that states cannot align complex scientific-military-industrial machines by gentlemen's agreements, assurances, and the like. Such an arrangement works only at the highest level. To be effective at a lower level, even between the closest allies, the arrangement must be formal, clear, and understood by all those executing policy. Any other method proves inadequate in the short run, by providing loopholes for unwilling executive officers to prevent implementation of the relationship, and also in the long run, by its failure to ensure that the next generation of leaders is adequately informed of past commitments.

II

The constant spur to start work on a nuclear weapon and to continue it despite setbacks and competition for resources was the fear that the Germans might find a short cut to the atomic bomb. This fear was not unrealistic, for the Germans had first-class nuclear physicists, and control of uranium resources in Czechoslovakia as well as of a heavy-water plant in Norway. Indeed, it was not until the major German scientists had been detained and uranium stocks seized by the advancing Allied armies that this fear was finally dissipated. Furthermore, the Germans were not initially behind, as the experiments of Hahn and Strassman in 1939 showed. It was Lise Meitner's interpretation of these

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experiments that sent physicists throughout the scientific world to their laboratories to check the results for themselves. They quickly realized that the prospect for a bomb had been opened up. This points to a striking factor: the international character of the roster of major nuclear physicists—Joliot-Curie (France), Fermi (Italy), Bohr (Denmark), Chadwick (U.K.), and Oppenheimer (U.S.), to name only a few. Moreover, the British and American scientific establishments were a ready haven for German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Italian refugees of the highest caliber.

In the United Kingdom the early experiments proved disappointing, and the outbreak of war occurred when most of the initial enthusiasm generated by the German experiments and Meitner's interpretation had evaporated. However, work continued and it was Peierls and Frisch, both refugees, who first "thought it would be worth building the bomb" (Clark, 53). This problem was then examined by Sir George Thomson's Committee, which eventually reported in the early summer of 1941 that the project was feasible. An organization to develop the bomb was established under the code name "Tube Alloys."

In the meantime, American work in the field of nuclear physics had been progressing in a rather desultory fashion. The British were eager to see what was going on in the United States and had no qualms about including atomic information in the exchanges of technical information and scientific missions that were so characteristic of 1940 and 1941. The importance of this interchange was considerable, for one document forwarded to the United States was the Thomson Committee Report. This statement of the feasibility of a bomb and the consequent British decision to pursue the project was an important factor in the U.S. decision to take the same course. It advanced that decision by several months and was followed by an offer from Roosevelt to Churchill for joint conduct of the project (October 11, 1941).

But on what basis was the joint conduct to be made? The informality of the early exchanges is striking and the degree of completeness of the exchange on the British side (even at a time when the United States was not a belligerent) set a tone of great intimacy. The exchange in atomic and other fields seemed to flow from a high degree of mutuality of interest and a rough equality of reciprocity in the benefits to be gained. A division of labor, the next logical step, was agreed upon in February 1941, with the United States undertaking the long-range developments, including the atomic project. Thus a future bone of contention was buried, only to be exhumed later.

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The project then became, in British eyes, an Anglo-American-Commonwealth one rather than a British-Commonwealth one. The U.S. contribution was in the form of all grades of scientific help, engineering capability, and finance; the British, of high-level scientific help; and the Canadian, of raw materials. Thus, on June 20, 1942, Churchill settled a basis of agreement with Roosevelt as the project began to move out of the research stage.

However, matters did not run smoothly. The early informality and gentlemen's agreements were no longer a suitable method of regulating exchange. The international world of science was crumbling in the face of the nationalistic demands of the ascending military. A vast industrial-scientific-military complex was being put in motion. Vague assurances *à deux* between Churchill and Roosevelt hardly percolated down to the highest level of this complex. Bad feeling grew—the British being irritated by the ineffectiveness of these assurances, the Americans being unable to comprehend British irritation. The value of the British contribution was questioned increasingly on the U.S. side. A suspicion grew that the United Kingdom was seeking postwar commercial advantages. Finally, when the U.S. War Department took over the project, it severed the flow of information to the British, as a need-to-know requirement had been instituted. In the American view, since it was a long-range development not helping the British war effort, the British did not need-to-know of the atomic project. This view was anathema to the British, for whom exchange of information was a *sine qua non* of joint conduct.

Thus a crisis quickly arose. Churchill argued that his "whole understanding was that everything was on the basis of fully sharing the results as equal partners."[1] He also stressed the grounds of "fair play" and threatened a "somber decision" to go it alone.[2] It was not until May 1943 that Roosevelt gave Churchill what were satisfactory assurances from the British viewpoint. It seems clear that the United States did not live up to the spirit of what the British thought was the June 20th agreement. This was due to control of the project by the U.S. Army, the implementation by General Groves of the need-to-know policy, and the President's failure to provide for making operative the assurance that he had given Churchill. While the British strongly desired joint conduct, they were prepared to proceed independently if the exchange offered by the United States did not meet their minimum requirements.

[1] Leonard Bertin, *Atom Harvest* (London 1955), 70-71.

[2] Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York 1948), 704.

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However, it was crucially important for them to capitalize on their assets in negotiating with the United States, for with the erection of plant, their contribution would be of less importance owing to the great relative strength of the United States in the sphere of industrial resources. Undoubtedly, the British had some real assets in the dispute: they could point to full cooperation when the United Kingdom was in the lead in the early stages, which entitled them to greater consideration, if only on a basis of fair play; the benefits of a division of labor in all fields of scientific research; and a number of scientists of the highest ability. It is one measure of the "special relationship" to see the extent to which the United Kingdom was able to capitalize on these assets.

III

By 1943 British thinking on the bomb was far-ranging. Anderson told Mackenzie King prior to the Quebec Conference that "they [atomic bombs] will give control of the world to whatever country obtains them first . . . it would be a terrific factor in the post-war world."[3] Churchill was also worried about Soviet progress. This sort of thinking explains the urgency with which the British viewed the problem, and their bitterness when differences arose over interpretation of "agreements." There was also some indication of British distrust of the USSR and a growing vision of the bomb as a great equalizer vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the postwar world.

In the United States, Dr. Conant, President of Harvard and one of the principal policy-makers on the project, was also looking to the postwar period and seeking to ensure that the United States not be too closely bound to the United Kingdom, especially as a full exchange would, in his view, prejudice American security and not aid the war effort. Groves, Bush, and possibly Stimson, the other principal policy-makers in the field, shared this view. Roosevelt, however, had decided otherwise. "I feel that our understanding with the British encompasses the complete exchange of all information," he wrote to Bush (Groves, 131), directing him to "renew, in an inclusive manner, the full interchange of information with the British Government regarding tube alloys" (Hewlett and Anderson, 274).

Yet the President's directive was not implemented. It is not clear why. Partly it was due to slowness in the delivery and garbling in decoding of the President's letter to Bush (who was in London negotiating on the subject); partly, to pressure put on Roosevelt after the letter was sent.

[3] J. W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record, I: 1939-1944* (Chicago 1960), 532.

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In any case, Bush negotiated an agreement on the basis of his policy of limited exchange on the condition of need-to-know and not on Roosevelt's basis of full exchange. It was to this that the British reluctantly agreed.

Unhappily, even the Quebec Agreement of 1943 was of the genre of previous agreements. As Attlee later commented, "It was really rather a loose agreement . . . no doubt it seemed a nice gesture not to bother about industrial use, or even to insist on too much specific exchange on the military side. We were allies and friends. It didn't seem necessary to tie everything up."[4] On hindsight, Conant felt that ". . . a treaty should have been drawn between the three nations involved dealing with everything even distantly related to atomic energy."[5] Experience indicates that there was no other suitable way to align two great bureaucratic industrial and military machines, particularly when one of them was a rather unwilling partner. The "allies and friends" atmosphere might exist at the top level, but it was not translated into day-to-day practice at the operating levels. Nevertheless, the British did secure a settlement that was sufficiently satisfactory to prevent a rupture and, given their other successes at Quebec and the growing dominance of the United States in the alliance, they successfully capitalized on their assets as a whole.

Thus, with Canada being made a formal partner, the enterprise moved into the production stage on the basis of a mutual veto over employment of the device and the dissemination of information to third parties. The settlement of any postwar industrial or commercial advantages resulting from the project was to be at the discretion of the President alone. In scientific research and development, full and effective interchange between those engaged in the same sections of the field was envisaged, but in the field of design, construction, and operation of large-scale plants it was to be on an *ad hoc* basis.

Almost one year later the Quebec Agreement was supplemented in an important way. On September 18, 1944, at Hyde Park, Roosevelt and Churchill initialed an *aide-mémoire* providing for interchange of any postwar industrial or commercial advantages and stating that "Full collaboration . . . for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement" (Hewlett and Anderson, 327). When Roosevelt's advisers learned of this, they were very disturbed, for it prejudiced the

[4] Francis Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers* (London 1961), 108.
[5] *The Times* (London), March 18, 1952.

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issue of international control of atomic energy and risked antagonizing the USSR by its implementation and the United Kingdom by its non-implementation. In the opinion of his advisers, the President, in the blaze of friendship after the second Quebec Conference but with failing health and "punch drunk" from long years in office, had made a serious error. Churchill, on the other hand, as pro-American and personally deferent as ever, had the assurances he wanted for the future of the United Kingdom. But these assurances were to a large extent dependent upon the personal relationship of the two leaders. After the previous unhappy experiences with this type of arrangement, why did the British not seek a more formal agreement? That they did not was perhaps due partly to Churchill's view of the alliance, partly to the constitutional difficulties of regulating a secret matter by treaty, and partly to the inevitable opposition that would arise in the United States if such an attempt were made, which would constitute a greater disadvantage than the existing arrangements. In the event, the United Kingdom suffered both these disadvantages—non-implementation of the assurances and great opposition to a formal exchange.

IV

Canada was formally admitted to the atomic project at the Quebec Conference in 1943. Earlier, in the autumn of 1942, a joint Anglo-Canadian research team had been established in Montreal. It is unfortunate that a full description of the Anglo-Canadian agreement is not available, for it would be interesting to compare the attitude of London when in a dominant position with that of Washington in similar circumstances. The United States refused to become a partner in the enterprise and, indeed, hindered its work until an agreement was reached on April 6, 1944, that provided a basis for U.S. participation and for exchange of information.

Among those working at Montreal was a group of French scientists who had escaped to the United Kingdom on the fall of France. In the 1930's, the French were more alive than any of the other powers to the possibilities of an atomic weapon. A patent had been taken out by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in 1939 for the construction of an uranium bomb and arrangements had been made with Union Minière du Haut Katanga, a major uranium supplier, to test a bomb in the Sahara. France had also secured almost the complete world's supply of heavy water, which was brought to Britain under conditions of high drama on the fall of France, together with

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several scientists under the leadership of von Halban, but excluding Joliot, the most eminent French scientist. These men and materials provided a powerful stimulus to the British program. Von Halban and Kowarski "assigned to the British their own rights in the French patents and promised to ask Joliot to try to persuade the Centre [C.N.R.S.] to assign its collective rights as well. In return, the British would offer to the Centre certain rights in a series of other patents in the same field" (Groves, 224-25). The United States was apparently not informed of these British obligations.

With the liberation of France, several French scientists wished to return home. This caused something of a crisis, for the British were obliged by the Quebec Agreement not to give information to third parties except by mutual consent. As British obligations to France had not been clearly spelled out at Quebec, it could be that the British had deliberately kept quiet in order to secure an agreement with the United States, given the bad relations between the Americans and de Gaulle at that time. However, it is more likely that the British leaders had overlooked the obligations to France in the long months that had passed since that agreement had been made.

In 1944, when the French decided to activate the agreement, Groves and other Americans protested strongly. They could see no reason for bringing the French into the atomic partnership, especially as the French government was unstable and Joliot, the leading French scientist, was known to be a Communist. Security was prejudiced and the worst U.S. fear was realized when later, in February 1945, Joliot indicated that if full cooperation was not forthcoming, France might have to turn to the USSR. The legend of "perfidious Albion" quickly took on substance in American minds. The British, however, were adamant, arguing that the French scientists were not prisoners, that the French were only requesting commercial information, and that a refusal would prejudice both security and the chance of acquiring patents held by the French government. Moreover, whatever was done, the information would eventually reach the French authorities.

In the end the British authorized von Halban to give Joliot only the "barest outline" of activities in the atomic field from 1940 on, but unfortunately he did not keep to his brief (Groves, 226). The incident was of some significance, for "one of the first aspects of the project which was brought to President Truman's attention after he assumed office was the break in the Quebec Agreement which grew out of British-French liaison" (*ibid.*, 229).

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V

The question of the supply of uranium ore is one that constantly intrudes in any discussion of either the scientific or the political aspects of Allied relations and atomic weapons during and after the war. Canada and Belgium were greatly involved, for they were the principal wartime suppliers. The United Kingdom was intimately connected both by close relations with the Canadian government and also by large British shareholdings in the uranium mines of Union Minière. Moreover, the Belgian government-in-exile in London was influenced by the British government to some extent, but not to the extent that much hard bargaining could be avoided. The British did, however, use their influence to secure the necessary supply of ore for the Manhattan Project, but they did not attempt to use it to gain concessions on the exchange of information during the war. After the war they requested a revision of the wartime arrangements as, with the cessation of joint production, the United Kingdom needed ore for its own program.

Like the French, both the United Kingdom and the United States had (separately) approached Union Minière in 1939. Neither was successful. Interest then turned to Canada and, in June 1942, the British prevailed upon the Canadian government to purchase all the uranium mines in that country. Later the United States again approached Union Minière, but unsuccessfully and without informing the British. In February 1944 both governments jointly contacted Union Minière without informing the Belgian government. Eventually that government was included and on September 24, 1944, the Anglo-American agreement with Belgium was signed. One interesting stipulation was that, if the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom decided to utilize as a source of energy for commercial purposes ores obtained under the agreement, they would admit the Belgian government to participation in such utilization on equitable terms. This stipulation seemed to go unhonored after the war by both governments, for then several such arrangements were quietly pushed aside or ignored as the project was exposed to the public spotlight, as domestic legislation was passed, as the common danger receded, and as the security aspect assumed greater proportions. The United States was the main offender in this respect.

But, for the moment, adequate supplies of ore had been ensured. The Combined Development Trust was set up and allocated the ores from all sources without any dispute arising. Belgium and Canada thus

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played a small but necessary part in enabling the project to achieve its aim in the shortest possible time, insisting only on minimum safeguards for their interests.

VI

The question of security is, in some respects, at the core of the Anglo-American relationship in regard to the project, for it furnishes a good test case of how the execution of a policy can be at great variance with the intention of the policy-maker if the latter does not ensure that clear, explicit instructions are given to all levels of all relevant executive bodies. Indeed, one may ask whether the needs of security demanded the policy of compartmentalization, with its consequent deceleration of the information flow to the United Kingdom, or whether the desire for such a deceleration begot the policy of compartmentalization on the grounds of security. Certainly the policy of compartmentalization—telling the members of a compartment only what they need to know to perform their specific task—is an old and standard military doctrine. Yet General Groves, among others, was strongly against an unrestricted flow of information to the British, and it was his institution of the compartmentalization procedure that prevented such a flow.

There is no doubt that the security arrangements on the Manhattan Project were very tight. The doctrine of compartmentalization was very much of a mixed blessing because one of the greatest catalysts in science is the exchange of ideas, their discussion and the consequent cross-fertilization. Compartmentalization prevented this very necessary scientific process and set a higher value on security than on an increase in the chances of success.

It is clear that the plea of security was used by the opponents of exchange with the United Kingdom as a powerful argument. But was it used to prevent exchange? Certainly, Groves "gradually came to be more and more responsible for the initial formulation of general policy and for the translation of policy into action" (*ibid.*, xii). His later comment on his use of this responsibility is illuminating: "I was not responsible for our close co-operation with the British. I did everything to hold back on it. . . . I did not carry out the wishes of our Government with respect to co-operation with the British because I was leaning over backwards."[6]

[6] U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer,* Texts of principal documents and letters of the Personnel Security Board (Washington 1954), 175.

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By the nature of these things, it is hard to go further in such matters than speculation over possibilities. Very much is based on hearsay and second-hand allegation. No clearer impression than that which can be gained from such sources as the books under review is possible until access to all the files is granted, and perhaps not even then. While the subsequent revelation of failures in security emphasized its necessity, the possibility of the abuse of security measures for other purposes emphasizes the need for the exercise of tight control over the executors of a policy by those who initiate that policy, particularly if such a policy is unpopular with those who execute it.

VII

The Quebec Agreement of 1943 provided for a joint decision on the use of the atomic bomb. As it involved only a few men, it was the sort of decision that could be made by gentlemen's agreement in wartime when secrecy was not likely to be questioned and when the principal policy-makers were also in close touch with the principal executive officers. However, the decision was in fact made by the United States, although it was accepted by the United Kingdom without demur. Certainly there is very little in the record or in the volumes under review to indicate Anglo-American consultations on this question. The British position, in American eyes, was one of "recording concurrence."[7] It seems that the British were neither expected nor allowed to take any real part in this decision. In any case, "The British had learned that it did not pay to be assertive, and the Americans had every reason to believe that London did not differ fundamentally on how to use the bomb" (Hewlett and Anderson, 372). Churchill apparently realized this, for he wrote to Anderson: "I am sure Field-Marshal Wilson will put these matters in a tactful and friendly way and that the question of machinery for Anglo-American consultation will emerge in his talk. It would be better if we did not have to insist, at this stage, on any legislative interpretation of the Quebec Agreement."[8]

Churchill thus seems to indicate that British policy was aimed at putting the question on an informal and friendly basis and at not giving the United States occasion to question the wisdom of the veto. Although legal rights were not stressed by the United Kingdom, the Quebec mechanism was not allowed to fall into disuse. For any change in it was

[7] Wilson in John Ehrman, *A History of the Second World War*, VI: *Grand Strategy* (London 1956), 298.
[8] *Ibid.*, 297.

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likely to be to the disadvantage of the United Kingdom, given the relative decline of the U.K. in all spheres since 1943 and, after the war, the emergence of the question into the public eye in the United States and the need for U.S. economic aid.

Thus, on July 4, 1945 (a singularly appropriate day), the British informed the United States of their concurrence in operational employment of the bomb against Japan, although Churchill expressed a desire to talk to the President on the subject at the Potsdam Conference. The decision was, from an alliance viewpoint, smoothly arrived at without contention. There was, in reality, no substantive issue and in any case the relative balance of power in the Pacific was overwhelmingly in favor of the United States. However, in the postwar period, the British veto was to prove a real bone of contention.

VIII

It is not difficult to assess the contribution of Belgium and Canada to the atomic project, nor did this contribution present any political problems for the United States. The contribution of France is more difficult to estimate, for it was, during the war, the work of individual French scientists within the British contribution, some in a private capacity, some as French civil servants. Certainly its initial impact on British work was considerable and the later work of the scientists was commensurate with their eminence. However, politically the French contribution had great drawbacks. U.S.-French relations were not good, and they were not improved by the French desire for an equal position with the United Kingdom and the United States or by Joliot's threat to play the USSR against the two allies. This also brought about a crisis in Anglo-American relations through the conflict of British obligations to the United States under the Quebec Agreement and to the French under their earlier agreement, to which reference has already been made.

In the United States, the importance of the British contribution is often underestimated or largely ignored (as in the Hewlett and Anderson volume). However, a report of the U.S. Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy maintained that "Our own qualified scientists are almost unanimous in believing, too, that only the participation of their British and Canadian colleagues made possible the achievement of the atomic bomb within the time available and that, without such participation, the success of the project would have been materially de-

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layed"[9]—an opinion that Groves shares (Groves, 408). It should also be remembered that the British would probably have pressed ahead if the United States had been unwilling to conduct the project jointly. Their determination to do this in the face of severe economic difficulties was amply shown in the years following 1945. The British proved themselves in every way to be good friends of the United States in the early days of the project when they were in the ascendency. This was a wise policy of enlightened self-interest. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of any British government headed by Churchill that would not have sought a close relationship with the United States.

By contrast, there was a widespread antipathy towards the United Kingdom in the United States before the war. The United Kingdom was conceived as an imperialist, class-ridden society which was the historical enemy of the anti-colonialist, egalitarian United States. Moreover, as Conant once told Anderson, "Americans had to do the development on their own as there still persisted the old myth that where they worked anything jointly with the British, the British got ahead. It was not true but nevertheless a myth which would be effective in post-war times . . . "[10] Perhaps this helps to explain the varying nature of Anglo-American relations in regard to the bomb, for at the very top a special relationship undoubtedly existed—but not at lower echelons. This was partly because direct and explicit orders were necessary from those responsible (e.g., Roosevelt) to those executing (e.g., Groves). These were generally not forthcoming. It seemed impossible to align two industrial-military complexes without clear, explicit instructions, especially when the principal executive officers did not share the values of the special relationship. This was the source of much friction. In the case of the United Kingdom, the United States' right hand did not know what its left hand was doing, and when it did know, it did not approve. Thus practical decisions on cooperation were made according to the "letter" and not the "spirit." Such action kills any special relationship that is essentially "spirit," relying on understandings rather than on treaties. A special relationship of this sort is also the product of individual and powerful men.

After the war the same men were no longer in control nor were their replacements, by the nature of things, so all-powerful. To these men assurances, many not even fully written down, meant nothing out of the context of the great intimacy in which they had been conceived. The United Kingdom was therefore able to salvage only a very few of

[9] *New York Times*, April 15, 1951. [10] Pickersgill, 532.

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them. Perhaps it was unwise to rely on assurances given under unique conditions. Would it not have been better to have got firm assurances for less exchange (which turned out to be more, in the long run) than to have gambled for all and lost? With hindsight, the answer is probably "yes."

As the volumes under review consider only the immediate postwar period, the fate of the wartime agreements is not within the scope of this review article. However, by a synthesis of the relevant chapters, these volumes do enable one to draw an outline of U.S.-Allied relations in regard to the atomic bomb. In sum, the volume by Hewlett and Anderson is disappointing. Its great virtue—access to documents—is its great drawback, as many Anglo-American "agreements" and "assurances" were verbal. The books by Clark and Groves are both dangerous and useful—dangerous because they are based on memories of events of twenty years ago and memories are notoriously fickle; but useful because Groves is disarmingly frank, and Clark has interviewed most of the leading figures on the British side.

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THE RATIONALE OF JAPANESE SURRENDER

By HAROLD STEIN

Herbert Feis, *Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1961, 199 pp. $4.00.

I

JAPAN SUBDUED is the last of the five admirable studies in which Herbert Feis has set forth the diplomatic history of the United States from the events that led to Pearl Harbor to the surrender ceremony on the U.S.S. Missouri. "Diplomatic history" in the conventional sense is actually an inadequate description, for *Japan Subdued* is not limited to the doings of the diplomats; it follows the actions of the extraordinary group of men in the United States government concerned with winning and ending the war, using or not using the atomic bomb; it describes, in sharp contrast, the doings of the unhappy group of vacillating and conflicting statesmen, military and civilian, who surrounded the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor himself. To Feis diplomacy encompasses the actions of scientists, politicians, and generals and is never limited to diplomatic negotiations and the formal interchange of diplomatic messages.

In the opening chapters of the book, Feis lays out with brilliant clarity the three separate but overlapping plans for securing Japanese surrender that our government had decided on in the spring of 1945:

(1) *Combined Assault.* This was the direct military approach, with an initial landing on Kyushu, followed by a final attack on Honshu. The plans for this were given final approval, and our armed forces were turned in this direction immediately after V-E Day. Originally it was in support of this plan that Russian entrance into the war seemed so important; by May 1945 neither Marshall nor King regarded Soviet participation as essential, but Marshall particularly, mindful of the losses that we might well sustain, wanted Russian help to reduce our burden and speed up the end.

There is no doubt that an American invasion would have brought about total Japanese defeat; and it is hard, almost impossible, to believe, regardless of the Japanese military code (*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori!*) and the honorable status of military suicide, that at some point the Emperor would not have stepped in and insisted on

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surrender. Otherwise—if, for example, the Emperor had been killed in an air raid—the consequences might have been appalling: without the Imperial Rescript, the Emperor's personal order to surrender, Japanese unit commanders might still be waging guerrilla warfare on islands in the Pacific. The basic assumption, however, was reasonable: whatever the process of decision-making, sooner or later some one in the Japanese government would speak for the nation and surrender, but the time of decision might easily have been (in our thinking) insanely late.

(2) *Inducement.* The inducements we had in mind were mercy and tolerance, not compromise. From the Japanese standpoint, our inducements were not *per se* appealing. We were insisting on the defeat of Japan: Japan's total withdrawal to its home islands, demilitarization under our surveillance, Allied trials of those we considered war criminals. All we were willing to offer was the promise that total defeat would not include the annihilation of Japan and the Imperial family. Obviously inducement of this limited scope would have no value until Japan was ready to accept defeat. Nor can one see much persuasive power in promises that Russia would not enter the war and that we would abstain from dropping the atomic bomb—possible alternatives that might be described as inducements in reverse. As Feis notes, Stalin presumably would never have agreed to the first, nor is there serious reason to believe that a threat of the bomb would have brought the agonies of decision in Tokyo to the necessary climax, since even the bomb itself caused surrender only after the passage of time. One can add that the Japanese army was staking all on the defense of the home islands and would have pretended—and did in fact—that the turn of the tide would come then, and only then. Therefore, since the Japanese generals prophesied partial victory and a compromise peace, a merciful defeat was no substitute.

(3) *Shock: The Atomic Bomb.* It was the hope of Truman and Stimson, those most directly responsible, that the atomic bomb would bring a quick end to hostilities. It did, and it did so (for reasons set forth below) in the only way that could cause an immediate surrender of all Japanese armed forces on the mainland, on the home islands, and on hundreds of scattered islands in the Pacific—the Imperial Rescript. The carefully measured account that Feis gives of the last days in Tokyo shows that the shock of the bomb was the spur that caused the Emperor to take his unprecedented action. Whether the second bomb, the one

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dropped on Nagasaki, was also essential is less certain, though probable, and those who doubt should remember that after the Emperor ended the Council meeting on August 10 (after Hiroshima) with his flat decision to surrender, the military were still trying to avoid surrender by reversing the irreversible on August 14 (after Nagasaki).

There was a further alternative not given serious consideration at the time: continued bombing and blockade without invasion. The staff of the Strategic Bombing Survey, having seen the devastation of Japan, concluded that Japan would have "surrendered" probably before November 1, 1945, and "certainly" before December 31. Feis sets this aside as an unrealistic alternative because of the burning desire of all American leaders for a far quicker termination of the holocaust that had been going on so long; and of course he is right. Beyond that, it should be noted that while a prediction of the timing of the devastating consequences of strangulation is reasonable, the same assurance cannot be given to predictions of the act of governmental surrender. What American can say how much suffering—death as well as misery—the Japanese government might have permitted or required its people to undergo before it gave up the fight?

There is more substantial foundation for speculation in respect to the consequences of a more realistic alternative—invasion without the bomb as a way of winning and ending the war. The American casualties, as our military leaders calculated in 1944 and 1945, would have been substantial, perhaps up to a million men, with, conceivably, half a million dead. The Japanese military losses can be more easily estimated. Assuming the same kind of defense that the Japanese forces adopted in the Philippines, which led to 475,000 dead out of 630,000 troops, the home army of 1,500,000 men in 1945 would have lost in *killed* about one million and a quarter. But the civilian casualties would have continued simultaneously, and these would also have been staggering. The fire bomb raid on Tokyo in March 1945 had killed and wounded more men, women, and children than the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. By July the civilian population of Japan was on short rations; fire bombing of the rice fields would have been able to destroy the new crop. Death and disease of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of civilians were not far off unless the war ended in the very near future. Such a fate as a substitute for Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have made Japan a nation killed with kindness.

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II

Why could we not persuade Japan to surrender? Why did the atomic bomb accomplish so quickly what evident defeat and continually increasing civil and military losses and devastation could not do? The answer lay in the workings of the Japanese government. Ordinarily predictions of what would cause a government, or its armed forces, to surrender are based on assumptions about governmental "rationality." In this case, predictions of early surrender were based, as our Acting Secretary of State, Grew, once put it, on the assumption that "all sensible Japanese" would recognize inevitable defeat after the fall of Okinawa and that therefore we could then persuade Japan to surrender. It was quite true that any "sensible" Japanese would or should have known after the loss of Okinawa that Japan could not win the war; but the *ergo* does not necessarily follow. Quite possibly most of the French people and certainly Hitler and his chief assistants looked on Churchill's great speech after Dunkirk as a form of suicidal nonsense; all the quantitative advantages seemed to lie with the Nazis. But England, like Japan, was an island nation and ardent patriots give up slowly. One can say that Churchill's rationality was not Hitler's; and rationality in the eyes of the Japanese military was far different from ours. Feis's account of the slow, painful, stumbling movement of the Japanese government toward surrender reveals why the atomic bomb could precipitate a decision that the continuing abominations of a losing war could not. In summary, the events can be set down as follows:

The ending of the dreadful fighting on Okinawa was announced by us on June 22, and there seems to have been a widespread agreement within the Japanese government that the Japanese armed forces could no longer keep us from entering the seas around Japan. Yet it took two weeks and the Emperor's personal intercession before the Japanese government would agree to seek any means at all of surcease from continued fighting. Then at last, on July 7, the Japanese government decided to send an envoy to Moscow to seek Soviet mediation. This belated, mishandled, and unrealistic move on the part of the Japanese is usually described as a "peace feeler." The meaning of the phrase is uncertain; more precisely, the Japanese plan was an attempt to make a deal. Even the most realistic of the Japanese leaders, including the Emperor himself, thought quite vaguely that a rescinding of the Treaty of Portsmouth (but of course not the liberation of Korea) or some such promise would persuade the Russians to somehow persuade us to stop fighting. (It is worth noting that the retention of the Emperor

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was not a matter of concern at this point; this shadowy deal would obviously not have permitted Allied occupation of Japan.) Sato, Japanese ambassador in Moscow, perhaps stimulated by the grim but hopeful atmosphere of his abode, unlike the phantasmagoria in which his superiors were living in Tokyo, warned them—again and again, and with great courage—that their proposal was preposterous.

This unrealistic attempt to use the Soviet Union as a shield originated with the civilian members of the Cabinet. When, on July 16, "the Emperor was emerging from his isolated seclusion and making an active effort to arrange a peace," his support of the proposal was based on the advice he received from Marquis Kido. The military, whose veto power over Cabinet decisions was absolute, accepted the proposal only after it was agreed that Prince Konoye, who was to be the envoy to arrange the deal, was to be accompanied by high-ranking army and navy officers who would protect the military interests. One is reminded of our own famous Defense-State Department deal on NATO: an American commander plus American troops *plus* German rearmament. Admiral "One Package" Robbins shepherded Secretary Acheson to New York to the meeting with our allies in order to enforce the agreement; but our allies recalcitrantly accepted the honey of American participation and rejected the vinegar of German rearmament. The Admiral could do no more than stand by when the knots on his package came untied; the role of the military in our democracy is frequently difficult. In Japan, the military did not suffer from such disadvantages.

The Japanese military developed an alternative proposal at this time, which was composed of equal parts of rational planning and pure wishful thinking. As Feis says, " . . . the heads of the Japanese military organization that was doomed to extinction, still avowed [just before Hiroshima] that they would be able to repel the invasion of Kyushu with great losses to the attacking ships and men, and that when this happened the President and the American military commanders would lose face, and the will of the enemy to accept great losses would break, and thus the American government would be receptive to the idea of a compromise peace" (p. 108).

At least to an American, the notion that the Americans would abandon the fight because of heavy losses seems sheer fantasy. Yet the conviction of the Japanese that they could inflict grievous losses on us if we did invade was thoroughly realistic. "There were over a million and a half men in the Japanese Home Army. Of these, a ground force of about seventeen able and determined divisions were being assembled in Kyushu, but with barely enough oil and ammunition for one great

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battle. . . . Thousands of planes, mostly of a sort that could be used only for suicide attacks, were being hoarded—as a special assault armada that was to be launched from hundreds of secret small airstrips in the interior" (p. 107). The Japanese, therefore, however profound their misreading of American character, were on solid ground when they promised to cause serious losses to the invading forces; but partly from understandable ignorance, partly from willfulness, they refused to read the handwriting on the wall: Russia's obvious move toward war and our ominous threat in the Potsdam Declaration, "prompt and utter destruction." The Japanese military leaders had no reason to doubt the substantial reality of "utter destruction" even if based merely on a continuation of our conventional air raids. These they expected; and they well knew also that their anti-aircraft defenses were practically destroyed. Whatever the weight of the kamikaze attacks against our ships, whatever the valor of their ground forces imbued so deeply with the Bushido Code, their cities and their people were bound to suffer destruction almost unparalleled in history. Even if a compromise peace had been conceivable, its price would have been appalling.

There were three characteristics of Japanese governmental behavior that prevented any early or orderly moves toward surrender:

(1) The interrelations of the Japanese leaders were characterized by double-dealing and dishonesty so standardized that many individuals probably used dishonesty as an ambiguous cloak to avoid decision; similarly, agreement was of no more than fleeting significance. Thus Suzuki became Prime Minister by promising "that he would comply with the judgment of the Army" and by assuring the Emperor "that . . . he would implicitly carry out the Emperor's wishes." And again, the Cabinet agreed that there should be no comment on the Potsdam Declaration about surrender terms for Japan, pending word from Russia, but merely publication of a censored version which omitted those promises that would have had the greatest appeal to the Japanese people. Yet on the following day at a press conference Suzuki said, under military pressure and without warning Togo, the Foreign Minister, that the Declaration was "nothing but a rehashing of the Cairo Declaration," so there was no "recourse but to ignore it entirely and resolutely fight for the prosecution of the war."

(2) The second aspect of Japanese governmental behavior that conditioned the course of Japanese actions toward surrender was the strange role, both constitutional and traditional, of the military leaders and their own attitudes toward war and peace. Under the Japanese constitution, a Cabinet fell automatically if either the War or Navy

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Minister resigned. Thus in our terms it might be said that the civilian members of the Cabinet and of the Supreme Council could argue with the military, could request and even be granted limited concessions, but could never bargain on equal terms. Using their position of power, the almost unanimous military leaders ("almost," since Admiral Yonai, Navy Minister, wanted to end the war and always voted with the almost unanimous civilians—but then the navy had entered the war against the United States with reluctance) consistently rejected any practical actions that would lead to surrender, basing all on the suicidal defense of the home islands. The extent of their commitment to this objective was illustrated by their unwillingness to permit Suzuki even to abstain from public rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum, described above. Again, the day after Hiroshima, August 8 in Tokyo, when Suzuki tried to "convoke an immediate meeting of the Supreme Council, some of the military members said they could not be present." Even in the prolonged meetings of the Supreme Council and the Cabinet that were held on August 9 just after they had learned of the Russian declaration of war and the fall of the bomb on Nagasaki, the military leaders insisted that any reply to Truman's new ultimatum should not only require that the national polity and Imperial family be preserved, but also that the Japanese forces should disarm themselves, that there be no Allied occupation, and that all war criminals be prosecuted by the Japanese government itself.

Any "sensible" Japanese knew that these terms would not be accepted, save for the protection of the polity and the Imperial family, which was implicit in the Declaration; why then did the military leaders demand a policy that would mean more atomic bombs, more napalm bombs, more shells from the Allied battleships and cruisers, partial or total starvation, hundreds of thousands or millions of deaths, even on the absurd assumption that we would not have carried the invasion on to total victory? Feis gives what is at least a partial answer: "For them surrender meant at least humiliation and loss of career, at most disgrace and condign punishment—death" (p. 119).

(3) The position of the Emperor was the third decisive element in the governmental process. The Emperor customarily had a role that was looked on both by him and by his governing officials as reigning, not ruling. Imperial intervention in the affairs of state was almost as unthinkable as royal intervention in the United Kingdom—almost, but not quite. On June 18, after the Supreme Council decided (1) that the invasion battle ought to be risked and (2) that Kido's plan for trying to secure Soviet intervention should proceed, Kido, who knew

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that the Emperor agreed with him, had to "persuade" the Emperor to let the military know that he wanted an approach to the Soviets—lest the military renege in characteristic fashion on that half of the agreement. On June 22, our government announced the completion of the Okinawa campaign and on the same day the Emperor urged six members of the Council to seek an end of the war by negotiation. But it was not until two weeks later, on July 7, that the Emperor, again following Kido's advice, proposed to Suzuki that the Soviets be told openly of Japan's desire for Soviet mediation and of the Emperor's intention to send a special envoy. Yet on July 11, Togo cabled Sato, telling him *not* to reveal the Japanese desire for Soviet intervention, although expressly stating that that was exactly what was wanted, a vivid example of Japanese governmental double-talk. Presumably the Emperor pursued his efforts, for on the next day Togo sent another message stating the Emperor's desires and his intention to send Konoye as emissary. And then the Emperor, as Feis puts it, "having taken one weak initiative, was quiescent."

The day after the bomb fell on Hiroshima, the Emperor argued with Togo and Suzuki that there should be a quick termination of the war, but the essential action was delayed until the meeting that began on August 9—after Soviet entry into the war and the bombing of Nagasaki. After fifteen hours of debate, with the military and a few civilian Cabinet ministers still holding out for the impossible, at 2:00 in the morning Suzuki finally called on the Emperor to decide, "in an act unprecedented in modern Japanese history." The Emperor had previously expressed his willingness to act on Suzuki's request, and now at long last he issued the absolute command: the Voice of the Sacred Crane, the ultimate expression of the Imperial mystique.

The Cabinet meeting ended at 4:00 in the morning on August 10, Tokyo time. The Foreign Office promptly drafted the authorized message, which fully accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration so long as it did not "comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as Supreme Ruler." This message, which showed that the Japanese government now finally realized that the war was lost, was transmitted by the Swedish and Swiss legations, a clear indication that the message meant surrender and not some shadowy negotiated compromise like the previous appeals to Russia.

Nonetheless, on the following day the Minister of War was still calling on the army "to fight doggedly to the end in this holy war." When the Allied reply which accepted the Japanese condition was received on August 12, the anguished debate was resumed. Once again

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the military and their supporters opposed acceptance; even Suzuki vacillated. On August 13, there was more debate. On August 14, Kido brought to the Emperor one of the American leaflets (in Japanese) dropped on Tokyo which told the Japanese people of the Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam terms and of our reply. Kido warned the Emperor that since this information was now known, he must act immediately to prevent action by extremists. Once again the Emperor accepted Kido's advice, convoked with his Imperial authority an immediate meeting of the Supreme Council: this time the military had to come, and the Emperor ordered them to accept the Allied offer. This was the end.

III

These developments in Japan are now known to all; in 1945 the American authorities were working partly in the dark, though they did have some light. Grew, Acting Secretary of State during most of this period, and Dooman, his chief adviser on Japanese matters, had an intimate knowledge of Japan. They interpreted the significance of the new Japanese Cabinet in April correctly: Suzuki and several of the others were indeed sane enough and open-minded enough to seek an escape from the do-or-die trap that the Japanese army imposed—that is, they wished to escape if they could. Grew and Dooman also understood the religious meaning of the Imperial role and rightly predicted that surrender would come only if the Japanese were allowed to retain the Emperor. On this crucial point they were victors over opponents in the State Department who assumed, wrongly, that the Emperor was the keystone in the arch of Japanese militarism.

Further light was cast by the intercepts of Japanese messages. The President and his chief advisers knew of the clumsy Japanese efforts to secure Soviet mediation for the sake of ensuring some kind of compromise peace, efforts which went on until August 8 when Molotov informed Sato of the Russian declaration of war. From these messages it could be deduced that Japanese recognition of loss and destruction was real, but recognition or admission of total defeat was still rejected. The much maligned phrase "unconditional surrender" was cited in these intercepts incorrectly, because President Truman had made it clear in his statement on May 8 that the words applied only to the armed forces. But it was obviously not the phrase that bothered Togo; he was rejecting the demands he anticipated before they were fully stated not because he misunderstood them but because he understood them only too well. What Togo was not prepared to accept were such

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requirements as the giving up of Korea and Formosa, the forbidding of military activities, and American occupation of the home islands. It is thus surprising, in retrospect, that at the beginning of May such extremely knowledgeable people as Grew thought that surrender could be induced by making our terms clearer and by promising that we would not seek to eliminate the Imperial dynasty.

Grew and some of his colleagues were unduly optimistic; their optimism seems to have reflected a kind of unwillingness to recognize what was well known, the ultimate military monopoly of power in the Japanese Cabinet and Supreme Council—save only for unprecedented intercession by the Emperor. The inarticulate premise was that if sane men desire peace, they can persuade or outvote the bitter-enders. Recent historians have taken a similar position. Thus Feis quotes Ehrman's *Grand Strategy* about the situation on August 2: "It was indeed as reasonable to deduce from the latest developments that an atomic bomb might now enable the peace party to force surrender on its opponents as it was to deduce that the two parties would together accept defeat without it. Togo and the Emperor were desperate; but they still could not prevail. The situation seemed to have reached the point where the bomb—and perhaps the bomb alone—would have the required effect" (p. 104). Ehrman is thinking in terms of persuasion, when the situation required something quite different.

The basic conclusion—that a quick ending turned on the bomb alone—is shared regretfully by Feis and seems undebatable; but the reason for this conclusion may be put in a slightly different way from his stated rationale. The "peace party"—Togo and his variably vacillating colleagues—could not force surrender on the "war party," because the war party's spokesmen, Anami, the War Minister, had the power of *liberum veto*. Nor was there any visible chance of persuading Anami. He was not immune from assassination, that dark portent that hung over all the Japanese politicians. More important, his conduct was governed by a code in which death for the fatherland was as honorable as victory and surrender for any reason dishonorable. The Minister of War could hardly be persuaded to seek peace by the prospect of hundreds of thousands of military deaths, even less by the prospect of the deaths of millions of civilians.

Seen in these terms, the peace-party-war-party explanation is hardly fitting, for what was needed was not a stimulant for intellectual reconsideration, for persuasion, for arousing the people, for encouraging the opposition: it was an act that would cause the Emperor to perform his unprecedented act: to speak with the Voice of the Sacred Crane.

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IV

Feis gives us not only this vivid description of the Japanese government in action, but also an account of the doings of our own government. Most significant perhaps is the extraordinary contrast between the dismal days in Tokyo and the worrisome but reasoned meetings that preceded the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It should be unnecessary to note that the development of the atomic bomb in the United States was not set in motion by a "power elite." The original proposal was made by scientists moved by a burning desire to destroy Hitler and Nazism: the man who carried the message to Roosevelt was Einstein, greatest of living scientists, most loving and kind-hearted of men. The victory in Europe caused a questioning. Feis gives a fascinating account of a group of atomic scientists in Chicago known as the Franck Committee who in early June 1945 suggested that even "the saving of American lives achieved by the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and wave of horror and revulsion sweeping over the rest of the world and perhaps even dividing public opinion at home" (pp. 41-42). Presumably, if the bomb had been ready a year earlier, the same group of eminent and public-spirited scientists who raised these questions in June 1945 would have urged the military on to use it without hesitation to wreak vengeance on Hitler and destroy the Nazi power. This guess, however, is parenthetical. The group in fact knew quite well that no American president could toss aside a weapon that would bring a quick termination of the war and save American lives; he might, however, accept an alternative which could be tried without abandoning the possibility of ultimate recourse. Their proposed alternative was a demonstration of the bomb before a group of UN observers, followed up by various further steps, such as an ultimatum to Japan either to surrender or to evacuate a named area, or a sharing of responsibility for the decision with "public opinion" at home and with other nations.

These views were not lightly rejected. On the recommendation of Stimson, President Truman had earlier appointed what was known as the Interim Committee, composed of Stimson as chairman, Byrnes representing the President, Bard and Clayton for Navy and State, and the three eminent scientists who were leaders in our wartime research, the President of Harvard, the President of MIT, and the President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington; as Feis emphasizes, the ab-

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sence of military members was deliberate. (The contrast with the processes of decision-making in Tokyo is dramatic.) The Committee was to consider (1) the whole range of questions which would be raised by the eventual disclosure of the existence of the bomb, and (2) the use of the bomb. The Committee wisely set up a Scientific Advisory Panel composed of four physicists who had been making major contributions to the devising of the bomb: Robert Oppenheimer, and three Nobel Prize winners, Arthur H. Compton, E. O. Lawrence, and Enrico Fermi.

When the Franck Committee was reaching its conclusions, the Panel was considering what to recommend to the Interim Committee; it delayed making its final report until after it had studied the Franck Committee recommendations. It then proposed (1) that talks be initiated with the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China immediately about cooperation in "making this development contribute to improved international relations"; but (2) on the basic question, the reluctant advice was "We can see no alternative to direct military use." Feis, who has pondered over these questions long and deeply, has come to agree with this advice, though he suggests that we should have announced to Japan what our terrible weapon was and what it would do. Feis feels that such an announcement might have influenced the Japanese government to surrender, but his own description of the proceedings in Tokyo makes this conclusion seem, to this reviewer, so improbable as to be impossible. On the other hand, Feis's opinion that an announcement would have been prudent "for the record," as they say, is hard to dispute.

Misconceptions from 1945 to the present day on what would have caused Japan to surrender seem to have been partly created by a distaste for the horror of historical fact and partly by an underlying assumption that all nations surrender for the same reasons and in the same way. Yet, as even a cursory glance at World War II surrenders will show, the same factors that lead one country to surrender do not apply to others. During World War II, the first surrender problem facing us was in North Africa; here, after no substantial battle at all, the French surrendered because their officers accepted Darlan's claim of legitimacy in ordering them to surrender; Petain's actual public statements of denial were overlooked either because the officers thought that Darlan represented the "true" Petain, or because the excuse was all they really sought.

In the case of Italy, surrender depended on (1) the displacement of Mussolini and (2) our assurance that we would protect the new govern-

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ment. The Italians long since had had no need for proof of their own military incapacity. The Italian navy, which had remained intact, followed orders and surrendered *en masse*; the ground forces merely disintegrated.

Germany was quite different. Here surrender was a consequence of vast military defeat. What was notable was the speedy and effective execution of surrender with no real central government capable of ordering surrender. (Doenitz's legitimacy was not taken seriously.) The German military tradition did not envisage the hopeless continuation of fighting and the German field marshals saw no virtue in mass suicide. They were quite capable of surrendering whole armies even without Hitler's approval.

In Japan we faced a different situation. Officers and men would not surrender unless ordered to do so; no one in the Japanese government could serve as surrogate for the Emperor, as Darlan did for Petain; and there could be no overthrow of military dominance by popular uprising or by vote of the Cabinet or Council (as with Mussolini). The only way was to force the Emperor not only to want peace rather than victory, as he did in April—and probably even earlier—but to enforce his want by command. Without the Imperial Rescript there was no effective means of surrender. What we needed was not mere additional Japanese defeats, but something that would somehow serve as justification for the Emperor in an unprecedented fashion to end the fighting. And that was what the use of the atomic bomb accomplished.

V

There is one more tormenting question for which a speculative answer can be suggested:

By the spring of 1945 Pandora's box was open; the knowledge of how to make an atomic bomb could not be unlearned; used or not used against Japan, its potential danger was equally real. What then was the effect of actual use of the bomb on postwar attempts to secure international control? Feis supplies a persuasive answer: "But the mind . . . may wonder whether, if the exterminating power of the bomb had not been actually displayed, the nations would have been impelled to make even as faltering an effort as they have made to agree on measures to save themselves from mutual extinction by this ultimate weapon" (p. 187).

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ON THE CORRECT HANDLING OF CONTRADICTIONS

By THOMAS PERRY THORNTON

Kurt London, ed., *Unity and Contradiction: Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962, 464 pp. $7.50.
Peter S. H. Tang, *Communist China Today*, Vol. I: *Domestic and Foreign Policies*, rev. ed., Washington, D.C., Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1961, 745 pp. $10.00.
R. G. Boyd, *Communist China's Foreign Policy*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962, 147 pp. $4.50.
Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1962, 484 pp. $8.50.

ANY dramatic event will evoke a variety of responses from witnesses, and the initial requirement is to synthesize these responses and obtain a coherent description of the event. The Sino-Soviet dispute is certainly the most dramatic political event of the post-World War II period, second in significance only to the polarization of the international system. Although the dispute is far from settled, our immediate requirement has been filled by extensive and good coverage of the event; Zagoria's bibliography lists some hundred items, and his own work provides us with an eminently useful synthesis. Thus we are free to turn to the intriguing problem of the variations in the responses of the witnesses. The four books under review provide a good sample. They represent various methodological and philosophical viewpoints, and from them we can learn much about the problem of assessing developments in a changing Communist world.

Unity and Contradiction is a selection from the papers presented at the Third International Sovietological Conference, held in Japan in September 1960.[1] The list of contributors is impressive and several of the items selected for publication contribute significantly, on a variety of levels, to our understanding of the Sino-Soviet relationship.

Among the most stimulating is H. F. Schurmann's "Organizational Contrasts Between Communist China and the Soviet Union," an example of the results that can be obtained from detailed work on a limited area. In discussing the factory-manager systems of China and the USSR, Schurmann illustrates how the Chinese have tried and rejected the

[1] Described by Klaus Mehnert in "Peking und Moskau: Stand ihrer Beziehungen im Herbst 1960," *Osteuropa*, x (November-December 1960), 729-44.

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Soviet model. While the Russians have moved toward ever greater concentration of authority in a single manager, the Chinese have now opted for increasing control by a party collective. Studies of this type are badly needed, for they document general trends in observable detail, giving in this instance substantiation to the compelling theory that much of what Peking is doing today is a conscious rejection of Soviet models, in the hope that the Chinese can be spared the "new class" development that they feel has distorted communism in the USSR. The question of conscious rejection is discussed only implicitly in T. H. Rigby's "The Embourgeoisement of the Soviet Union and the Proletarianization of Communist China," which deals with a number of striking manifestations of this tendency. Schurmann's article makes an excellent companion piece.

Although these divergences can be ascribed simply to the varying levels of technology in China and Russia or to the greater maturity of the Soviets, Cyril Black's suggestion of a unified concept of modernization presents interesting possibilities for the explanation of the differentials in the two societies. Black's article attempts no more than to present a point of departure, but further analysis along the line that he indicates could prove helpful in producing a more comprehensive view of the most basic problems of Sino-Soviet relations in a broad international context.

Two other contributions are outstanding. Alan Whiting and Zbigniew Brzezinski "creatively apply" recent developments of behavior theory to the Sino-Soviet dispute; Brzezinski achieves some particularly striking conclusions through game-theory analysis, drawing on T. C. Schelling's *Strategy of Conflict.*[2] Both articles should find attentive audiences in Moscow and Peking, in addition to providing valuable interpretive tools for Western analysts who follow the evolving dispute.

The remaining contributions are mainly concerned with specific manifestations of Sino-Soviet relations. They are generally of acceptable quality, but most of them work over well-plowed fields that might better lie fallow for a while. Two exceptions are Hugh Seton-Watson's "The Communist Powers and Afro-Asian Nationalism," which presents a cogent résumé of recent important aspects of the Soviet approach (China is barely considered), and Paul Langer's "Moscow, Peking and Tokyo," covering a problem area that has received surprisingly little attention.

[2] Brzezinski has expanded upon these ideas in "Deviation Control: A Study in the Dynamics of Doctrinal Conflict," *American Political Science Review*, LVI (March 1962), 5-22.

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The contributors to *Unity and Contradiction* were understandably more interested in contradiction than in unity. The only paper devoted specifically to binding factors (by Masao Onoe) is disappointing. After cataloguing the tensions between the USSR and China, Onoe simply notes that any alliance that could withstand such tensions must certainly have very strong cohesive forces. This argumentation is irrefutable; unfortunately, it is equally uninformative. Kurt London's own contribution, elaborating on the idea of a "socialist commonwealth" (*sodruzhestvo*), attempts to establish the framework of cohesion, but fails to present a convincing case. It imputes to ideology a binding force that appears excessive as one examines the recent course of Bloc affairs.

There is still need for an analysis of binding forces in the alliance based upon something more than outworn and irrelevant clichés such as "democratic centralism" and "proletarian internationalism." One may regret that *Unity and Contradiction* fails to provide a fruitful approach to this particular problem, but Peter Tang's attempt to reassert the old clichés in *Communist China Today* can only be looked upon with dismay. This is the second edition of a book first published in 1957, and Mr. Tang has done himself and the community at large a disservice in offering this new version. The 1957 edition may have filled a need for a general survey of Communist China, and even today such coverage is something of a tour de force. However, what may have been adequate scholarship in 1957 falls far short of the minimum standards of 1961. The new edition consists of updating material pasted onto segments of the old book. Perhaps the economics of publishing dictated this, and if the updating were consistent, it would be unfair to criticize the technique.

Unfortunately, the procedure has been carried out irregularly. For instance, Lin Piao and P'eng Te-huai appear to be concurrent defense ministers. Presumably it is up to the diligent student to find out in the course of reading that Lin succeeded P'eng in 1959, and to correct his copy accordingly. The specialist will have little trouble in resolving this and similar dilemmas, but the book is manifestly not written for specialists.

Some of the routine textbook sections of *Communist China Today*, such as that on the organization of the government (which conveniently has not changed much since 1957) and Chapter XIII (which considers overt foreign relations), constitute a useful compendium of information. Much of the remainder, however, is of very poor quality.

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I will discuss in specifics only three of the fields covered, although similar criticism could be offered on others.

In the area of foreign trade (pp. 638-40) the level of presentation ranges from statistical inaccuracies to untenable hypotheses. The table on page 639 purports to show Chinese trade in selected commodities with several European countries. The data are presented in three columns: "After April 1958," "Before April 1958" and "Percentage Increase." Granted that April 1958 is a turning point, there is no indication of the period of time under survey—does the author include Marco Polo's trade goods in the "Before April 1958" category, and when does the survey end? Even the innocent heading "Percentage Increase" is misleading. We find, for example, that the trade with France in chemical fibers increased from 21.5 to 35.0 million francs, providing a 150 per cent [*sic*] increase. All of the "percentages" given are in fact index comparisons. On the next page, the discussion of trade with Canada stops at 1959 and makes no mention of the recent Chinese grain purchases, which are the most significant development in Chinese foreign trade in the past decade.[3]

Discussions of the Chinese Communist military posture are equally misleading. Tang points out in a footnote (p. 495) that data are scant and often come from unreliable sources. With this offhand caveat behind him, he then retails the most extreme propaganda. What should the reader deduce from the statement that in 1954 there were "allegedly" 250,000 Soviet troops stationed on Chinese soil (p. 498)? Very few analysts would accept the contention (p. 496) that the Soviets retained control of Dairen after 1954, and probably fewer that they had "acquired" Chefoo and had "special access rights" to a dozen or so other Chinese ports. The myth of a joint Sino-Soviet naval command in the Far East was exploded by Khrushchev at the 1960 Bucharest conference, so that the datum of the "combined Soviet-Chinese submarine strength in the China Sea" of 100 ships is at best meaningless. Or consider the statement, "The USSR is also reported to have given anywhere from a few up to 60 submarines to Red China, the number varying with the source and date of the report" (*ibid.*). Although the "varying sources" are never indicated, an estimate of 60 ships can hardly be considered as anything but gross special pleading. It is up to Tang to weigh and assess statements that vary so widely. The perfunctory comments on a possible Chinese nuclear capability (p. 411) are on the same level.

[3] The grain sales are mentioned elsewhere in the text, but why not here?

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Throughout, Tang is very sparing with source references, but he has included a fairly comprehensive bibliography. In a work of this scale, this approach is acceptable—or at least would be if the author had given a fair presentation of the available information.[4] Regrettably, however, in addition to the kind of lapses indicated above, he has failed to come to terms with the preponderance of scholarly opinion, especially concerning Sino-Soviet relations. His point of view is rigid, emphasizing at each turn the closeness of Sino-Soviet ties and the overriding importance that the two partners ascribe to their shared objectives. Indeed, he extends this identity backward in time so that there is practically no Chinese Communist move that is not found to have been in complete accord with explicit Soviet policy. Even assuming that he has an arguable case, in a book written for non-specialists it is misleading to ignore completely the preponderance of opinion, which is at sharp variance with Tang's argumentation.

In discussing current Sino-Soviet relations, Tang resolutely rejects overt manifestations of Sino-Soviet discord or attempts to relegate them to insignificance. Thus, on page 566, Chinese grain shipments to Albania in 1960 are a sign of "proletarian internationalism." The Soviet specialists were withdrawn from China because there was no further need of them in view of Chinese progress (p. 519; source: Chou En-lai). On page 508 Tang has no doubts that both Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i are ardent supporters of Moscow, "nor has the top leadership of the Communist Party of China shown any indications, collectively, of growing restiveness under the Soviet leadership."

In other areas, the author also proceeds uncritically on the basis of highly dubious Chinese statements and data. His discussion of the communes presents an unbelievably favorable net impression, and gives credit to them (p. 684) for doing much to alleviate problems arising from the recent natural calamities that have beset Chinese agriculture. Even the backyard steel enterprises come in for a bit of praise on page

[4] On the matter of footnotes: Tang does in fact give some source references to contemporary Western scholarship in the footnotes—42 instances, to be exact. It is enlightening to note that exactly one-third of the citations are to works by Peter Tang. Of the rest, 13 are to works by persons listed in the back of the book either as staff members or as trustees of the Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, which—scarcely coincidentally—bears the onus of publishing this edition. The remaining 15 references are distributed among various other persons writing on China—five of them refer to Karl A. Wittfogel. Most of the persons cited are in fact highly reputable scholars in the field of Chinese studies. Too many other major figures are unrepresented, however, and by devoting two-thirds of the references to works by himself and his immediate colleagues, Tang is at least guilty of a breach of good taste.

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361—probably the only kind words said about them on either side of the iron curtain in the past three years.[5] Production statistics—mostly unsubstantiated claims or even quotas—from Peking propaganda are reprinted with little attempt at analysis or criticism. The entire chapter on economics is dangerously misleading.

It would not normally be worthwhile to catalog all of these faults, but they are of broader significance than might at first seem to be the case. Each represents a tendency on Tang's part to portray the strength of communism as being at a level far higher than most analysts would accept. This attitude exemplifies a striking and at first perplexing present-day phenomenon: the common interest of anti-Communists and Communists alike in inflating the Communist image.

The Communists do so because they feel that their trumpets are a promising weapon against the walls of the capitalist Jericho. The anti-Communists look back with dismay to the years when the Chinese Communists were considered only "agrarian reformers"; when the Bolsheviks were just another group of ineffectual radicals; and it finally became necessary to sound trumpets within the city to awaken the unaware. After the anti-Stalin campaign and Sputnik, however, few still doubted the horrors of the Stalin regime or the technological progress of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Chinese Communists have shown what sort of "agrarian reforms" they had in mind and, despite many faults, the five-year plans have proved that China could make significant industrial progress.

Although some excessive optimism concerning the collapse of Sino-Soviet relations must still be overcome, few responsible commentators are guilty of this. These basic battles of Communist studies have been won, and exaggeration of the unity or strength of the Communist system no longer serves any useful purpose. In portraying the evils of the system, particularly for a mass audience, identification of communism with the Antichrist may be a useful approach, but it is a dangerous one, for an Antichrist has attributes other than evil. In Martin Luther's characterization:

> Gross Macht und viel List
> Sein grausam Rüstung ist.
> Auf Erd ist nicht seinsgleichen.
>
> Mit unsrer Macht ist nichts getan.
> Wir sind gar bald verloren,

[5] Only on p. 366 does Tang get around to mentioning their faults.

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Es streit't für uns der rechte Mann
Den Gott hat selbst erkoren.[6]

Aside from the implicit invitation to dictatorship (and the activities of our right-wing radicals show that speculation in this direction is not idle), we note that the Antichrist possesses powers far greater than those of humans, so that evil, diabolical cunning, and great material power become mutually reinforcing attributes. Thus a Communist Antichrist readily becomes not only inhuman, but superhuman, lending his adherents the power to conjure up material progress and make basic alterations in the forces that determine human relationships.

Exaggeration of Communist material advances is dangerous, for it can lead us to uneconomic utilization of our own resources. Much more dangerous, however, is the idea that communism has provided a whole new framework within which actors—be they individuals or states—perform their functions without the problems and limitations that beset ordinary men.

Were this true, we would have to write off all of our knowledge of behavior as useless and turn to some sort of occult theology to find guidelines for dealing with Communist behavior. Some do dabble in this occult analysis; in all fairness it must be emphasized that Tang does not. Yet his approach must inevitably lead either to occultism and probable ultimate reliance on "the man of God's own choosing"; or encourage us to make a terrified withdrawal to Fortress America where we have no room for maneuver and a choice only between economic and military disaster.

Communism, both the symbol and the specific features of the doctrine, undoubtedly introduces a new factor into the relationships of states and individuals. I reject, however, the idea that this factor represents a qualitative change.[7] To return to Kurt London's article in *Unity and Contradiction*: should we accept the idea that calling "commonwealth" by its Russian name and putting the adjective "socialist" in front of it estab-

[6] From strophes I and II of "Ein feste Burg" ("A Mighty Fortress"); in the translation of Frederic H. Hedge (1852):

His craft and power are great,
And, armed with cruel hate,
On earth is not his equal.

Did we in our own strength confide,
Our striving would be losing;
Were not the right man on our side,
The man of God's own choosing; . . .

[7] The same problem exists in analysis of Soviet domestic affairs. See Daniel Bell, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior in the Social Sciences," *World Politics*, x (April 1958), 327-65.

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lishes a qualitatively new type of international relationship? The Communists would like us to believe this; they would like to believe it themselves, but the events of the last few years have shown that the "Socialist Commonwealth" is subject to strains similar to those of its British namesake. The concept of "democratic centralism," which was lent great weight even by many who realized the fraudulence of its official interpretation, has been completely discredited, and for a very simple reason: we now realize that it was no reified slogan that held the Bloc together, but the ability of the Soviet state to enforce its hegemony. The cohesive force of the monolithic Bloc was a simple exercise of power, a phenomenon with which we have long been familiar.

If we set up an equation to describe or predict Communist behavior, it would be impossible to exclude ideology as a factor. But it is no less foolish to scrap the equation and recast the problem in the Communists' own terms. For the analysis of intra-Bloc relations, we have some very good ideas about what kind of equation best describes the behavior of any group of allies. The articles of Whiting and Brzezinski, noted above, provide sound bases for analysis along highly promising lines, and two other studies under review furnish even more highly developed demonstrations of the advantages of dealing with Communist relationships in terms of our own choosing.

R. G. Boyd of the Australian National University, formerly with SEATO, has produced the stimulating contribution, *Communist China's Foreign Policy*. Boyd approaches the problem in familiar terms of foreign policy analysis—objectives, capabilities, conditioning factors—which would be considered routine in analyzing, say, France or the United States, but produce striking new insights when brought to bear on Communist China. The main impact of Boyd's study is contained in a series of chapters that elucidate the forces shaping Chinese foreign policy. First place among these is accorded to the input of ideology. Boyd considers three aspects of ideological motivation—not only Marxism-Leninism, but also the Maoist version of Marxism and the specifically Chinese chauvinist contribution. By taking these three together (they form a continuum of sorts), the author substantially bridges the dichotomy between Han-nationalist and Marxian-internationalist interpretations of Chinese policy.

From his Australian vantage point, Boyd is able to provide a fresh perspective on the Chinese world position—pointing out, for instance, that a major (but little appreciated) result of the Sino-Soviet dispute has been the relative isolation of China in her dealings with other

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Asian countries. Taken together with his concept of Chinese chauvinism as a major ideological motivation, this insight goes far to explain Chinese relationships with her neighbors, especially India, in recent years. In fact, Boyd believes that competition for leadership in Asia is one of the most important factors in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and that since 1953 the Russian alliance has ceased to be a basic Chinese policy motivated by Marxist ideological considerations, and has become a strategy that is subordinated to the totality of the Chinese ideological commitment. Boyd may seem to be overstating the case somewhat with regard to competition for Asian leadership, but what he says bears listening to and the open-minded reader will realize that he has been exposed to a major reappraisal of Chinese foreign policy.

The disparity between the objective Chinese national interest and the demands of the Soviet alliance is but one of several dialectic pairs that Boyd sees as the basis of Chinese foreign policy. This disparity manifests itself in the dilemma that Peking faces of avoiding a war for which it is not yet prepared, while at the same time desiring a revolution in Asia before ameliorative measures can take effect—and before Soviet influence has become predominant. Although the answer to this problem would seem to be the fomenting of internal wars, Chinese capabilities in this regard are sharply circumscribed by geographic considerations.

China also benefits from several apparent paradoxes. Given the disparity in strength between China and her neighbors, even those acts (such as the subjugation of Tibet) that cause revulsion among the smaller Asian states can benefit the Chinese position by making China seem still more frightening. Similarly, non-Communist Asians find it difficult to determine a proper response to Chinese policy. Unwilling to enter a Western alliance (and unsure of its efficacy if they did), they must seek to maintain their own security without offering the Chinese any pretext for still more aggressive moves. Boyd suggests that these countries are willing to countenance a considerable degree of Chinese support for their domestic subversive and even insurrectionist movements in order to avoid an overt confrontation with Peking.

Although Boyd will satisfy neither those who view Chinese communism as the modern agent of the Middle Kingdom nor (especially) those who assign primacy to Leninist ideological considerations, his book marks a major step forward in our understanding of Peking's view of the outside world. It is objective, it makes good sense, and it provides an apparently sound basis for both estimates and policy guidance. I know of no better study of the subject.

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While Boyd views Sino-Soviet relations as a function of overall Chinese foreign policy, Donald Zagoria, the author of *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961*, has approached the problem from the opposite direction. In using the technique of esoteric communications analysis, he becomes closely involved with Communist ideological jargon. In unskilled hands, this can be disastrous and degenerate into extreme forms of occultism, but Zagoria's performance is splendid. In his wanderings through the labyrinth he keeps his orientation toward external reality, and upon emerging presents us with an accurate map of the paths that lead to the heart of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

It is obviously impossible to write a definitive work on a subject that is still in flux and about which we have only fragmentary evidence. Within these limitations, however, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict* is not likely to be surpassed. While the author is entitled to full marks for substantive coverage of events, the book is perhaps even more valuable as a methodological example. Zagoria has spent many years in close study of Sino-Soviet Bloc propaganda, and has profited by his association with effective research organizations that processed and made available the material on which the book is based.

It in no way detracts from Zagoria's accomplishment to point out that this study, or any study of similar scope, could not be produced by a scholar working on his own. Material from Kathmandu and Sofia, Tokyo and Rome, not to mention the overwhelming output of the central propaganda machines in Peking and Moscow, adorns the footnotes and plays a significant role in constructing the picture. Linguistic problems aside, no individual could survey the mass of potentially useful material. What Zagoria has so excellently done (and no group could do so effectively) is to mold this mass of material into a coherent story and to interpret it in terms of a unified structure.

It was only by early 1960 that the general outlines of the dispute became clear. Prior to that, the pattern was indeterminate and individual phenomena often appeared contradictory. Even after 1960, the general outlines have been open to debate, for there was no organization of supporting material to delimit the area of ambiguity. Zagoria has painstakingly assembled the bits and pieces of evidence—I cannot think of any relevant and important item that has been omitted—and provided a firm basis for a description of the issues of the dispute and its course.

There are no radical interpretations, and the conclusions reached would be accepted by most persons dealing with Sino-Soviet affairs.

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At all times the presentation is plausible, in the sense that the heliocentric concept of the solar system is plausible; the observations seem to give the most reasonable explanation of phenomena that can be only indirectly observed. Naturally enough, Zagoria's points increase in plausibility in fairly direct proportion to the amount of evidence available, but for most of the basic points at issue there is at least a minimum of usable supporting material. One can, however, legitimately doubt the existence of more or less distinct and identifiable factions within the Chinese party (p. 86); and, as the author notes (p. 367), we can make only vague correlations between the Chinese problem and the renewal of Khrushchev's belligerency after mid-1960.

Esoteric communications analysis has its obvious limitations. It cannot bridge the gap between what the communicator says and what he actually thinks; it can, however, tell us what the communicator is actually saying and in many instances give us valuable clues to the message the recipient is intended to get. (We cannot know what Khrushchev thinks about Mao; we can, however, learn quite a bit about what Khrushchev wants to tell Mao.) Above all, good esoteric communications analysis decodes the esoterica and provides a product that is comprehensible in conventional terms, a usable tool for further analysis. Just as it would be desirable for all analysts to be polyglots, so would it be desirable for them to cope directly with esoteric communications. Many of the problems that we have discussed above, however, are the result of faulty analysis of esoteric communication or even of failure to recognize that the communication was not a plain-text message; Zagoria's work obviates the grounds for these mistakes. Some may still feel that a different key has to be found for decoding the verbal manifestations of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but the burden must be upon them to produce a more plausible structure.

We can derive considerable satisfaction from the performance of both the academic and government communities in analyzing and even anticipating the manifestations of the Sino-Soviet conflict. From 1958 onwards, timely and reliable analysis has been widely available. The intense interest that has been devoted to the conflict has provided a valuable education for many, not only in developing "Sino-Sovietology" but in contributing to our overall understanding of the Communist phenomenon. Paradoxically, our view of the Communists may now in many respects be better than their own view of themselves. We have been able to simplify our analytic equation by factoring ideology out of many of the equation's terms and reducing it to a single input, there-

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by reducing the number of unknown or partially unknown elements. There are good reasons to believe that the Communists' own equation remains overly complicated by their inability to make this step. Our task is now to ensure that our own ideological input is also factored out for analytic purposes, and that demonology and occultism are suppressed. These are but two facets of the same problem.

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GERMAN WAR AIMS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

By KLAUS EPSTEIN

Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland, 1914-1918*, Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1961, 896 pp. DM 34.80.

I

GRIFF nach der Weltmacht, the new book by Professor Fritz Fischer of Hamburg University, is a noteworthy contribution to our understanding of German policy during the First World War. Its wealth of documentation from previously unused archives (as well as its startling interpretations) makes much of the earlier literature in the field—such as the standard work by Erich Otto Volkmann, *Die Annexionsfragen des Weltkrieges* (Berlin 1929)—obsolete. Fischer is the first historian of the period who bases his conclusions upon a thorough examination of the official German documents, which became accessible to researchers only in 1955. His work certainly bears out the truism that definitive diplomatic history can be written only after the archives have been opened. A brief listing of the collections examined for the present volume will give an impression of its exhaustive character. Fischer has worked through deposits of the old *Reichsarchiv*, now located at Potsdam (in the East Zone), where the files of the Chancellery, Reich Ministry of the Interior, and Commercial Section of the Foreign Office proved especially important; the old *Preussisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv*, now at Merseburg (also in the East Zone), containing the files of the Prussian government (whose great influence upon the formulation of war aims is revealed for the first time); the *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts*, Bonn, containing most of the files of the Old German Foreign Office (recently returned to Germany from Britain, where they had been brought in 1946); the *Österreichisches Staatsarchiv*, Vienna, for the files of the Austrian Foreign Office; as well as some important collections in the *Bundesarchiv* at Koblenz and the *Staatsarchive* at Munich and Stuttgart. Fischer's documentary basis is so firm and broad that startling additions to the factual evidence are unlikely in the future. The archives have yielded their treasure at last. The task of future historians will be one of interpreting an established body of facts rather than making fresh discoveries.

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Fischer himself provides a good many new and highly controversial interpretations, which will be discussed below. First, however, a few words about the general character of the volume and the significance of the material he has discovered. The sheer length of the book (856 text pages) will be a trial to many readers but is fully justified by the importance of the subject and the range of new information offered. Fischer's lucid style and extraordinary capacity for organizing dry and heterogeneous materials into readable blocs deserve the highest praise. He balances chronological with topical chapters, and keeps a sovereign view of the whole while expounding a great wealth of detail. The attractiveness of the volume is enhanced by the inclusion of twenty-four photographs (a veritable portrait gallery of Germany's leaders) and four clearly drawn maps. The publishers are to be congratulated for turning out a book of such "old-fashioned" excellence at a reasonable price, and one only wishes that American publishers would more frequently follow their example.

It is necessary to note in passing that the book suffers from certain obvious flaws. There are signs of hasty composition and more than the normal quota of minor errors. Fischer's source foundation is comprehensive but raises some basic questions about the value of different types of materials in the writing of diplomatic history. He relies too exclusively upon official documents, forgetting that other sources—for example, memoirs—are also important and, in fact, frequently essential for explaining the genesis and interpreting the significance of what can be found in official archives. Some fellow-scholars will be annoyed because Fischer's preoccupation with the primary documents has sometimes led to neglect of significant secondary works. There is no running commentary on the many recent studies dealing with the period of the First World War, a regrettable omission since an unusual amount of fruitful historical work is being done in this particular area today. Fischer knows, of course, the two great American works by Ernest May (*The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959) and Arno Mayer (*Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918*, New Haven 1959), both of which are path-breaking in their comparative approach to the problems of several nations. Fischer's own study, however, remains confined within the traditional framework of national, non-comparative history. This "parochialism" is merely the defect of Fischer's main virtue, his ploughing through a gargantuan volume of German primary documents. The continued inaccessibility of British and French official files makes a parallel exploitation of Allied

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materials as yet impossible; it need not preclude, however, a greater use of the comparative approach than Fischer has seen fit to employ.

Nevertheless, one hesitates to criticize the book for too narrow a scope, for it possesses the special merit of viewing German policy in its total configuration, where previous historians concentrated upon particular segments like *Mitteleuropa*[1] or Germany's "drive to the West."[2] Fischer covers the entire war period in balanced proportion, where most of his predecessors (for example, Volkmann) concentrated unduly upon the years 1916-1918. Fischer's broad geographical and chronological framework is in fact admirably suited for bringing out the overall significance of his new material. This consists primarily of intragovernmental correspondence throwing fresh light upon the attitude of such figures as Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, Foreign Secretary Jagow, and Undersecretary Zimmermann. The tenor of most of these documents, and especially of those drawn up when Germany prepared for specific peace negotiations in 1915, 1916, and 1917, is extremely annexationist. They provide Fischer with supporting evidence for his central thesis (to be discussed below) that German official policy showed a continuously imperialist character from 1914 to 1918. Of greatest importance in this connection is the documentation of Bethmann's rabidly annexationist outlook in September 1914 (pp. 107-14), which Fischer makes the basis for a complete reevaluation of Bethmann Hollweg.[3] The book also brings new material to show that

[1] Henry Cord Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815-1945* (The Hague 1955). This standard work requires some revision in the light of Fischer's findings. Fischer shows that *Mitteleuropa* was more important on the official level than Meyer—without access to the Foreign Office documents—was aware. It is now clear that Meyer was that rare author who underestimates the importance of his subject matter.

[2] Hans Gatzke, *Germany's Drive to the West* (Baltimore 1955). This excellent work stands up remarkably well in the light of the new materials discovered by Fischer, though it must be supplemented on some points. To give but one example: Gatzke was puzzled by the contrast between Bethmann's moderation on Belgium in August 1914 and his acquiescence in the annexationist Delbrück-Zimmermann memorandum in December 1914 (Ch. 1). The missing link is provided by Bethmann's "September-Programm 1914" (discussed below), which Gatzke—lacking access to the Chancellery files at Potsdam—could not know.

[3] Bethmann's important memorandum of September 9, 1914, has not been mentioned by any previous author, including E. O. Volkmann, who had access to many Foreign Office files while serving as an expert adviser to the Reichstag Committee of Inquiry in the 1920's. Did Volkmann know this memorandum and conceal its existence for patriotic reasons? The question—which is important in reaching any judgment about both Volkmann and the work of the Reichstag Committee—cannot be answered conclusively. Fischer found the memorandum in the Chancellery files, not the regular Foreign Office files, and it is improbable that Volkmann had access to the former. It can be proved, however, that the Foreign Office did exercise a "patriotic" censorship over what materials were made available to the Reichstag Committee. See an important unpublished letter of Consul Max Müller, Foreign Office liaison man with the Committee of In-

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German annexationism was the primary obstacle to the completion of several negotiations looking toward a separate peace between Germany and one of her various antagonists. Thus, to give two examples, the official German-Belgian negotiations held by Count Törring and Professor Waxweiler at Zurich between November 1915 and February 1916 (first described in detail by Fischer on pp. 262-74) failed because of Germany's inflexible resolve to control postwar Belgium; while the semi-official German-Russian-Japanese negotiations at Stockholm in May 1916 were similarly destined to fail because of Germany's annexationism (first described on the basis of Foreign Office drafts, pp. 278-88). Fischer shows that the German government was unwilling to forswear far-reaching demands even to secure the tremendous advantage of splitting the hostile coalition arrayed against the Central Powers.[4]

The second type of new material found in Fischer's book consists of Foreign Office files documenting German efforts to promote national and social revolution among her enemies. The well-known fact that Germany allowed Lenin to return to Russia to spread chaos in the rear of the Russian armies (the "sealed train" of April 1917) is treated as a single item in a general policy launched by Germany at the beginning of the war. The German government promoted separatist movements among all of Russia's oppressed "border nationalities": Finns, Esthonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, and Georgians. It launched similar movements against the British and French colonial empires in Persia, India, Egypt, and French North Africa. It valued national and social revolution as twin brothers in the destruction of

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quiry, to Senator Petersen, Chairman of the Committee, dated December 11, 1919, and a request of Müller for additional personnel because he could not cope with the work load by himself, dated December 18, 1919. (Foreign Office files, Serial 2787:D540925-927 and D540922.) The use of executive privilege to hamstring the work of parliamentary committees is, of course, a practice known in many countries and is not especially discreditable to either the Foreign Office or the Reichstag Committee. It does, however, show the indispensability of the kind of archival work done by Fischer even upon subjects covered at length by the Committee of Inquiry.

[4] It may be noted that Fischer conveys a misleading impression when he occasionally implies that Germany could have had a satisfactory negotiated peace at any time *if only* she had forsworn annexations. He ignores the fact that Allied annexationism was *equally* a barrier to a negotiated peace. Fischer incidentally does not always differentiate sharply between a negotiated peace based upon the *status quo ante* (which a strong German leadership *might* have accepted) and a "Wilsonian" peace—involving the loss of Alsace and Posen—which an undefeated Germany could not possibly entertain. (The argument in Ch. 23 that Germany should simply have accepted Wilson's fourteen points in January 1918 is "unhistorical.") Fischer is, of course, right in his insistence (see especially Ch. 9) that Germany should have offered an anti-annexationist peace at all times, *if only* to score a propaganda victory and embarrass the Allied war effort—but the chances that the Allies would have accepted such a peace must be considered poor.

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the armed power of its enemies. Fischer shows that the German government—though a conservative autocracy at home—knew neither ideological nor moral scruples in its war measures. It played for the highest stakes—quite logically, in Fischer's view, since he is convinced that Germany was aiming at European hegemony as the basis for assuming the role of a world power.[5]

II

Fischer's new revelations make his book an *important* book; what makes it *great*, however, is his use of his new materials to develop in a scholarly fashion the general thesis, originally developed by publicists of the anti-German coalition, that Germany deliberately aimed to become a world power. Put briefly, the thesis runs as follows: All of Germany's specific annexationist objectives fall into the pattern of the overall objective of achieving European hegemony, which in turn was sought as the basis for world-wide competition in trade and power with such giants as the British Empire, the United States, and Russia. This policy required a decisive military victory over all of Germany's enemies, to be followed by the imposition of punitive terms. The terms contemplated were as follows: (1) in the West—permanent control of Belgium and direct annexation of the French iron areas of Briey and Longwy; (2) in the East—permanent control (through political, military, and economic ties) of the entire area between Germany and a Russia reduced to its pre-Petrine limits, with the pattern of German indirect control from Finland to the Caucasus being supplemented by some direct annexations in Poland and the Baltic countries; (3) in *Mitteleuropa*—the creation of a Central European Customs Union, clearly dominated by Germany, which would embrace not only its partners in the Quadruple Alliance but also neutrals (such as Holland and the Scandinavian countries) and even defeated enemies like France. This European program was supplemented by (4) the demand for a vast and consolidated German Empire in Central Africa, composed of the restored German colonies, the Belgian Congo, most of the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, and choice parts of French and British West Africa. Germany's overseas position was to be

[5] Germany's promotion of revolutionary movements will be the theme of an important new book by Egmont Zechlin, *Friedensbestrebungen und Revolutionierungsversuche*, of which some advance chapters have appeared in the weekly *Das Parlament*. Zechlin is especially brilliant in comparing German efforts in 1914-1918 with Bismarck's important but little-known "flirtation" with Hungarian, Serb, and Czech revolutionary circles in 1866.

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further strengthened by (5) the acquisition of a wide range of naval bases, such as Gibraltar, the Azores, Dakar, Valona, and Timor.

Fischer documents the existence of such grandiose plans for every period of the war, from Bethmann's extreme annexationism in September 1914 (when Germany appeared on the verge of a decisive victory) to the Spa Crown Council of August 13, 1918 (when Germany's leaders, both military and civilian, still refused to recognize imminent and inevitable defeat). He demonstrates the close connection that existed between the previously mentioned policy of revolutionizing the Russian, British, and French Empires as a *means* of war, and the postwar objective of dominating many of the affected areas as a *goal* of war. He goes beyond many of his predecessors in a subtle analysis of how German annexationism took on a great variety of forms, of which direct territorial incorporation was significant only in certain border areas of France, Belgium, Poland, and the Baltic countries. Of far greater importance were extremely specific plans for German economic domination of vast territories (for example, the Ukraine) through unilaterally imposed commercial treaties that provided for a privileged position for German capital, direct control of the railroad system, amalgamation of customs, currency, and banking systems, etc. Fischer shows in fascinating detail the close cooperation (and occasional friction) that existed between Reich officials and leading industrial concerns in planning Germany's postwar economic domination of much of the globe. The economic supremacy was to be reinforced in every instance by political and military arrangements imposed upon a large belt of German satellite states.[6]

[6] Fischer's statement of Germany's war aims overemphasizes their "aggressive" character and minimizes the "defensive" component that also played a role. The idea of a Central European Customs Union was, for example, stimulated in part by the experience of England's wartime blockade and genuine fear of Allied postwar economic discrimination against Germany. The stress upon military securities, guarantees, etc., came naturally to men haunted by the vision of an inevitable second world war before the first was even finished. There was some truth, moreover, in the contention that Germany had *only* the choice between becoming a genuine world power and being soon reduced to the status of a parochial country in Central Europe (with little influence upon the future course of world history). Fischer pays too little attention to these genuinely tragic elements in Germany's situation: the German megalomania was undoubtedly promoted by a genuine feeling of insecurity. One must further ask whether it was *absolutely* illegitimate for Germany to seek to become a world power in view of its formidable strength. Admitting that such a goal was beyond their resources, is it reasonable to expect the Germans of 1914 to have recognized this fact and accepted all its consequences? These questions are more easily asked than answered.

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III

It has long been known by historians that *some* influential people in Germany, such as the Kaiser, the Supreme Command, the *Admiralstab*, the Pan-Germans, right-wing politicians, and many industrialists favored a program of this fantastic nature. What is essentially new in Fischer's book is the thesis that such was the civilian program of the German government, that it remained in full force from September 1914 to September 1918 under three chancellors (Bethmann, Michaelis, and Hertling) and three Supreme Commands (Moltke, Falkenhayn, and Ludendorff), and that it was accepted with quasi-unanimity by everyone who counted. Historians have hitherto believed that at least Bethmann Hollweg, the melancholy "philosopher from Hohenfinow," was a moderate at heart, bent upon a negotiated peace, and only reluctantly driven into annexationism by the clamor of public opinion and the Supreme Command. Fischer seeks to show that this interpretation, largely based upon Bethmann's own apologetic *Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg* (1921) and the notorious fact that the extreme annexationists hated him as a *Flaumacher*, is quite untenable. Bethmann substantially accepted the world program outlined above in the memorandum discovered by Fischer that is dated September 9, 1914—i.e., *before* the Chancellor could be influenced substantially by either public opinion or the Supreme Command; Fischer argues that the memorandum reveals Bethmann's "true intention" for the entire period of the war. In fact, the book provides an impressive amount of evidence to show the continuity of Bethmann's war aims: numerous intra-governmental memoranda, conversations with right-wing politicians, and instructions to persons charged with the negotiation of "separate" peace treaties (as in the cases of Russia and Belgium mentioned above). The Chancellor's public utterances remained very moderate, of course, compared with his September program, but Fischer believes that tactical considerations were responsible for this moderation. Bethmann naturally did not wish to alarm Germany's enemies, wavering neutrals, or the Socialist supporters of a purely defensive war at home. Fischer shows, incidentally, that even Bethmann's public statements were frequently not as moderate as they seemed *prima facie*. To give only one example, he interprets the vague phrases of the famous Reichstag speech of April 5, 1916, declaring that Belgium must never again become an "invasion gate" into Germany and that Germany must have "securities" against future attack and "guarantees" for its future development, in the light

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of strictly contemporary intra-governmental memoranda calling for the complete domination of Belgium, a secure iron supply for the next war (!), and the creation of a German-dominated European customs union as a guarantee against postwar economic discrimination. Bethmann showed his true annexationist sentiments even when it was obviously in Germany's interest to conceal them—for example, in his reply to Wilson's confidential request for Germany's peace terms (January 30, 1917): the formulas of Bethmann's note simply described in vague terms the very specific annexationist ambitions held by Germany at that time.

It is Fischer's contention that there was little substantial difference as to war aims between the German civilian government and the Supreme Command, and that the post-1919 attempt to make the latter the scapegoat for all of Germany's follies is quite unfair. Fischer even shows that during Falkenhayn's tenure (September 1914-August 1916) the civilians were sometimes more extreme in their war aims than the generals. A notorious specific war aim, the annexation of a Polish border strip from which the existing Polish and Jewish population was to be expelled, was discussed at a conference of officials on July 13, 1915, upon the initiative of the following civilians: Arnold Wahnschaffe, *Unterstaatsekretär in der Reichskanzlei*; Friedrich von Schwerin, *Regierungspräsident* in Frankfurt an der Oder; and Freiherr von Rechenberg, former *Generalkonsul* in Warsaw. There is no record that Bethmann officially supported this atrocious objective, though it is certain that some of his close collaborators did.[7]

Fischer is not interested in drawing up any specific indictment against Bethmann Hollweg: his point is rather to show that *all* influential figures in Germany, necessarily including the Chancellor, supported a program aiming at world-power status. Even if Bethmann had been the moderate at heart depicted by traditional historiography, it would not have affected Germany's political course in the light of the overall constellation of political forces. Fischer emphasizes that the anti-annexationist forces were woefully weak in Germany. Only the Independent Socialists were adamant foes of annexation; Fischer stresses (perhaps overstresses) that the Majority Socialists were only too eager to cooperate with the government, and he argues that their self-determination slogan dovetailed very well with governmental annexation-

[7] On this topic, see the important study by Immanuel Geiss, *Der polnische Grenzstreifen, 1914-1918* (Hamburg 1960), originally a dissertation directed by Fritz Fischer.

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ism masquerading as "national autonomy."[8] Fischer notes that the so-called "moderate annexationists" around Hans Delbrück differed from their extremist foes more in tactics than in ultimate objectives, and that the famous Peace Resolution of 1917 was far from firmly anti-annexationist either in wording or in the intention of its sponsors. Many of the latter—including Erzberger—supported Germany's wild adventures in Eastern Europe after Brest-Litovsk, and Fischer argues that their hope that Germany's advance might lead to genuine self-determination was at best a pious self-delusion.

IV

I believe that Fischer's evidence requires a substantial revision of the traditional picture of Bethmann Hollweg. He has solved the problem—so puzzling to previous historians—of why the "moderate" Bethmann made such frequent and seemingly unaccountable concessions to the "extremists," by the simple device of showing that Bethmann was something of an extremist himself. Bethmann's recurring "lapses" from cool-headed moderation are no longer seen as aberrations but as expressions of his true intention. There is much to be said for Fischer's point of view, though he falls into the chronic revisionist vice of carrying his reinterpretation too far. Instead of merely showing that Bethmann was far more sympathetic to annexationism than was previously thought, he depicts him as a deliberate, calculating statesman who pursued, with consistency and continuity, the well-defined program of European hegemony and world influence sketched above. Bethmann resisted extreme annexationism only occasionally and then for purely tactical reasons, and he muffed several promising peace possibilities because he was caught in the web of his own annexationist sentiments and earlier statements. He differed—and this is the gist of Fischer's case—from Ludendorff and the Pan-Germans not in aim, but only in "the extent, the form and the method of his annexationist demands."[9]

[8] It should be noted that Fischer's unfavorable picture of Bethmann as an annexationist requires *pari passu* a favorable judgment upon the Independent Socialists, who argued that the Majority Socialists were deceiving themselves—to use no stronger term—in maintaining that they must support the moderate Bethmann against the annexationists. If Fischer is right, the Independent Socialists were right also, and the Majority Socialists were either stupid (in failing to see that Bethmann was fighting much more than a merely defensive war) or wicked (in knowingly supporting an annexationist Chancellor contrary to their own principles).

[9] F. Fischer, "Kontinuität des Irrtums," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 191 (1960), 95. This article is a reply to one by Hans Herzfeld, "Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg," *ibid.*, 67-82, which criticized an earlier article of Fischer's wherein he anticipated the major theme of his book: "Deutsche Kriegsziele, Revolutionierung und Separatfrieden im Osten," *ibid.*, 188 (1959), 249-310.

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There are several objections to be raised to Fischer's new view of Bethmann Hollweg. It appears to me that he concedes a great deal when he admits that Bethmann differed from Ludendorff "in the extent, the form and the method" of his annexationism: political controversies deal far more frequently with questions of extent, form, and method than with basic goals. Bethmann wanted (at least most of the time) to annex *less* territory than Ludendorff; he contemplated indirect *forms* of annexation where Ludendorff tended to rely upon the naked sword; and his flexible *methods* included dissociation (in public and private) from extremist annexationism in a manner that infuriated Ludendorff. To be specific: Bethmann on several occasions dissociated himself from the extreme war aims of the Supreme Command—for example, in his *Aktennotiz* of May 1, 1917, stating that he did not feel himself bound by the extremist Kreuznach program (dictated by Ludendorff on April 23). Bethmann had, in fact, given an encouraging reception to the far more moderate peace terms that Erzberger had negotiated with an informal Russian emissary only a few days previously (see Ch. 12). Bethmann recognized, especially after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, that durable annexations must be disguised in the *form* of national self-determination, and he was far more willing than Ludendorff to work for the voluntary cooperation with Germany of the freshly emancipated people of the East (a contrast in *method* that was to be repeated by Ludendorff and Kühlmann at the time of Brest-Litovsk). Fischer's thesis really requires that Ludendorff deceived himself when he believed in the existence of deep-lying differences between himself and the Chancellor, differences that led to a sharp enmity (which Fischer, from his point of view, finds puzzling—e.g., p. 487) and finally to Ludendorff's successful insistence in July 1917 that Bethmann be dismissed.

Fischer denies the significance of these patent differences because of his *a priori* conviction that Bethmann's extreme annexationist program of September 9, 1914, was *not* merely an *ad hoc* response to the intoxicating early German victories but a statement of Bethmann's true and permanent intention throughout the war. It seems to this reviewer dubious to credit a weak and vacillating personality like Bethmann's with permanent intentions of any kind. Fischer's thesis requires him to accept all the Chancellor's annexationist statements at face value while dismissing all his moderate statements as tactical expedients. The fact is, however, that Bethmann was deliberately all things to all men: the annexationist statements that he made to right-wing politicians (to which Fischer attaches great importance) were often balanced by mod-

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erate statements made on the very same day to Socialist leaders (which Fischer refuses to take seriously). Under pressure from the Supreme Command, Bethmann accepted extreme war aims; under pressure from his defeatist Austrian ally, he affixed his signature with equal facility to moderate war aims. The explanation of these divergences is not to be found, I believe, in a guileful Machiavellianism, but in Bethmann's being generally the victim rather than the master of circumstances.

Fischer recognizes this in a notable accusatory passage that does not square with his overall thesis: "One of the most striking phenomena in the history of German war aims is the surprising fact that the plans of the German leadership always depended upon the immediate prospects for the outcome of the war" (p. 455). It is possible to attack Bethmann *either* because he pursued consistently unrealizable annexationist plans *or* because he was a mere tactician who adapted himself *ad hoc* to changing circumstances—but it is illogical to attack him on *both* grounds at the same time.

V

In the passage just quoted, Fischer expresses surprise at the flexibility of Germany's war aims, thereby sharing an approach that has bedeviled much of the historical (and political) discussion of the question. It is assumed that Bethmann, or Ludendorff, or the Kaiser must have possessed a specific catalogue of war aims irrespective of time and circumstance, and that all departures from such a norm were "tactical expedients." There is, however, no reason to believe that Bethmann possessed such fixed aims. What is more natural in a general war of uncertain outcome, it may be asked, than flexibility as regards acceptable terms of peace? Some wars are, to be sure, launched by statesmen with specific objectives, as when Frederick set out to win Silesia in 1740 and Bismarck attacked Austria in 1866 to expel her from the Germanic Confederation: once the stated objectives had been attained, both wars had lost their *raison d'être* and the victorious statesmen knew exactly what peace terms they wanted to impose upon the defeated enemy. The 1914 war was not a war of this kind, for Germany—whether the aggressor or not—did not begin the war with any specific objectives in mind. There was a widespread mood of claustrophobia after war had begun, a belief that Germany must secure some rewards for the sacrifices of war, and that a *status quo ante* peace would be a national disaster. Hence there was general agreement (among the in-

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fluential classes at least) that there must be *some* annexations, *some* reparations, *some* guarantees, and *some* securities; an agreement that extended from the Pan-German leader Class, to the comparatively moderate Professor Hans Delbrück (the main sponsor of the "moderate" petition that countered the famous annexationist *Intellektuellen-eingabe* of July 8, 1915) and the vacillating Chancellor Bethmann. There was serious disagreement, however, on what annexations, reparations, etc., were objectively attainable by a Germany surrounded by a host of enemies, and men naturally changed their conception of what was attainable in accordance with Germany's ever-changing military position. Thus Bethmann, writing in September 1914 before he understood the significance of the Marne defeat, wanted to annex or control a great deal (as stated above); later he became more moderate and was widely accused in the spring of 1917 (probably incorrectly) of willingness to acquiesce in a peace without annexations or indemnities. His views adapted themselves to circumstances, and his failure to adapt still more (i.e., to the point of seeing the necessity of a *status quo ante* peace) appears to have resulted from his defective understanding of circumstances as they really were—i.e., that Germany would be lucky to emerge from the war with its 1914 status intact (more on this crucial point below).

Since Germany lacked *specific* war aims (at least at the start of the war) but believed in the *general* necessity of aggrandisement, its guiding principle inevitably became "Let us grab what we can." Differences on war aims were based primarily upon differences in judgment as to what could in fact be attained, what priorities should be established between different possible aims if a choice had to be made, and how much flexibility was desirable whenever there was a chance of negotiating a separate peace with one of Germany's antagonists (e.g., Russia in 1915, 1916, or 1917). It is a notable fact that there was remarkably little moral objection to annexationsm *per se* outside the ranks of the Socialists. It is easy to pass a harsh judgment upon Imperial Germany on this score, but in fact Germans were not different in this respect from Frenchmen, Russians, Italians, or important elements in Britain and the United States in 1914-1918. (The Liberal *governments* in the last two countries, and the section of the electorate that supported them, did, of course, at least *profess* hostility to forcible annexations, though their conduct frequently fell short of their professions.) The statesmen who conducted the First World War were all, with the exception just noted, products of the imperialist age, which considered land-grabbing quite reputable and condemned anti-

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annexationism as a Gladstonian or Socialist fad. It would be unhistorical to judge them by the moral standards of our own anti-imperialist age.

One should not, therefore, be surprised that Germany's ruling class did not curb its annexationist appetites out of moral considerations. What is remarkable, however, is that there was so little intelligent opposition to annexationism on the grounds of *Staatsräson* properly understood. Germany's rulers surely should have realized that Europe and the world would never accept the fantastic annexationist program outlined above. The widespread German feeling of claustrophobia was scarcely justified by the objective facts of Germany's 1914 position. Her territory extended far beyond what was warranted by the increasingly fashionable principle of nationality, while her misgovernment of her Alsatian, Danish, and Polish minorities had long been a scandal throughout the civilized world. Her military and economic power—especially as wielded by a narrowly chauvinistic ruling class with strong touches of megalomania—caused legitimate apprehension throughout Europe. It was an intolerable thought that such a people—with such a ruling class—should establish a hegemonial position over the entire Continent (not to speak of harboring further ambitions for a world role). It is unsurprising—but nonetheless deplorable—that Germany's ruling class, including Chancellor Bethmann, did not see the world—and themselves—in this light. The essence of the disease of megalomania consists, after all, precisely of the failure to see the obstacles that stand in the path of cherished ambitions. Whom the gods wish to destroy they first make blind.

Europe would never have tolerated the German hegemony promoted by Germany's annexationists, and this simple fact suffices to condemn every type of German annexationism, whether extremist, moderate, or vacillating. It also necessitates making a distinction between German and Entente annexationism during the First World War. In purely moral terms there was little to choose between Germany's desire to dominate Belgium, France's desire to control the Rhineland, and Russia's ambition to push its Western frontier to the Oder River. (All were equal violations of the principle of nationality.) Yet Germany's ambitions challenged the equilibrium of Europe by seeking to establish the predominance of a single power, as Allied ambitions did not. It should also be noted that the more moderate Allied war aims (e.g., France's desire for Alsace-Lorraine, Italy's for Trieste, and Serbia's for Bosnia) were substantially in accordance with the wish of the populations affected, whereas *all* German territorial objectives were a violation of the right of self-determination. This is but

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to say that the 1914 German frontiers were already bloated as a result of the eighteenth-century partitions of Poland, the violation of the Treaty of Prague (1866) as regards Schleswig-Holstein, and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871.[10]

It was impossible for Europe to swallow any German annexations, but Europe *might* have been willing to settle for the 1914 *status quo* if freely offered by an undefeated Germany. Such a settlement (labeled by a few judicious Germans a "Peace of Hubertusburg" by analogy with the *status quo ante* treaty that ended the Seven Years' War in 1763) would have constituted a *de facto* German victory, for a Germany that had withstood a coalition of three Great Powers would be immensely enhanced in prestige and would in fact possess a hegemonial position on the Continent. It is a measure of the paucity of genuine statesmanship in Germany that very few men appreciated this elementary fact at the time. A *status quo ante* peace was in fact so intrinsically favorable to Germany that the Allied Powers could have accepted it only with the greatest reluctance. This should have been all the more reason for Germany to offer it: Germany could easily have assumed an attitude of moral superiority toward those incorrigible Allied nations who needlessly prolonged Armageddon for purely annexationist aims. What did Germany have to lose by making such an offer? At best, it would have secured a peace assuring *de facto* hegemony; at worse, an improvement of its moral position and a consequent increase in war weariness in all the Allied nations. These attractive possibilities were left unutilized because of the collective megalomania of Germany's rulers, specifically including Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. While not quite the inflexible annexationist portrayed by Fischer, he was cer-

[10] Many German reviewers have bemoaned the fact that Fischer has "one-sidedly" concentrated upon German annexationist war aims and painted a false "overall picture" by not giving equal prominence to Allied annexationist war aims. The charge would be justified if Fischer had intended to write a *general* book on war aims in World War I, or had castigated German annexationism for being morally *sui generis*. His intention was, however, to analyze Germany's striving for European hegemony, and for *this* problem Allied war aims were quite irrelevant. Fischer is right, moreover, in his contention that Germany, and Germany alone, threatened the European equilibrium by its annexationism, thus *qualitatively* differentiating German annexationism from that of other powers. It should also be noted that Fischer set himself the scholarly task of exploring the German archives; others will no doubt perform the same task for the archives of the Allied Powers as they are opened to historians. Fischer naturally presents *in extenso* what he found in *his* researches without attempting to anticipate what future scholars will discover in Paris and London. He has the right to assume, moreover, that Allied war aims are well known to the reader: they were, after all, revealed by the Bolsheviks as early as 1917 in the "secret treaties," and were largely incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.

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tainly guilty of a complete failure to educate his fellow-countrymen in the facts of international life that dictated moderation.

VI

Fischer has demonstrated that Bethmann failed to offer adequate resistance to annexationism because he shared—at least to some extent and at certain times—the basic outlook of those whom it was his duty as a statesman to curb. An instructive parallel may be drawn between his position toward the annexationists and Brüning's position in the face of the Nazis fifteen years later. Both were men of stature with a sense of ethical responsibility; neither offered successful resistance to dangerous men whose triumph spelled disaster for Germany and the world. Both were handicapped by professorial personalities little suited to the rough and tumble of political warfare as conducted by demagogues like Tirpitz and Hitler; neither possessed a gift for mass popularity or a reliable parliamentary position. Yet external circumstances do not suffice to explain their failure; both were also internally paralyzed by the fact that they objected more to the *means* than to the professed goals of their antagonists. Brüning believed in reforming the Weimar Republic in an authoritarian-nationalist direction, and was deeply hostile to social democracy (though—or because—it was the Republic's only devoted defender); Bethmann shared (in however flexible a form) the imperialist vision and values of the annexationists, and never felt comfortable at the necessity of an *ad hoc* marriage of convenience with the Socialists. The fact that both stood for *relative* moderation, and that they were succeeded by men much worse than themselves, has given them an unjustifiably favorable reputation.

The materials presented by Fischer knock Bethmann off the pedestal where he has stood too long—in itself a great negative achievement unimpaired by the fact that Fischer goes much too far in portraying him as a cool, calculating, and consistently annexationist statesman. I believe that his real historical position is that of a helpless, vacillating incompetent who failed at everything to which he put his hand. He failed in foreign policy before 1914: Germany blundered into the First World War in a very unfavorable diplomatic constellation. He failed in domestic policy before 1914: Germany entered the war with an unreformed, utterly anachronistic constitution that precluded the attainment of the moral unity of state and people so necessary in modern war. He talked about domestic *Neuorientierung* for three years after 1914, but was unable to pass from rhetoric to action though the democratic

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masses became increasingly embittered by his failure. He failed completely to provide Germany with strong wartime leadership, steering for realizable—i.e., moderate—war aims. Instead, he largely acquiesced in a fantastic program aiming at European hegemony and world power. His concessions to annexationism went much too far and resulted from lack of judgment as much as weakness. It is true, of course—a fact frequently pointed out by Fischer—that the failures of the man were the failures of his age and country. Bethmann unfortunately shared the widespread German illusion that a nation of sixty million, located precariously in the center of Europe, could dominate Europe and then use it as a fulcrum to achieve world power.

VII

Fischer is on solid ground when he indicts the conduct of Germany's ruling class during World War I. He conclusively demonstrates the remarkably broad support given to the pursuit of utopian goals, and the high degree of continuity that existed in specific war aims from 1914 to 1918 (though he fails to make a conclusive case as regards Bethmann). He passes onto far more doubtful ground when he extends his indictment to trace this continuity backward (to pre-1914 imperialism and 1914 "war guilt") and forward (to the post-1918 foreign policy of Stresemann and Hitler). Fischer's first chapter, entitled "German Imperialism," provides a vivid picture of all the dynamic forces of Germany that believed in the inadequacy of its pre-1914 position. He analyzes such ideological factors as Wilhelmine conservative, militarist, *völkischer* nationalism; theories of a future struggle for world supremacy, both neo-mercantilist (e.g., Schmoller) and neo-Rankean (several leading historians—e.g., Erich Marcks and Max Lenz), and pre-Naumann champions of the ideas of *Mitteleuropa*. All these ideologies stood in an intimate relationship with expansionist economic forces (organized in cartels, big banks, and pressure groups) that dominated political life through their influence upon parties, the bureaucracy, the press, and manipulated mass organizations (such as the *Kriegervereine* and the *Flottenverein*). Germany's economic leaders were deeply convinced that Germany must become a *Weltmacht* and that this process required the pushing aside of rivals, by means of war if necessary. Fischer's background analysis is a brilliant *tour de force*; it suffers, however, from one-sidedness in an obvious attempt to set the stage for the wartime annexationism that is analyzed in the bulk of the book. He ignores all the counterforces that existed in the complex and tension-

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ridden political constellation of Imperial Germany. The excessive militarism noted by Fischer was opposed on occasion by an overwhelming Reichstag majority, as in the Zabern debate of December 1913. The excessive nationalism was opposed by a Socialist Party that drew one-third of the vote in the elections of January 1912. The theorists of future world struggle were opposed by Liberal publicists, such as Bethmann's close associate Kurt Riezler, who envisioned an international future based upon harmonious economic cooperation. It can be argued, of course, that Reichstag majorities, Socialist voters, and Liberal publicists did not count in the *effective* political life of pre-1914 Germany. They cannot, however, be summarily eliminated from any overall balanced picture, for their attitude could not—to say the very least—be ignored completely by the "ruling class." It is regrettable that Fischer never precisely defines what he means by the "ruling class" and he inevitably employs conventional stereotypes (Junkers, bankers, etc.), to whom he imputes an exaggerated homogeneity of outlook. (It would, of course, be unreasonable to expect an explicit sociology of German society in a book devoted primarily to war aims. Its absence shows, however, an area where significant scholarly research is still in its infancy.)

Fischer argues that at least after 1911 the dominant forces of German society deliberately aimed at war. His argument is, however, essentially an *a priori* construction without conclusive supporting evidence. He notes the widespread anger produced by Germany's humiliation in the second Moroccan Crisis of 1911, but fails to mention Bethmann's attack on the Conservative leader Heydebrand when the latter ventilated this anger in the Reichstag. He is convinced that in the 1912 negotiations with Haldane the German government wanted an English neutrality guarantee primarily to provide Germany with a better starting position in what was believed to be an imminent Continental war (an extreme, though not untenable, hypothesis). Fischer claims there was much German thought of preventive war, but he gives no evidence for this doubtful contention. He believes that Bernhardi's *Germany and the Next War* gave expression to Germany's official program (a view that would have surprised Bernhardi, who saw himself as something of a Cassandra). It seems to this reviewer that Fischer perceives in pre-1914 Germany—as in his interpretation of Bethmann mentioned above—far too much rational design where in fact there was mostly drift and muddle.

This observation also applies to Fischer's second chapter, on "Germany and the Outbreak of the World War." Here Fischer makes a

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forceful statement of Germany's primary "war guilt," a thesis previously developed by non-German historians like Pierre Renouvin and Bernadotte Schmitt. The case will undoubtedly appear novel to many German readers raised exclusively on the views of Alfred von Wegerer and Sidney Fay, but it covers ground familiar to all American students of the subject. There is no question that Germany not only failed to restrain Austria in her policy toward Serbia, but positively pressured her into assuming an utterly intransigent position from July 5 (the famous "blank check") to July 30 (when Germany made some feeble and belated efforts to apply a brake). German pressure was probably decisive in overcoming the anti-war party in the Habsburg monarchy headed by the Hungarian Premier Tisza: he was made to believe that Berlin would question Vienna's "alliance-worthiness" (*Bündnisswürdigkeit*) if the latter did not crush Serbia's pretensions. Fischer argues that this fact refutes Bethmann's post-1918 apologia that he was forced to support Austria for fear of losing Germany's last remaining ally (p. 62), though the two considerations are by no means incompatible. (I believe both in fact played a role in July 1914.) Bethmann on several occasions delayed the sending of British mediation proposals to Vienna and minimized their impact by negative commentary: Fischer argues that his reversal of this policy on July 30 was an isolated action (quite out of tune with his general line of conduct), to be explained by his belated recognition that England would not remain neutral in a general war, plus his desire to shift responsibility for the outbreak of war from Germany's shoulders to Russia's. Fischer believes that Bethmann, while not precisely wanting a world war, was anxious to secure a great diplomatic triumph for the Central Powers by having Austria crush Serbia at a time when Russia probably would not dare to intervene. He freely ran the risk that Russia (and hence France) might intervene because he thought that (1) neither Russia nor France was yet prepared for a major war and (2) England would remain neutral. There is monumental incompetence in his conception and conduct, but it should be said that there were some good reasons for Bethmann's acting the way he did. There *was* a genuine danger of a Habsburg collapse if Serbia were not firmly chastised: the murder of an Archduke was, after all, no venial offense. There *was* a shudder of horror (not mentioned by Fischer) throughout Europe after the Sarajevo assassination, and some reason to believe that a conservative autocracy like Russia would not support an assassin's cause. The comparative weakness of Russia and France in 1914 *was* a fact, although their strength relative to Germany's was likely to increase over the next few years. These con-

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siderations explain why Bethmann wanted a local Austro-Serbian war and believed that it could remain localized.

Fischer is excellent, incidentally, in showing that Germany's policy was made by the civilian government, not the General Staff, until July 30—i.e., well beyond the point of no return. The intervention of Moltke on that date was quite understandable in view of his preoccupation with the military time-table, and did not have a decisive impact upon events. Fischer dissents from the theory—popular with some American historians (e.g., Gordon Craig)—that the military forced a reluctant Bethmann into war. He insists that there was no fundamental friction between soldiers and civilians in the upper echelons of German policy-making, and that the civilians were quite willing (perhaps even anxious) to conduct the "strong" policy naturally desired by the military. We have already seen that Fischer believes this continued to be the case throughout the entire World War, and that he interprets their joint policy as a deliberate drive for European hegemony and world power.

Fischer insists that the aim (*Zielsetzung*) and mode of thought (*Denkform*) associated with this policy was by no means exhausted after the collapse of 1918. In a rather abrupt conclusion tagged onto his last chapter, he shows that the annexationist Stresemann of the war years continued to strive for European hegemony after he became Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic. While temporarily abandoning his aims in the West, he refused to sign an "Eastern Locarno" and hoped for a return to the Brest-Litovsk policy of German domination in the East (beginning with the economic penetration of Poland). General von Seeckt, champion of large annexations in Poland in 1916, proposed a Russo-German partition of Poland in 1922 and quite naturally appeared at the Harzburg Front with Hitler in 1931.

More important than such individual instances of continuity (whose significance can easily be exaggerated) is the fundamental continuity to be found in Germany's attempt to win a hegemonial position on the European Continent (and with it a base for world power) in the First and Second World Wars. The matter is seldom raised explicitly by Fischer, but his book provides all the necessary documentary materials. In both instances German dynamism provoked a hostile coalition that doomed the Germans to inevitable defeat; Germany's rulers overestimated their nation's resources and seriously underestimated the strength of its enemies. There are many parallels to be found in specific policies and modes of thought. The power struggle in both wars took on important ideological overtones, with Germans priding themselves on the

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defense of their uniquely valuable civilization, which they considered to be threatened by the plutocratic-democratic West. Germany's rulers in World War I thought more frequently in terms of race than is usually recognized: to give only one example, Foreign Secretary Jagow sometimes referred to the Russian danger as arising from the "Slavic Mongolian race" of the Russian people (p. 243). Some of Germany's rulers thought of coping with this danger by the notorious proposal of annexing a broad strip of Polish land, expelling its Polish and Jewish population, and settling it with Germans to create a "Germanic protective wall" against Slavs and Mongols. There was thought of "calling home" the Volga and Balkan Germans to provide the necessary manpower for this settlement, exactly as Hitler called home the Baltic Germans in 1939. Occupied countries were in both wars milked ruthlessly for the benefit of Germany's war effort, while a bad precedent was set for later Nazi measures by the shooting of Belgian hostages in 1914 and the deportation of 120,000 Belgian laborers in 1916. Germany's ruthless conduct toward its allies in the Second World War (Italy, Hungary, Rumania) was anticipated by its callousness toward Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey in the First. The list of parallels could easily be extended—yet a proper evaluation requires that they be balanced by considering the fundamental differences that existed between Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany.

Bethmann (despite Fischer's thesis) blundered into the First World War; Hitler deliberately started the Second (the opinion of A. J. P. Taylor notwithstanding). Hitler gloated over the invasion of Poland; Bethmann apologized for the regrettable necessity of invading Belgium. The defense of a distinctively German civilization sounded somewhat differently when it came from Ernst Troeltsch rather than from Josef Goebbels. Jagow *talked* about the alien Russian race; Himmler acted to destroy large segments of it. Bethmann acquiesced in plans to expel Jews from a Polish border strip; Hitler killed millions of Jews in the gas ovens of Auschwitz. Ludendorff insisted upon the deportation of Belgian laborers to eliminate unemployment behind the German lines and to meet a specific labor shortage in the Ruhr; Sauckel deported millions of slave laborers in what was clearly viewed as a permanent measure. The Hegelian dictum that differences in quantity become differences in quality surely applies to 1914 and 1939: yet there remains a sufficient residue of disturbing continuity to remind us how deeply the roots of Nazism were implanted in German history.

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VIII

These are but a few historical perspectives raised by Fischer's *Griff nach der Weltmacht.* The importance of the book lies partly in its new information, partly in its challenging interpretation of Germany's overall ambitions in the First World War. Both combine to make it the most significant book about wartime Germany since Arthur Rosenberg's great *Birth of the German Republic* (Berlin 1928). The importance of Fischer's new materials cannot be questioned even by those who dissent from his interpretation. This reviewer believes that the overall thesis of a German drive for European hegemony and world power is essentially convincing, although Fischer ascribes too much rational purposiveness to German statesmanship. His view of the deliberateness of German policy before 1914 and during the July 1914 crisis is doubtful; his view of the homogeneity of German leadership, and consequent denial of fundamental conflicts between Germany's civilian and military chiefs, cannot be sustained; his revision of the traditional Bethmann picture goes too far; while the question of continuity between 1914 and 1939 is too complex to be settled in a brief epilogue (or review article). These qualifications and criticisms do not, however, impair the validity of Fischer's thesis that German policy during the First World War constituted a case of hegemonial striving within the framework of the traditional European state system, based upon a competitive equilibrium; and that the emergence of a new "world political system" inevitably made European hegemony the basis for world power. Germany constituted a threat to the European equilibrium by its objective political, military, and economic strength, and its conduct conformed to what could be expected of a hegemonial power. The fact that many of Germany's leaders did not consciously and deliberately strive for hegemony was irrelevant to the unfolding of historical events; but Fischer succeeds in showing that most groups in Germany's influential strata *did* support a program whose inevitable goal was the achievement of world power (whether they realized this or not).

Fischer has, of course, no intention of passing a moral indictment against the German people as a whole—though it is to be feared that some of his readers will pounce upon his materials to corroborate an *a priori* prejudice against the "eternally wicked German." Fischer is keenly aware that his analysis of German "hegemonial imperialism" deals with a strictly *historical* phenomenon that has lost all relevance for the understanding of contemporary Germany. The reader of his

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book is struck, indeed, by the enormous difference between Germany's external and internal position during the First World War and now. In 1914-1918 Germany was an independent military colossus aiming at domination of Europe from the Flemish coast to the Caucasus; today Germany is a partitioned country with sharply curtailed frontiers, and the continued existence of each part is tied indissolubly to international alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pacts). The Germany of the First World War was notorious for its monarchical autocracy, extreme militarism, and nationalist imperialism. The Hohenzollern monarchy has been replaced by a viable democracy in the West and a Communist satellite regime in the East. Militarism has lost its domestic appeal, with rearmament after 1949 constituting a reluctant adaptation to international pressures and arousing much popular opposition (overt in the West, furtive in the East). Nationalist imperialism is a burnt-out flame that has become not merely an anachronism but positively ridiculous in its few surviving specimens. The repudiation of nationalism has, indeed, gone so far that even simple patriotism—the healthy core of the nationalist disease—is at a heavy discount and too many West Germans are more absorbed in personal economic advance than in public-spirited concern about the lot of suffering fellow-nationals in East Germany.

The reception given to Fischer's book in West Germany is of itself an interesting symptom of how much Germany has changed in the last generation. No German professor in the Weimar Republic could have published this kind of book without provoking unanimous execration as a traitor who was sabotaging Germany's good fight against the "war guilt lie." Professor Fischer has, on the contrary, received several respectful reviews from such leading journals as *Die Zeit, Der Spiegel,* and *Der Monat.*[11] Men like Professor Ludwig Dehio[12] had prepared the way for the reception of Fischer's major theme: that Germany's twentieth-century striving for a hegemonial position—first in Europe, then in the world—constituted an intrinsically utopian policy that deserves condemnation (morality apart) on the "prudential" ground that

[11] There have, of course, also been some outcries from the "incorrigible" elements within the German historical profession, some of whose older members have been marked for life by their passionate absorption in the campaign against the "war guilt lie" in the interwar years. A notorious example is a review by Erwin Hoelzle in *Das Historisch-politische Buch,* x (1962), 65-69, which scores some telling scholarly points but is deplorable in its overall tone. Fischer's "one-sided" emphasis upon German annexationism is described as approximating "the monologue of a madman," and Hoelzle accuses him of national masochism because he forgets that "one owes justice to one's own country as well as to other nations"!

[12] Ludwig Dehio, *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich 1955).

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it obviously exceeded Germany's resources. It has, indeed, become something of a commonplace in West Germany that the political role appropriate to Germany's strength, position, and finer traditions is a loyal partnership in a Europe more conscious of a common cultural legacy than divisive nationalism. It is clearly a case of the owl of Minerva fluttering only in the dusk!

Fischer himself has made a valuable intellectual contribution to Germany's full integration into Western Europe by repudiating several notions still too prevalent in the German historical consciousness, such as the innocuous character of German policy in 1914 and the view of the First World War as a primarily defensive struggle against a jealous ring of enemies. His book constitutes a rare combination of Herculean research, a challenging thesis, and deep political wisdom—and I believe that even his exaggerations fall into the category of "fruitful errors" since they compel a systematic reevaluation of traditional views of German policy in World War I.

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